# The Works of Aristotle, Vol. XII: Select Fragments - Author: Aristotle - Source: Internet Archive item `worksofaristotle12arisuoft` (https://archive.org/details/worksofaristotle12arisuoft) - Note: OCR plain text from a scanned public-domain edition; minor OCR artifacts may remain. --- 1 LU _D 1 o III^MM 1 1 n = = m ^-=o m p~ f THE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH UNDER THE EDITORSHIP OF SIR DAVID ROSS VOLUME XII SELECT FRAGMENTS OXFORD AT THE CLARENDON PRESS i952 Oxford University Press, Amen House, London E.C. 4 GLASGOW NEW YORK TORONTO MELBOURNE WELLINGTON BOMBAY CALCUTTA MADRAS CAPE TOWN Geoffrey Cumberlege, Publisher to the University PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN PREFACE It was suggested to me many years ago by Prof. A. E. Taylor that a translation of some of the fragments of Aristotle's lost works would be a useful addition to the Oxford Translation of the extant works. I then thought that I had enough on my hands without this addition. In the interval, however, interest in the fragments has been quickened by the pioneer work of such scholars as Prof. Jaeger, Prof. Bignone, and Prof. Wilpert, and many passages not included in Rose's editions of the fragments have been recognized as being derived from Aristotle's lost works. A translation of the whole of the fragments included by Rose would not be of much general interest, and I have thought it best to limit this selection to three of the sections in his editions — the dialogues, the logical works, and the philosophical works. The references in the notes to this trans- lation are to the page and line of Rose's Teubner edition. At the same time I have included many other passages which have been with probability assigned to Aristotle by the scholars named above and others. I must in particular express my indebtedness to Dr. R. Walzer, who has not only published a useful edition of some of the fragments, but has called my attention to others which would otherwise have escaped my notice, and has lent me some useful books and articles. It is not intended to make any further addition to the Oxford Translation of Aristotle. W. D. R. TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION VII DIALOGUES I-I02 Gryllus, or On Rhetoric 7 Symposium 8-14 Sophistes 15 Eudemus, or On Soul 16-23 Nerinthus 24 Eroticus 25-26 Protrepticus 27-56 On Wealth 57 On Prayer 58 On Good Birth 59-62 On Pleasure 63 On Education 64 On Kingship 65-66 Alexander 67 Politicus 68-71 On Poets 72-77 On Philosophy 78-99 On Justice 100-2 LOGICAL WORKS 103-14 On Problems 104 Divisions 105 Dissertations 106 Categories 107-8 On Contraries 109-14 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS H5-49 On the Good 115-23 On Ideas 124-33 On the Pythagoreans 134-46 On the Philosophy of A rchytas 147 On Democritus 148-9 CONTENTS AUTHORS QUOTED ROSE'S NUMBERING OF FRAGMENTS BIBLIOGRAPHY INDEX 150 155 156 l6l INTRODUCTION The oldest lists of Aristotle's works that have come down to us from antiquity are those written by Diogenes Laertius, in the third century a.d., and by Hesychius, probably in the fifth. A strong case has been made out by E. Howald1 for the view that both lists rest on the good authority of Hermippus (about 200 B.C.). Diogenes' list begins as follows: On Justice, 4 books2 On Poets, 3 books3 On Philosophy, 3 books4 Politicus, 2 books5 On Rhetoric, or Gryllus, 1 book6 Nerinthns, 1 book Sophistes, 1 book Menexenus, 1 book Eroticus, 1 book Symposium, 1 book7 On Wealth, 1 book Protrepticus, 1 book On Soul,8 1 book On Prayer, 1 book On Good Birth,9 1 book 1 In Hermes, 1920, 204-21. 2 Cicero, p. 100 infra, refers to its four books; Suetonius, p. 100 infra, refers to the first book. 3 Diogenes Laertius, p. 73 infra, refers to book 1 ; Macrobius, p. 75 infra, to book 2 ; Ps.-Plutarch, p. 76 infra, to book 3. 4 Hesychius says '4 books'; Syrianus, p. 83 infra, refers to book 2; Philodemus, p. 78 infra, and Cicero, p. 97 infra, refer to book 3. 5 ttoXi.ti.kov a jS 4 MSS. of Diogenes; -nepl ttoXltikov i MS. of Diogenes; ■noXniKov a Hesychius. Syrianus, p. 68 infra, refers to the second book. 6 '3 books', Hesychius. 7 From pp. n-14 infra we may infer that this work was also known as the work On Drunkenness. 8 We learn from Plutarch, pp. 16, 18 infra, and from Simplicius, p. 21 infra, that this was also called Eudemus. 9 Plutarch says, p. 60 infra, that the genuineness of this work is doubtful, viii INTRODUCTION On Pleasure, i book Alexander, or On Colonists,1 i book On Kingship, i book On Education, i book. The list goes on to On the Good, 3 books From Plato's Laws, 3 books From the Republic, 2 books On Economy, 1 book On Friendship , 1 book, and so on. It is clear that the first nineteen works in Diogenes' list formed for him a separate group, arranged according to the number of books each work contained, and that from it he went on to a second group similarly arranged. The same nineteen works appear at the beginning of Hesychius' list, except that the Alexander appears a little later and its place is taken by the Economicus. Some of these works are known to have been dialogues. The works On Poets, On Philosophy, and On Soul (or Eudemus) are explicitly so described by ancient authors.2 The form of Politicus fr. 1, Eudemus fr. 6, and On Good Birth frs. 1, 2, 4 shows that these were dialogues. Themistius' reference to 'the Corinthian dialogue'3 is usually taken to refer to the Nerinthus. The Historia Augusta says that Cicero's Horten- sius was modelled on the Protrepticus* and as the Hortensius was a dialogue5 the Protrepticus was probably one too. There is thus good evidence that several of the nineteen works that stand at the head of Diogenes' and Hesychius' lists were dialogues ; it may be inferred with high probability, though not with certainty, that the others were so too. but Stobaeus, pp. 59, 61 infra, and Athenaeus, p. 61 infra, confirm its genuineness. 1 Diogenes has vnep dnoiKcvv, Hesychius vnep dnoiKia>v, which is more probable. But if, as is likely, inep is used in the sense of 'about', the sub- title probably does not go back to Aristotle, who rarely uses vnep in this sense. 2 For On Poets, see p. 72 infra ; for On Philosophy, pp. 78, 82 infra ; for the Eudemus, pp. 19-22 infra. 3 See p. 24 infra. 4 See p. 27 infra. 5 See pp. 41, 42, 46 infra. INTRODUCTION ix It seems probable that Aristotle began with short dialogues called (on the Platonic model) by one-word names (three of which are actually identical with the names of Platonic dialogues), that from these he proceeded to works which were still dialogues but began to have something of the character of treatises and are therefore designated as 'on' so-and-so, and later still went on to the large works containing more than one book. Thus we get, tentatively, three groups : i. Menexenus, Symposium, Sophistes, Nerinthus, Eroticus, Gryllus, Eudemus, Protrepticus, Alexander. 2. On Wealth, On Prayer, On Good Birth, On Pleasure, On Kingship, On Education. 3. Politicus, On Poets, On Philosophy, On Justice. Before we make any further attempt to date the dialogues, it is necessary to have in mind the various periods of Aris- totle's life. From his eighteenth year to his thirty-seventh (367-348/7) he was a member of the school of Plato at Athens. The next five years he spent partly at Assos, in Mysia, and partly at Mitylene, in Lesbos. From 343/2 to about 340 he was in Macedonia, tutoring Alexander the Great, and for about five years thereafter he was pursuing his studies in his native town, Stagira. From 335/4 till his death in 323 he was actively engaged as the head of his own school, the Lyceum, in Athens. We must make one alteration in our tentative grouping. The work Alexander, or On Colonists, is, as Jaeger has pointed out, suitable only to the time at which Alexander was en- gaged in setting up colonies in Asia, from (say) 331 B.C. onwards, while the work On Kingship (also addressed to Alexander) can most suitably be dated at or before Alexan- der's succession to the throne in 336. Thus the work Alexander must be removed from the first group, and placed later than On Kingship in the second group. The Gryllus must be dated after the death of Gryllus at the battle of Mantinea in 362/1, 1 but probably not very long after it. It may therefore well be the earliest of all Aristotle's works ; it is worth while to note that he had a model for it 1 See p. 7 infra. x INTRODUCTION in Plato's Gorgias.1 The Eudemus must be dated after, but probably not long after, the death of Eudemus in 354/3. Thus these two works, at least, probably belong to the time of Aristotle's membership of the Academy, while the work On Kingship and the Alexander belong to the period 343-331. The date of the Protrepticus has been examined by B. Einarson and by P. Von der Muhll in the articles mentioned in our bibliography. On the basis of connexions between the dialogue and Isocrates' Antidosis, Einarson has argued for a date shortly after, and Von der Muhll for a date shortly before, 353, and it is likely that one or other of these scholars is right. The work On Philosophy, in which Aristotle vigorously attacked Plato's theory of Ideas, must have been written after Plato's death and Aristotle's withdrawal from the Academy. With regard to the rest of the dialogues we cannot be certain whether they were written during or after Aristotle's membership of the Academy; but it is probable that most of them were written during it ; for the remaining twenty-five years of his life are none too long to serve for the task of founding and directing the Peripatetic school, and of composing the vast fabric of the complete works that have survived to our day, and the very many lost works other than dialogues that are named in the ancient lists of his works. There is an important point of form in which some of Aristotle's dialogues differed from Plato's. Plato never ap- pears as a speaker in any of his dialogues. Cicero in one passage2 speaks of 'the Aristotelian plan, in which the parts are so assigned to others that the writer himself has the principal part'. But in another passage3 he describes his own De Oratore as Aristotelian in method, though he is not in that work the chief speaker. Aristotle's practice, therefore, must have varied. The only dialogue in which it is certain that he must have appeared as a speaker himself is the Politicus, in which Cicero says expressly4 that he did so. But there are phrases in fragments from the Eudemus5 and the work On 1 As he had for the Eudemus in the Phaedo, and for the Protrepticus in the Euthydemus. z Att. 13. 19. 4, p. 3 infra. 3 Fam. 1. 9. 23, p. 3 infra. 4 Q- Fr- 3- 5- J» P- 68 infra. s fr. 2, p. 17 infra. INTRODUCTION xi Philosophy1 which suggest that there too Aristotle appeared in person. In his Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus and in his Berlin edition of the fragments Rose included the work On Kingship and the Alexander among the dialogues (for him, the pseudo- Aristotelian dialogues), but in his Teubner edition he places these works partly among the speeches and partly among the letters ; in the latter case his ground seems to have been the occurrence of the phrase tGsv amearahcoroiv (' the senders ') in an extract from Strabo.2 In this he was mistaken. Diogenes expressly distinguishes these two works, which come in the first section of his list of Aristotle's works, from the four volumes of letters to Alexander, which come near the end of the list ; and Hesychius places the two works near the be- ginning of his list, but the letters to Alexander among the pseudographa at the end of his life. The phrase 'the senders' proves nothing ; a dialogue, no less than a letter, might have been sent to Alexander. The pseudo-Ammonius distinguishes the two works in question from the letters,3 and describes the work On Kingship as a single- volume book ;4 and Cicero also calls it a book.5 Rose includes among the dialogues the work On the Good and the Magicus. But there is ample evidence that the former was not a dialogue, but Aristotle's record of Plato's famous lectures on the Good. As for the Magicus, Suidas s.v. 'AvTLoOevrjs says that some people assign it to Aristotle, but he himself assigns it to Antisthenes; it occurs nowhere in Diogenes' list, and in Hesychius' list only at the end, in a list of works which he describes as spurious. Of the works other than dialogues included in our selection, the most important were those On the Good and On Ideas. The former was Aristotle's record of the lectures in which Plato unfolded the latest phase of his theory of Ideas, the theory of Ideal numbers ; and every fragment of it that we possess is of interest as helping to give us some understanding of that mysterious theory. Again, the researches of Jaeger and Wilpert have shown that the criticism of the ideal theory 1 frs. 10, ii, pp. 82, 83 infra. 2 p. 67 injra. 3 p. 65 injra. 4 p. 65 injra. 5 p. 65 injra. xii INTRODUCTION in Metaphysics A. 9 is in all probability based on an earlier and much fuller criticism in the work On Ideas, which, with the work On Philosophy, formed Aristotle's earliest expres- sion of his breakaway from the Platonic system. Wilpert has been able to show that much more of On the Good and On Ideas (and also of On the Pythagoreans) can be recovered from the pages of the Greek commentators on Aristotle than had previously been recognized. The best existing commentary on the Eudemus, the Pro- trepticus, and the work On Philosophy is to be found in Jaeger's Aristoteles. The ransacking of ancient literature to find fragments of Aristotle has been carried further by E. Bignone in many articles catalogued in our Bibliography, and in his massive work L'Aristotele Perdnto e la Formazione Filosofica di Epicnro. It is doubtful whether Greek or Latin literature has much more to yield in this kind. More is to be expected from the still unexplored field of Arabic literature on philosophy, and here a beginning has been made by R. Walzer (see pp. 23, 26 infra), who has also published a scholarly text of the fragments of the Eudemus, the Protrepticus, and the work On Philosophy. In our numbering of the fragments, 'R2' refers to Rose's Berlin edition, ' R3 ' to his Leipzig edition, ' W ' to Walzer's edition. In the notes on readings, ' R ' refers to Rose's Leipzig edition. DIALOGUES TESTIMONIA Arist. Ph. i94a35~36: see p. 99 infra. Arist. De An. 404bi8-2i: see p. 83 infra. Arist. Poet. I454bi5-i8. All these rules one must keep in mind throughout, and further, those also for such points of stage-effect as directly depend on the art of the poet, since in these, too, one may often make mistakes. Enough, however, has been said on the subject in our published writings.1 Cic. Inv. 2. 2. 6. Aristotle so greatly excelled in charm and brevity of speech the inventors of rhetoric themselves, that no one knows their precepts from their own books, but all who wish to understand their precepts return to him as to an expositor much more suited to their needs. Cic. De Or. 1. n. 49. For this reason, if the natural philosopher Democritus was eloquent (as is commonly held and as I myself think), while his matter was that of a natural philo- sopher his eloquence must be deemed to be that of an orator. And if Plato has, as I admit, spoken like a god about matters far removed from political controversy — if Aristotle, Theo- phrastus, and Carneades were, on the subjects they discussed, eloquent, charming, and polished in their language — then, though the subjects they discuss belong to other studies, their language itself belongs to this single art which we are speaking about and inquiring into. Ibid. 3. 21. 80. But if anyone ever comes forward who can, in the Aristotelian manner, put forward both sides on every subject, and can with knowledge of Aristotle's precepts 1 i.e. in the dialogue On Pods. 645.29 B 2 FRAGMENTS develop two contrary speeches on every question, or who can in the manner of Arcesilaus and Carneades argue against any proposition that is put forward, and who adds to that method this practice and training in speaking, let us agree that he is the true, the perfect, the only orator. Cic. Brut. 31. 120-1. For this reason I approve all the more of your judgement, Brutus, in following the Academic school, in whose doctrine and precepts methodical discussion is united with charm and fluency of speech ; although that very practice of the Peripatetics and Academics in the matter of speaking is such that, while there cannot be a perfect orator without it, it does not by itself make a perfect orator. For as the language of the Stoics is too terse and a little too much compressed to appeal to the ears of the public, so the lan- guage of those others is too free and expansive for the prac- tice of the courts and the forum. Who is richer in style than Plato ? The philosophers say Jove speaks so, if he speaks Greek. Who is more sinewy than Aristotle, more charming than Theophrastus ? Cic. Top. 1. 3. The obscurity of Aristotle's Topics has re- pelled you ; and the great rhetorician replied, I fancy, that he did not know the works of Aristotle. I have, indeed, been very little surprised that a rhetorician did not know a philo- sopher who is unknown to philosophers themselves, all but a very few; for which they are the less to be pardoned because they ought to have been attracted not only by the things he has said and discovered, but also by the incredible fluency and charm of his style. Cic. Fin. 5. 5. 12. Since there are two kinds of books, one written in popular style, and called by them exoteric, and another more precise kind which they left in the form of treatises, Aristotle and Theophrastus seem not to be always consistent with themselves on the subject of the supreme good. Cic. Lucullus 38. 119 (Plasberg): see p. 92 infra. DIALOGUES 3 Cic. Fam. i. 9. 23. 1 have written, therefore, in the Aristotelian manner (at least that was what I wanted to do) , three books in my discussion or dialogue On the Orator. Cic. Att. 4. 16. 2. You know the style of my dialogues. ... I have put into the mouths of Africanus, Philus, Laelius, and Manilius the discussion On the State which I have started; I have added some young men. . . . And so I planned, in having a preface in each book, as Aristotle does in the books which he calls exoteric, to do something that would justify me in appealing to him — which I believe will please you; heaven grant that I may complete my effort ! Ibid. 13. 19. 3-4. If I had represented Cotta and Varro as disputing with one another, as your last letter advises me to do, my role would have been a silent one. This has a good effect when characters from antiquity are introduced ; Hera- clides has used the device in many works, and we have done so in our six books On the State. There are also three books of ours On the Orator which I think very highly of ; in those, too, the persons are such that it was right for me to be silent. . . . I am supposed to be a boy when that dialogue starts, so that I could have no part of my own. But what I have now written follows the Aristotelian plan, in which the parts are so assigned to others that the writer himself has the principal part. I have completed in this manner five books On Ends. Cic. Q. Fr. 3. 5. 1 : see p. 68 infra. Quint. 10. 1. 83. What shall I say of Aristotle? I doubt whether I admire him more for his knowledge, for the copiousness of his writings, for the charm of his language, for his keenness of invention, or for the wide range of his works. Dio Chr. Or. 53. 1. Indeed Aristotle himself, from whom they say criticism and grammar took their origin, discusses the poet in several dialogues, for the most part admiring and honouring him. 4 FRAGMENTS Plu. M or. 447 f-448 a. Why is it that in philosophical in- quiries the process of being led by others and often changing one's ground is not always painful, and that Aristotle him- self, Democritus, and Chrysippus gave up without fuss or ill-feeling, and indeed with pleasure, some of their former opinions? It is because no passion opposes the part of the soul that contemplates and learns ; in such cases the irrational part remains calm and does not concern itself, so that reason willingly turns towards the truth when it appears, and abandons what is untrue. Ibid. 1115 b-c. With regard to the Ideas, about which Aris- totle chides Plato, misrepresenting them completely and bringing every possible objection against them, in his ethical works, in his metaphysical works, in his physical works, in his popular dialogues, he seemed to some to be polemical rather than philosophical in his attitude towards this doc- trine, as though his object was to belittle the Platonic philo- sophy ; so far was he from following it. Diog. Oen. fr. 4, col. 1. 7-col. 2. 8. When they say that things cannot be apprehended, what else are they saying than that we ought not to study nature ; who will choose to look for what he can never find? Aristotle and the members of his school say nothing can be known, since owing to the mere speed of their fluxion things escape our apprehension. Eus. P.E. 14. 6. 9-10. Cephisodorus, when he saw his master Isocrates being attacked by Aristotle, was ignorant of and unversed in Aristotle himself, but, seeing the repute which Plato's views enjoyed, he thought that Aristotle was follow- ing Plato; so he waged war on Aristotle but was really attacking Plato. His criticism began with the Ideas and finished with the other doctrines — things which he himself did not know; he was only guessing at the meaning of the opinions held about them. This Cephisodorus was not fight- ing the person he was attacking, but was fighting the person he did not wish to attack.1 1 i.e. not Aristotle but Plato. DIALOGUES 5 Them. Or. 319 c. And so Aristotle's popular works, which are meant for the multitude, are full of light and translucent ; their usefulness is not unmixed with enjoyment and pleasure ; Aphrodite and the Graces blossom on them. Basil, Ep. 135. Even of secular philosophers those who wrote dialogues, Aristotle and Theophrastus, at once got to grips with the facts, because they were conscious of their lack of the Platonic graces. Amm. in Cat. 6. 25-27. 4. We say that the Philosopher has evidently expressed his views in different ways. In the acroamatic works he is, as regards the thought, terse, com- pressed, and full of questions, and as regards the language quite ordinary, owing to his search for precise truth and clearness ; he sometimes even invents words if necessary. In the dialogues, which he has written for the many, he aims at a certain fullness, a careful choice of diction and metaphor, and modifies the style of his diction to suit the speakers, and in short does everything that can beautify his style. Simp, in Cat. 4. 14. Of the general works, some are hypo- mnematic, viz. those which the philosopher put together to aid his own memory and with a view to submitting them to further testing. . . . 19-20. Alexander1 says these works have been hastily put together and do not aim at one end; for which reason, and to distinguish them from these, he says the others are called systematic. Of these some are in dialogue form, while in others Aristotle speaks in his own person. Simp, in De Caelo 288. 31-289. 2. By 'popular philosophical discussions ' Aristotle means those originally intended for the many, which we are wont also to call exoteric, as we call the more serious books acroamatic and systematic ; Aristotle speaks of this in the books On Philosophy. Eli as in Cat. 114. 15. In some of his systematic works Aris- totle speaks in his own person (and these are also called 1 i.e. of Aphrodisias. 6 FRAGMENTS acroamatic), while others are in dialogue form, and are also called exoteric. The former class, as being works in which he speaks in his own person, are opposed to the dialogues, and as being acroamatic they are opposed to the exoteric works. For, wishing to benefit all men, Aristotle wrote both in his own person, for philosophical students ... 22 and in dialogue form, for those who were not. In the acroamatic works, since he was addressing people who were prepared to think philo- sophically, he used conclusive arguments, while in the dialogues he used probable arguments 115. 3-5. Alexander mentions another difference between the acroamatic wrorks and the dialogues, that in the former Aristotle says what he thinks and what is true, while in the latter he expresses the false opinions of others. Ibid. 124. 3-6. In those of the general works which are dialogues, i.e. the exoteric works, he is clear, because he is arguing for non-philosophers, but because he is arguing among dialecticians he is versatile in his impersonations, full of Aphrodite and overflowing with the Graces. GRYLLUS, or ON RHETORIC i (r2 57 > R3 68) Diog. Laert. 2. 6. 55. Aristotle says that a host of people wrote encomia and funeral speeches on Gryllus, partly in the wish to please his father.1 2 (R2 58, R3 69) Quint. Inst. 2. 17. 1. Let us pass, then, to the question that follows, whether rhetoric is an art. This . . . was not doubted by any of those who have handed down rules for oratory. . . . With these most of the Stoic and the Peripatetic philosophers agree. ... 4. I, for my part, think that those who argued against this were not so much saying what they really thought as wishing to exercise their wits by dealing with a difficult subject. ... 5. Some want rhetoric to be a natural gift. ... 7. They maintain that nothing which proceeds from art can have existed before the art did . . . 11. that that which a man does without learning co do it has nothing to do with art, but that even men who have not learned to speak do speak. ... 14. Aristotle, according to his wont, from sheer love of inquiry worked out in the Gryllus some argu- ments which show his usual subtlety. But he also wrote three books on the art of rhetoric, and in the first of them admits that rhetoric is not merely an art; he assigned to it an element of political science, as well as one of dialectic. 3 (r2 133, r3 139) Ibid. 3. 1. 13. The most famous of Gorgias' disciples was Isocrates — although the authorities are not agreed on the question who Isocrates' teacher was ; but we believe Aristotle. 1 i.e. Xenophon. SYMPOSIUM TESTIMONIA Plu. Mor. 612 d-e. To forget entirely what has been said and done in wine seems not only to conflict with the reputed tendency of the table to promote friendliness, but also to have the witness of the most famous philosophers against it — Plato, Xenophon, Aristotle, and Speusippus, Epicurus, Prytanis, Hieronymus, and Dion the Academic, who have thought it worth some trouble to record sayings made at the wine-table. Macrob. Sat. 7. 3. 23. I advise you at your feasts . . . either to propound or yourselves to resolve questions suit- able to the occasion. This kind of thing the ancients were so far from thinking ridiculous that both Aristotle and Plutarch and your Apuleius wrote on such ques- tions. I1 (R2 175, R3I00) Ath. 178 e-f. Homer, exact in all things, did not omit even this small thing, that we ought to tend and wash our poor bodies before going to a meal. At least he says of Odysseus that before the feast at the Phaeacian court 'The house- keeper straightway bade him bathe'.2 And of Telemachus' companions he says, 'They went to the polished baths and bathed'.3 For it was unbecoming, as Aristotle says, to go to the drinking-party covered with sweat and dust ; a man of taste, as Heraclitus says, should not be slovenly or unwashed or delight in mire. 1 R3's fr. 99 is omitted because, even if Nauck's emendation ApiaroriXovs is right, there is no reason for supposing the passage to refer to Aristotle's Symposium. 2 Od. 8. 449 3 Od. 4. 48. SYMPOSIUM 9 2 (r2 08, r3 ioi) Ath. 674 e-675 a. Sappho )ids those who do sacrifice to be crowned with chaplets, as being something gayer and more pleasing to the gods. And Aristotle in his Symposium says that we offer nothing mutilated to the gods, but things perfect and whole ; now that which is complete is perfect, and garlanding oneself signifies a sort of completion. Homer says 'The young men crowned the bowls with wine',1 and 'The god crowns his beauty with words ' ;2 those who are unshapely in aspect, he means, are made good by the charm of speech. This, then, is what the garland seems to mean. Accordingly on occasions of grief we arrange things in the opposite way ; in fellow-feeling for the departed we disfigure ourselves by cutting our hair and giving up our garlands. Cf. Schol. in Theocr. 3. 21. 3 (R2 98, R3 102) Ath. 40 c-d. Seleucus says it was the ancient custom not to take wine, beyond the ordinary, or to enjoy any other luxury, except in honour of the gods. It was for this reason that they used the words 'festivity', 'feast', and 'drunken- ness' ; the first because they thought it was in honour of the gods that we ought to drink wine, the second because it was in honour of the gods that they assembled and came together (this is what Homer's 'rich feast'3 means), while drunken- ness, Aristotle says, is so called because it is the taking of wine after sacrifices to the gods.4 Philo, De Plant. 34. 141. What the lawgiver said about drunkenness we shall later see precisely ; let us now examine5 what others thought. The question was much debated by many of the philosophers, and is propounded thus: 'Will the wise man get drunk ? ' ' Getting drunk ' has two meanings ; 1 II. 1. 470. 2 Od. 8. 170. 3 Od. 3. 420, etc. 4 The common element is the theta in deos, Boivq, OaXia, dvetv, fiedvaw 5 Reading in R. 99. 13 i$epewqa(ofiev, with Cohn and Wendland. io FRAGMENTS in one it is equivalent to being in wine ; in the other to being silly when in wine. Of those who attacked the problem, some said the wise man would neither drink too much strong drink nor become maudlin. ... 35. 144. The others declared that being in wine was becoming even to a good man, while being maudlin was not. ... 38. 154. Unmixed drink the ancients called not only wine but also liquor; at all events the name is often used in poetry, so that if synonyms ('wine' and 'liquor') are names for a single thing, words derived from them (' being in wine ' and ' being in liquor ') will differ only in sound1. . . . 155. If the good man is to be in wine, he will also get drunk. . . . 156. We have mentioned one argu- ment to show that the wise man will get drunk ; the second is as follows. . . . 39. 160. My purpose has been to show that people do not now take strong drink in the way the ancients did. . . . 161. Our fathers began every good work with sacred rites, thinking that so the result would be most propitious, because they had begun with prayer and sacrifice ; and even if the need for action was urgent, still they waited, thinking that more haste is sometimes less speed. Speed without fore- sight was, they thought, harmful, while leisureliness with good hope for the future was advantageous. Knowing, then, that even2 the enjoyment and use of wine needs much care, they did not take strong drink to their fill3 nor at all times, but in fitting manner and in due season. They first prayed and offered sacrifices and propitiated the divine power, and purified their bodies and souls, the former with baths and the latter with the streams of laws and right education, and then turned, cheerful and rejoicing, to a relaxed way of life ; they often did not return to their homes but continued4 in the temples in which they had sacrificed, so that, remem- bering the sacrifices and respecting the place, they might feast in the manner most befitting to a sacred place, erring neither in word nor in action. It is from this, indeed, that ' Reading in R. 99. 23-24 £nep6fi€vov, o>ot' el to. ovvajvvfiovvTa ko.9' evos vnoKfifievov Xeyerai, olvos Kal fieOv, Kal ra dno tovtwv ovoev on. fj.rj u>vats Sioiaei fxovov, to re olvovaOai, Kal to pedveiv [ev], with Cohn and Wendland. 2 Reading in R. 100. 8 ort *at 17, with Cohn and Wendland. 3 Reading in R. 100. 9 dbrju, with Cohn and Wendland. 4 Reading in R. 100. 16 BiaTeXovvres, with Cohn and Wendland. SYMPOSIUM ii they say getting drunk gets its name, because it was the custom of our forefathers to take wine after sacrifice.1 To whom, then, could the manner we have described of using strong drink be more fitting than to wise men, to whom2 the sacrifice that precedes the drinking is also fitting ? For one might almost say that no bad man really performs the sacred rites, even if without cessation he brings ten thousand oxen to the altar every day. For the most necessary sacrifice, his mind, is blemished, and it is not lawful for blemished persons to touch the altar. This is the second argument. ... 40. 165-6. The third depends3 on a different guess at the etymology. Some people think that drunkenness is so called not only because it is achie' xl after sacrifice, but also because it causes relaxation ot soul.4 Now when the reasoning of the foolish is relaxed, tho.. leads to the strengthening of many errors, but when that of the wise is relaxed, it leads to the enjoyment of relaxation, contentment, and cheerfulness. For a wise man who has taken wine becomes sweeter-tempered than he was when sober, so that in this respect too5 we should make no mistake in saying that he will get drunk. Cf. Plu. Mor. 503 e-504 b. 4 (R299, R3I03) Apollon. Mirab. 25 (Keller). Aristotle in his book on drunkenness says that Andron of Argos, though he ate many salty and dry foods, remained all through his life without thirst and without drink. Besides, he twice travelled to Ammon through the desert, eating dry barley-groats but taking no liquid. Cf. Ath. 44 d, Diog. Laert. 9. 11. 81, Sext. Emp. Pyrr. 1. 84. 1 fiedveiv = fieTa-\-dveiv ! 2 Omitting vvv in R. 100. 22, with Cohn and Wendland. 3 Reading in R. 100. 28-101. 2 tPItos . . . ijprT^eVos, with Cohn and Wend- land. 4 fiedri-fiedeois. 5 Reading in R. 101. 8 oib' av ravrr), with Cohn and Wendland. 12 FRAGMENTS 5 (r2 ioo, r3 104) Ath. 641 d-e. Aristotle in his book on drunkenness calls1 these, as we do, second tables, in these words: 'We must consider that a sweetmeat differs entirely from food, as much as2 an eatable differs from a "sucket" (the old Greek name for a sweetmeat when it is served as dessert) ;3 so that the first person to speak of "second tables" seems to have been justified; for the eating of sweets is a sort of extra dinner, and a sweet course forms a second meal.' Ibid. 641 b. Aristotle in his book on drunkenness says that sweetmeats were called by our ancestors suckets ; they were a kind of extra dinner. Cf. Schol. in Aristoph. Pacem 1. 772. 6 (r22i8, r3io5) Ps.-Jul. Ep. 391 b-c. The fig is not only pleasant to the taste, but also better for the digestion. It is so useful to man- kind that Aristotle even calls it an antidote to every poison, and says it is just for that reason that at meals4 it is served both as an hors-d'ceuvre5 and as dessert, as though it were being wrapped round the iniquities of the food in preference to any other sacred antidote. And indeed that the fig is dedicated to the gods, is placed on the altar in every sacrifice, and is a better incense than any frankincense, this is not my account only; anyone who has learned its use knows that this is the account any wise man skilled in sacred rites would give. 7 (r2ioi, r3io6) Ath. 447 a-b. As Aristotle says in his book on drunkenness, those who have drunk the barley liquor called beer fall on 1 Reading in R. 102. 9 Trpoaayopevei, with Kaibel. 2 Reading in R. 102. 11 oaov, with the MSS. 3 Omitting ra ^pw^ara in R. 102. 12 with Kaibel. 4 Reading in R. 102. 26 xav rots Selnvois, with Hercher. 5 Reading in R. 102. 27 -npo-napaTideadai, with Hercher. SYMPOSIUM 13 their backs; he says: 'The liquor made from barley called beer has a certain peculiarity ; people who are intoxicated by other liquors fall in all sorts of directions — to the left, to the right, on their faces, on their backs ; only those who are intoxicated with beer always fall backwards and lie on their backs.' Cf. Ath. 34 b. 8 (r2 102, R3 107) Ath. 429 c-d. Aristotle in his book on drunkenness says: 'If the wine is boiled down to a moderate extent it is less intoxicating' ; the force of the liquor, he says, is weakened by the boiling down. 'The old', he adds, 'are intoxicated most quickly, owing to the scarcity and weakness of the natural heat in them. But also those who are very young are intoxicated fairly quickly because of the abundance of the inherent heat ; they are easily overcome by the added heat from the wine. Of dumb animals, too, pigs get intoxicated if they are fed with masses of pressed grapes; ravens and dogs if they eat the wine-plant ; monkeys and elephants if they drink wine. This is why they capture monkeys and ravens by intoxicating the former with wine or the latter with wine-plant.' 9 (R2 103, R3 108) Plu. Mor. 650 a. Florus was surprised at the fact that Aristotle, who has written in his book on drunkenness that old men are overtaken most easily, and women least easily, by drunkenness, did not work out the reason, a thing he was not wont to fail to do. 10 (R2 104, R3 109) Ath. 429 f. The cup called Samagoreion made from three pints mixed will, according to Aristotle, intoxicate more than forty men. i4 FRAGMENTS II (R2 IO5-6, R3IIO-Il) Ath. 464 c-d. Aristotle in his book on drunkenness says: 'The so-called Rhodian cups are introduced at drinking parties both because of the pleasure they give and because when they are heated they make the wine less intoxicating ; they are made by boiling water in which myrrh and rushes and the like have been thrown, and when they are poured into the wine the drinkers get less intoxicated.' Elsewhere he says: 'The Rhodian cups are made of myrrh, rushes, dill,1 saffron, balsam, cardamom, and cinnamon boiled together; the cup made from these2, when poured into the wine, checks intoxication, so that it even restrains people from sexual intercourse, by cooling down their spirits.' Cf. ibid. 496 f. 12 Plu. Mor. 651 f-652 a. 'I want to learn whence came our notion that wine is cold.' 'You think', said I, 'that that is our view ? ' ' Whose is it, then ? ' he said. 'Well, I remember,' said I, 'happening — not lately but quite a while ago — on a discussion of this problem by Aristotle.' 1 Reading in R. 104. 19 axolvov, avrjBov, with Wilamowitz. 2 Omitting ko.1 in R. 104. 20, with the MSS. SOPHISTES i (r2 54, r3 65) Diog. Laert. 8. 2. 57 (3). Aristotle says in the Sophisies that Empedocles first discovered rhetoric, and Zeno dialectic. Cf. ibid. 9. 5. 25 (4), and Sext. Emp. Dogm. 1. 6-7. 2 (R255, R366) Diog. Laert. 8. 2. 63 (9). Aristotle, too, says that Empedocles was free-minded and averse to all rule, since he declined the kingship which was offered him (as Xanthus says in his account of him) — no doubt because he preferred the simple life. 3 (R2 56, R3 67) Diog. Laert. 9. 8. 54 (5). The first of his books that Prota- goras read in public was that about the gods. ... He read it at Athens, in the house of Euripides, or, as some say, in that of Heraclides, while others say it was in the Lyceum; his pupil Archagoras the son of Theodotus read it for him. He was accused by Pythodorus son of Polyzelus, one of the Four Hundred ; though Aristotle says his accuser was Euathlus. EUDEMUS, or ON SOUL i (r232, r337, w i) Cic. Div. ad Brut. i. 25. 53. What ? Is the great, the almost divine, intellect of Aristotle in error, or does he wish others to fall into error, when he writes that his friend Eudemus of Cyprus while on a journey to Macedonia came to Pherae, a Thessalian town of considerable note at the time, but held in cruel subjection by the tyrant Alexander. In that town Eudemus fell so ill that all the doctors feared for his life. He dreamed that a handsome young man told him that he would soon recover, that in a few days the tyrant Alexander would die, and that in the fifth year thereafter Eudemus himself would return home. Aristotle writes that the first two predictions were fulfilled forthwith ; Eudemus recovered and the tyrant was killed by his wife's brothers. But towards the end of the fifth year, when the dream had led him to hope that he would return from Sicily to Cyprus, he died in battle at Syracuse. And so the dream had been interpreted as meaning that when Eudemus' soul had left his body, it had returned to its home. Plu. Dion 22. 3. With Dion acted many of the politicians, and of the philosophers Eudemus the Cyprian, to whom after his death Aristotle dedicated his dialogue On Soul, and Timonides the Leucadian. 2 (r233, R338, W2) Them, in De An. 106. 29-107. 5. Of the arguments that Plato used about the immortality of the soul, pretty much the greater number and the most weighty find their basis in the reason. This is true both of the argument from self-move- ment (for it was shown that only the reason is self-moved, if we take movement to mean activity), of that which assumes learning to be recollection, and of that which speaks of the EUDEMUS, or ON SOUL 17 soul's likeness to God. Of the other arguments those thought the more convincing could be without difficulty referred to the reason, and also the more convincing of those worked out by Aristotle himself in the Eudemus. From these facts it is clear that Plato, also, takes reason alone to be immortal. 3 (R233, R339> w3) Elias in Cat. 114. 25. Aristotle establishes the immortality of the soul in his acroamatic works1 as well, and there he establishes it by conclusive arguments, but in the dialogues he naturally uses probable arguments. ... 32. In his dialogues he says that the soul must be immortal because we all instinctively make libations to the departed and swear by the departed, but no one can make a libation to that which is completely non-existent, or swear by it. . . . 115. 11-12. It is chiefly in his dialogues that Aristotle seems to announce the immortality of the soul. 4 (r234, r340, W4) Procl. in Tim. 338 c. Plato joined the soul to the body immediately, cutting out all the problems about the descent of the soul. . . . d. Nor will he tell us here what happens after the departure of the soul . . . because (as I will maintain) he confines himself to what is fitting to the purpose of the dialogue, and admits here just so much of the theory of the soul as is physical, describing the soul's companionship with the body. Aristotle in emulation of him treats physically of the soul in the De Anima, saying nothing either about its descent or about its fortunes ; but in his dialogues he dealt separately with those matters and offered2 the preceding argument. 5 (r235, r34I, W5) Procl. in Remp. 2. 349. 13-26 (Kroll). The divine Aristotle, also, states the reason why the soul on coming hither from 1 i.e. scientific works representing Aristotle's teaching to the members of his school. 2 Reading in R. 47. 1 KarefiaXeTo, with Diehl. 645.29 C 18 FRAGMENTS yonder forgets the sights it saw there, but on going from here remembers yonder its experiences here. We must accept1 the argument ; for he himself says that on their journey from health to disease some people forget even the letters they had learned, but that no one ever has this experience when passing from disease to health; and that life without the body, being natural to souls, is like health, and life in the body, as being unnatural, is like disease. For there they live according to nature, but here contrary to nature ; so that it naturally results2 that souls that pass from yonder forget the things there, while souls that pass yonder from this world continue to remember the things in it. 6 (r2 40, r3 44, w 6) Plu. Mor. 115 b-e. Many wise men, as Crantor says, not only recently but long ago have bewailed the human lot, thinking life a punishment, and merely to be born a man the greatest of misfortunes. Aristotle says that even Silenus revealed this to Midas when caught by him. But it is better to record the philosopher's very words. He says this in the work called Endemus or On the Soul: 'Wherefore, best and most blessed of all men, not only3 do we think the dead happy and blessed, and think it impious4 to say anything untrue about them and to slander them, since they have already become better and greater — this custom is so ancient and long established among us that absolutely no one knows either the time of its origin or who first established it ; it seems to have been followed continuously for endless ages — not only that, but you see the saying that has been current in the mouths of men for many years.'5 'What is that?' said the other. And he said in answer: 'Why, that not to be born is best of all, and death better than life ; to many a man has the heavenly voice so testified. This, they say, is what happened 1 Reading in R. 47. 7 a-nohiKreov, with Kroll. 2 Reading in R. 47. 12-13 vyieta, ttjv Se iv crco/xacriv, vcri.v aura?, ivravda Se Trapa votv war' cikotcos ovp.- fialvtiv, with Kroll. 3 Omitting in R. 48. 11 Kal before npos, with one MS. 4 Omitting ^yov/xeda in R. 48. 14, with Bernays. 5 Reading in R. 48. 20 (for ndXai) ttoXXwv £tu>v, with Paton. EUDEMUS, or ON SOUL 19 to the famous Midas when he had caught Silenus and asked him what is the best thing for men and the thing most desirable of all ; Silenus at first would not say anything but maintained unbroken silence ; but when at last by using every device Midas had with difficulty induced him to say something, he said under compulsion:1 "Shortlived seed of a toilsome spirit and of a hard fate, why do you force me to say what it is better for you not to know ? The most painless life is that lived in ignorance of one's own ills. To men it is quite impossible for the best thing of all to happen, nor can they share in the nature of the best (for it is best for all men and women not to be born), but the next best, and the best achievable for men,2 is, having been born, to die as soon as may be." It is clear that3 by this he meant that the time spent in death is better than that spent in life.' 7 (R24l, R345, W7) Philop. in De An. 141. 22. Aristotle, having blamed alike all those who had spoken of the soul, for having said nothing about the body which was to receive it. ... 30 naturally goes on to link with this his opinion about the soul. Some thinkers looked to the same fact, that it is not a body of any chance constitution4 that shares in soul, but it needs a definite con- stitution,5 just as attunement is not produced by any chance state of the strings but needs6 a definite degree of tension of them ; they thought, therefore, that the soul too is an attune- ment of the body, and that the different kinds of soul answer to the7 different attunements of the body. This opinion Aristotle states and refutes. At first he merely records the opinion itself, but presently he sets forth the arguments that led them to it. He had already opposed this opinion else- where, in the dialogue Eudemus, and before him Plato in the Phaedo had used some five arguments against this view. . . . 1 Reading in R. 49. 2 avayKat,6fx€vov, with Paton. 2 Reading in R. 49. 8 dvflpoWois, with Wilamowitz. 3 Reading in R. 49. 9-10 SijXov ovv on coy, with Reiske. 4 Reading in R. 49. 17 6povs, with Hayduck. 20 FRAGMENTS 144. 21. These are Plato's five objections. Aristotle himself , as I have already said, has used in the dialogue Eademus the two following objections. One goes thus: 'Attunement', he says, 'has a contrary, lack of attunement, but the soul has no contrary. Therefore the soul is not an attunement.' One might reply to this that there is strictly no contrary to attunement,1 but rather2 an indefinite privation, and the soul, as being a form, has an indefinite opposite, and as we say in the case of music that a certain kind of lack of attune- ment changes into attunement,3 so a certain kind of privation changes into soul. Aristotle's second objection4 is this: 'The contrary of the attunement of the body is the lack of attune- ment of the body, and the lack of attunement of the living body is disease, weakness, and ugliness; of which, disease is lack of attunement of the elements, weakness lack of attune- ment of the tissues, ugliness lack of attunement of the organs. If, then, lack of attunement is disease, weakness, and ugliness, attunement is health, strength, and beauty; but soul is none of these, neither health nor strength nor beauty ; for even Thersites, the ugliest of men, had a soul. Therefore the soul is not an attunement.' This is what Aristotle says in the Eudemus. But here5 he has used four objections to refute this opinion, of which the third is the second of those in the Eudemus. . . . 145. 21. Aristotle says 'in public dis- cussions'. He must mean either his unwritten discussions with his associates or the exoteric writings (among which are the dialogues, e.g. the Eudemus), which are called exoteric because they were not written for his genuine disciples, but for the general advantage of the many. . . . 147. 6-10. ' It is more appropriate to call health (or generally the good state of the body) an attunement than to assert this of the soul.' This is the third objection (the second in the Eudemus). That health is an attunement he has shown in the Eudemus from its being the contrary of disease ; we have stated above the course of the syllogism. 1 Omitting in R. 50. 8 ivavrlov after Kvplojs, with Hayduck. 2 Reading in R. 50. 9 dAAa p.d\Xov orepTjaig, with Hayduck. 3 Reading in R. 50. II roidi'Se avapp.0OTiav p.eTaf3aiveiv els ttjv app.ovlav, with Hayduck. 4 Reading in R. 50. 12 hevrepov, with Hayduck. 5 i.e. in the De Anirna. EUDEMUS, or ON SOUL 21 Simp, in De An. 53. 1-4. By the arguments used in public discussion Aristotle means those of the arguments used which are adapted to the intelligence of most people, hinting perhaps at those in the Phaedo, but meaning also those used by himself in the dialogue Eudemus to refute the attunement theory. Them, in De An. 24. 13. Another opinion about the soul has been handed down, which is as plausible as any, and has rendered account of itself and been examined both in public and in private discussions. Some people say soul is an attune- ment ; for attunement is a mixture and combination of con- traries, and the body is composed of contraries, so that that which brings these into concord and harmonizes them — hot and cold, moist and dry, hard and soft, and all the other contrarieties of the elements — is nothing other than soul, just as the attunement of notes blends low notes with high. The argument is plausible, but has been refuted in many places both by Aristotle and by Plato. The soul, they say, is prior to body, but harmony is posterior ; the soul rules and over- sees the body and often fights it, but harmony does not fight with the things that have been harmonized ; harmony admits of more and less, soul does not ; harmony, so long as it is preserved, does not admit disharmony, but soul admits wickedness; if the disharmony of the body is disease, ugli- ness, or weakness, the harmony of the body must be beauty, health, and strength, not soul — all these things have been said by the philosophers elsewhere ; but what Aristotle says now is this. ... 25. 23-25. That those who say the soul is a harmony would seem to be neither very near to nor very far from the truth is clear, then, both from what Aristotle has said now and from what he has said elsewhere. Olymp. in Phd. 173. 20 (Norvin). Aristotle in the Eudemus objects as follows: 'Disharmony is contrary to harmony, but soul has no contrary, since it is a substance ; the conclusion is obvious. Again, if the disharmony of the elements of an animal is disease, their harmony must be health, not soul. . . . 30. The third argument is the same as the second in the Eudemus. 22 FRAGMENTS Sophon. in De An. 25. 4-8. There has been handed down yet another opinion about the soul, which many people find plausible, as much so as any of those that are recorded. It has, however, already been brought to account and refuted by appropriate arguments which have been published — both by our arguments addressed to Eudemus and by those in Plato's Phaedo ; but none the less they will be criticized now as well. Some say the soul is a harmony. 8 (R2 42, R3 46, W 8) Simp, in De An. 221. 20-33. Plato is in every case accustomed to call by the same name the Forms and the things that are formed according to them. But Aristotle, when the thing formed is divisible, avoids using the same name, because of the great difference between the divisible thing and the indivisible form. The reasoning soul he describes not only as limited but also as a limit ; for as it is between the in- divisible and the divisible, being in a sense both, so too it is between the limit and the limited, exhibiting both characters — the latter as moving discursively, the former because it always moves in obedience to limits and because all that has been unfolded is gathered into one; in this respect it is likened to the limiting reason. And because of this he says in his dialogue on the soul called Eudemus that the soul is a form, and praises those who describe the soul as receptive of forms — not the whole soul but the rational soul, as knowing the forms that have the second degree of truth : for it is to reason, which is greater than soul, that the really true forms correspond. 9 (R2 38, R3 43) Plu. Mor. 733 c. Aristotle has recorded that in CiliciaTimon's grandmother hibernated two months in each year, giving no sign of life except by breathing. 10 Plu. Mor. 382 d-e. The knowledge of that which is knowable, pure, and simple, flashing like lightning through the soul, EUDEMUS, or ON SOUL 23 grants it at times to touch and see. This is why Plato and Aristotle call this part of philosophy a mystic vision, inas- much as those who forsake these confused and various objects of opinion leap in thought to that primary, simple, and immaterial object, and, gaining true contact with the pure truth about it, think that, as though by initiation into the mysteries, they have attained the end of philosophy. II al-KindI, cod. Taimuriyye Falsafa 55. Aristotle tells of the Greek king whose soul was caught up in ecstasy, and who for many days remained neither alive nor dead. When he came to himself, he told the bystanders of various things in the invisible world, and related what he had seen — souls, forms, and angels ; he gave the proofs of this by foretelling to all his acquaintances how long each of them would live. All he had said was put to the proof, and no one exceeded the span of life that he had assigned. He prophesied, too, that after a year a chasm would open in the country of Elis, and after two years a flood would occur in another place ; and everything happened as he had said. Aristotle asserts that the reason of this was that his soul had acquired this know- ledge just because it had been near to leaving his body and had been in a certain way separated from it, and so had seen what it had seen. How much greater marvels of the upper world of the kingdom would it have seen, then, if it had really left his body ! al-Kindi, cod. Aya Sofia 4832, fol. 34. Aristotle asserts of the soul that it is a simple substance whose actions are manifested in bodies. 12 Serv. in Aen. 6. 448. 'Caeneus, now a woman.' Caenis was a girl who won from Neptune as the price of her shame a change of sex. . . . Virgil refers to the Platonic or Aristotelian view that souls often by metempsychosis change their sex. / NERINTHUS1 i (R2 53, R3 64) Them. Or. 295 c-d. This man, after some slight association with my studies or amusements — whichever you call them — had almost the same experience as the philosopher Axiothea, Zeno of Citium, and the Corinthian farmer. Axiothea, after reading a book of Plato's Republic, migrated from Arcadia to Athens and attended Plato's lectures for a long time with- out being discovered to be a woman — like Lycomedes' Achilles. The Corinthian farmer after coming into contact with Gorgias — not Gorgias himself but the dialogue Plato wrote in criticism of the sophist — forthwith gave up his farm and his vines, put his soul under Plato's guidance, and made it a seed-bed and a planting ground for Plato's philosophy. This is the man whom Aristotle honours in his Corinthian dialogue. The facts about Zeno are well known and are recounted by many writers — that the Apology of Socrates brought him from Phoenicia to the painted Stoa. 1 The work Nerinthus, which occurs in the lists of Aristotelian works preserved by Diogenes Laertius and Hesychius, is not mentioned under that name by any other ancient writer, nor does the name Nerinthus occur else- where. The identification of the work with the 'Corinthian dialogue' named by Themistius, and of Nerinthus with the 'Corinthian farmer', is purely conjectural, but not unlikely to be right. EROTICUS1 1 (R2 91, R3 96) Ath. 564 b. Aristotle says that lovers look at no other part of the body of their beloved than the eyes, in which modesty dwells. 2 (R2 92, R3 97) Plu. Pel. 18. 4. It is said also that Iolaus, who was the beloved of Hercules, shares in the contests of the Thebans and throws the spear with them. Aristotle says that even in his time lovers and their beloved still pledged their troth on the tomb of Iolaus. Cf. Plu. Mor. 761 d-e. 3 (r2 93, R3 98) Plu. Mor. 760 e-761 b. 'You know, I suppose, what led to the death of Cleomachus of Pharsalus in battle. . . . He came with the Thessalian army as an ally to the people of Chalcis, when their war with the Eretrians was at its height. The Chalcidians thought their infantry strong, but the repulsing of the enemy's cavalry was a formidable task; so his allies called on Cleomachus, whose courage was famous, to lead the attack against the cavalry. He asked his beloved, who was present, whether he was going to watch the contest. When the young man said "Yes", greeted him lovingly, and nodded consent, Cleomachus, emboldened by this, called the best of the Thessalians together round him, made a brilliant charge, and fell on the enemy with such vigour as to throw the cavalry into confusion and rout them. When as a result 1 R8's fr. 95 is omitted, because iv hevrepa) epatTiK&v seems to refer not to the Eroticus, which both Diogenes Laertius and Hesychius describe as having one book, but to the deoeis epuiTtKal, which they both describe as having four books. 26 FRAGMENTS of this the hoplites also took to flight, the Chalcidians gained a mighty victory ; but it so happened that Cleomachus was killed. The Chalcidians show in their market-place his tomb, on which to this day the great pillar stands ; and to the love of boys, which formerly they had reprehended, they from that time gave more devotion and honour than others do. Aristotle, however, says that Cleomachus died in other fashion after defeating the Eretrians in battle, that the lover in question was a Chalcidian from Thrace who was sent to help the Chalcidians in Euboea, and that this is the origin of the Chalcidian song "Children, heirs of Graces and of splendid fathers, grudge not to the good the company of youthful prime; for along with courage limb-loosing love flourishes in the cities of the Chalcidians".' al-Dailami, cod. Tubingen Weisweiler 81. It is said in a certain book of the ancients that the pupils of Aristotle assembled before him one day. And Aristotle said to them: ' While I was standing on a hill I saw a 3'outh, who stood on a terrace roof and recited a poem, the meaning of which was : Whoever dies of passionate love, let him die in this manner ; there is no good in love without death.' Then said his pupil Issos: 'O philosopher, inform us concerning the essence of love.' And Aristotle replied: 'Love is an impulse which is generated in the heart ; when it is once generated, it moves and grows; afterwards it becomes mature. When it has become mature it is joined by affections of appetite whenever the lover in the depth of his heart increases in his excitement, his perseverance, his desire, his concentrations, and his wishes. And that brings him to cupidity and urges him to demands, until it brings him to disquieting grief, continuous sleeplessness, and hopeless passion and sadness and destruc- tion of mind.' PROTREPTICUS TESTIMONIA Hist. Aug. 2. 97. 20-22 (Hohl). Nor, I suppose, are the argu- ments unknown which Cicero used in his Hortensius, which he modelled on the Protrepticus. Nonius 394. 26-28. (Lindsay), s.v. contendere, intendere. Cicero in the Hortensius: 'for great mental effort must be applied to the explaining of Aristotle, if you are to read him.' Mart. Cap. 5. 44. The question whether we ought to philo- sophize is discussed in the Hortensius. 1 (R2 47, R3 50, W I) Stob. 4. 32. 21. From Teles' Epitome. Zeno said that Crates, as he sat in a shoemaker's workshop, read aloud the Pro- trepticus, which Aristotle had written to Themison king of Cyprus, saying that no one had greater advantages for be- coming a philosopher ; he had great wealth, so that he could afford to spend money on philosophy, and had reputation as well. As he read, the shoemaker listened while he went on with his stitching, and Crates said: 'I think, Philiscus, that I shall inscribe a Protrepticus to you ; for I see you have more advantages for the study of philosophy than were his1 for whom Aristotle wrote.' 2 (R2 50, R3 51, w 2) Alex. Aph. in Top. 149. 9-17. There are cases where, which- ever interpretation we adopt, we can on the basis of it refute the proposition proposed. Suppose someone said we ought not to pursue philosophy. Then, since even to inquire whether we ought to philosophize or not is (as Aristotle himself said in the Protrepticus) to philosophize, and since to pursue 1 Reading in R. 56. 21 17 evyeu> Kal vo(iiCeiv, with Wilamowitz. w 9) Iambl. Protr. 8 (45. 4-47. 4 Pistelli). It is worth while to point out that the view in question follows from common opinions, from views that are clearly held by all men. To everyone this much is plain, that no one would choose to live in receipt of the greatest wealth and power from men but deprived of thought and mad — not even if one were to be pursuing2 with delight the most violent pleasures, as some madmen do. All men, then, it seems, shun above all things the loss of their wits. Now the contrary of witlessness is wisdom ; and of two contraries one is to be avoided, the other to be chosen ; as illness is to be avoided, so health is to be chosen. Thus according to this argument, too, in the light of common opinion, it seems that wisdom is most of all to be chosen, not for the sake of any3 of its consequences. For even if a man had everything, but were destroyed and diseased in his thinking part, his life would not be worth living, since even the other good things could not profit him. Therefore all men, in so far as they are conscious of thinking and can taste its savour,4 reckon other things as nothing, and for this reason not one of us would endure being drunk or a child throughout his life. For this reason too, though sleep is a very pleasant thing, it is not a thing to choose even if 1 Reading in R. 64. 12 ttXciotov, with Festa. 2 Reading in R. 65. 7 8iu>Keiv for t,a>eLv, with Diels. 3 Reading in R. 65. 13-14 ov 81' erepov n, with the MSS. 4 Reading in R. 65. 18-19 aiodavovrai rov povetv xal yeveoOcu Swavrai tovtov tov Trpdy^aros, ovbev oiovrai, with the MSS. PROTREPTICUS 39 we suppose the sleeper to have all possible pleasures, because the images of sleep are false, while those of waking life are true. Sleep and waking differ in nothing but the fact that the soul when awake often knows the truth, but in sleep is always deceived ; for the whole nature of dreams is an image and a lie. Again, the shrinking of most men from death shows the soul's love of learning. For it shrinks from what it does not know, from darkness and obscurity, and naturally seeks what is manifest and knowable. This is, above all, the reason why we say we ought to honour and revere supremely, as authors of our greatest goods, the authors of our seeing the sun and the light — our fathers and mothers; these are, it seems, the authors of our thinking and seeing. It is for the same reason that we delight in things and men that are familiar, and call dear those whom we know. These things, then, show plainly that that which is knowable, manifest, and clear is a thing to be loved,1 and if that which is knowable and clear, then also knowledge and thought are equally necessary to us. Besides this, just as in the case of property it is not the same possession that conduces to life and to happy life, so too in the case of thought we do not, methinks, need the same with a view to mere life and with a view to the good life. The bulk of mankind may well be pardoned for doing as they do ; while they pray for happiness they are content if they can but live. But unless one thinks one ought to endure living on any terms whatever, it is ridiculous not to endure every labour2 and bestow every care to gain the wisdom which will know the truth. 10 a (R2 49, r3 59, w 10 a) Iambl. Protr. 8 (47. 5-21 Pistelli). One might know this even from the following facts, if one viewed human life in a clear light. For one will find that all the things men think great are mere scene-painting ; whence it is rightly said that man 1 Reading in R. 66. 9 to avep6v koX to S-fjXov dyamjTov, with the MSS. 2 Reading in R. 66. 18 ttovov v-noixivav, with the MSS. 40 FRAGMENTS is nothing, and nothing human is stable. Strength, size, beauty are a laugh and nothing more, and beauty1 seems to be beauty only because we see nothing accurately. If one could have seen as clearly as they say Lynceus did, who saw through walls and trees, would one ever have thought any man endurable to look at, when one saw2 of what poor materials he is made ? Honours and reputation, these much envied things, are, even more than other things, full of indescribable folly ; for to him who catches a glimpse of things eternal it seems foolish to busy himself with these things. What is there among human things that is long-lived or lasting ? It is owing to our weakness, methinks, and the shortness of our life that even this appears great. Boeth. Consol. 3. 8. How slight, how fragile is the tenure of those who boast of bodily goods! Can you surpass the elephant in size, the bull in strength, the tiger in speed? Look to the vastness, the durability, the speed of the heavens, and cease to marvel at those cheap possessions. No less than for these qualities, the heavens are admirable for the reason by which they are ruled. As for beauty, how swift is its passing — more fleeting than the flowers of spring! If, as Aristotle says, men had had the eyes of Lynceus, so that their sight could pierce through obstacles, would not the body of Alcibiades, so fair on the surface, have seemed most foul when its inward parts were seen ? So it is not your own nature, but the weakness of the eyes which see you, that makes you seem beautiful. But consider how excessive is your desire of bodily goods, when you know that that which you admire can be dissolved by the paltry fire of a tertian fever. Cic. Titsc. 1. 39. 94. But what age can truly be called old? What possession of man is lasting ? . . . Because we have nothing more, we call this lasting ; all these things are called long or short according to the proportion of each that is given to each of us. By the river Hypanis, which flows into 1 Reading in R. 70. 6 /caAAos re, with the MSS. 2 Reading in R. 70. 9 6p<2>v, with the MSS. PROTREPTICUS 41 the Pontus from the direction of Europe, Aristotle says there are born little creatures which live for but one day. One of these that has died at the eighth hour has died at an ad- vanced age ; one that has died at sunset is decrepit, especially if it is on a midsummer day. Compare our longest life with eternity ; we shall be found as short-lived as these little creatures. Sen. Brev. Vit. 1. 2. Aristotle's quarrel with the nature of things is most unsuitable to a wise man. He says that nature has indulged the animals so much that they live for five of our generations, while man, born to so many and such great achievements, has so much nearer a limit fixed for him. 10 b (r2 36, R3 60, w 10 b) Iamb. Protr. 8 (47. 21-48. 9 Pistelli). Which of us, looking to these facts, would think himself happy and blessed — which of us, all of whom (in the first place) are from the start (as they say in the initiation rites) born as though for punish- ment ? For it is an inspired saying of the ancients that the soul pays penalty and that we live for the punishment of great sins. The conjunction of the soul with the body looks very much like this. For as the Etruscans are said often to torture captives by chaining dead bodies face to face with the living, fitting part to part, so the soul seems to be ex- tended throughout and affixed to all the sensitive members of the body. Aug. C. Inl. Pel. 4. 15. 78. How much better and nearer the truth than yours were the views about the generation of men held by those whom Cicero, as though led and compelled by the very evidence of the facts, commemorates in the last part of the dialogue Hortensius ! After mentioning the many facts we see and lament with regard to the vanity and the unhappiness1 of men, he says: 'From which errors and cares of human life it results that sometimes those ancients — whether they were prophets or interpreters of the divine 1 Reading in R. 71. 16 injelicitale, with Migne. 42 FRAGMENTS mind by the transmission of sacred rites — who said that we are born to expiate sins committed in a former life, seem to have had a glimpse of the truth, and that that is true which Aristotle says, that we are punished much as those were who once upon a time, when they had fallen into the hands of Etruscan robbers, were killed with studied cruelty ; their bodies, the living with the dead, were bound as exactly1 as possible one against another: so our minds, bound together with our bodies, are like the living joined with the dead. Cf. Clem. Al. Protr. i. 7. 4. 10 c (R2 48, R3 61, w 10 c) Iambl. Protr. 8 (48. 9-21 Pistelli). Mankind has nothing worthy of consideration as being divine or blessed, except what there is in us of reason and wisdom ; this alone of our possessions seems to be immortal, this alone to be divine. By virtue of being able to share in this faculty, life, however wretched and difficult by nature, is yet so cleverly arranged that man seems a god in comparison with all other creatures. For ' reason is the god in us ' (whether it was Hermotimus or Anaxagoras that said so), and 'mortal life contains a portion of some god'. We ought, therefore, either to pursue philo- sophy or to say farewell to life and depart hence, since all other things seem to be great nonsense and folly. Cic. Fin. 2. 13. 39-40. I shall hold that we must first exclude the opinions of Aristippus and the whole Cyrenaic school, who were not afraid to place the supreme good in the pleasure which moves our senses most delightfully, and spurned the freedom from pain of which you speak. They did not see that as the horse is born to run, the ox to plough, the dog to follow a scent, so man (as Aristotle says) is born as a sort of mortal god to do two things — for understanding and for action. Aug. Trin. 14. 19. 26. Commending this contemplative wisdom . . . Cicero says at the end of the dialogue Hortensius : 1 Reading in R. 71. 25 aptissime, with the MSS. PROTREPTICUS 43 ' To us . . . who spend our lives in philosophy this is a great hope — that if that by which we feel and think is mortal and perishable, we shall have a happy setting . . . and a rest from life ; if, on the other hand, as the ancient, the greatest and far the most famous, philosophers thought, we have minds eternal and divine, then we should reflect that the more these minds have been constant in their courses — in the use of reason and in the desire of discovery — and the less they have mixed and implicated themselves in the vices and errors of mankind, the easier will be their ascent and return to heaven.' Then, adding this very clause and summing up his argument, he says: 'Wherefore — to bring my speech at last to an end — if we wish either to be quietly extinguished when we have lived our life in this prison, or to move without delay from this to a far better home, all our interest and concern must be bestowed on these studies.' II (w II) Iambl. Protr. 9 (49. 3-52. 16 Pistelli). Of things that come into being some come from thought and art, e.g. a house or a ship (for the cause of both of these is a certain art and process of thought), while others come into being through no art, but by nature; nature is the cause of animals and plants, and all such things come into being according to nature. But some things, also, come into being as a result of chance ; for of most of the things that come into being neither by art nor by nature nor of necessity, we say that they come into being by chance Now of the things that come into being by chance none comes into being for the sake of anything, nor have they an end ; but in the case of things that come into being by art there is an end and an object of purpose (for he who possesses the art will tell you the reason why he wrote, and for what purpose he did so), and this is better than that which comes into being for its sake. I speak of the things of which art is the cause by its own nature and not by accident ; for we should describe the art of medicine as pro- perly the art of health and not of disease, and architecture as the art of making houses, not of pulling them down. 44 FRAGMENTS Everything, therefore, that is according to art comes into being for the sake of something, and this is its best end, but that which comes into being by chance does not come into being for the sake of anything ; something good might come into being by chance, yet in respect of chance and in so far as it results from chance it is not good — that which comes into being by chance is always indeterminate. But that which comes into being according to nature does so for an end, and is always constituted to better purpose than the product of art ; for nature does not imitate art, but vice versa ; art exists to aid nature and to fill up its deficiencies. For some things nature seems able to complete by itself without assistance, but others it does with difficulty or can- not do at all — in the matter of birth, to take an obvious example; some seeds generate without protection, whatever ground they fall into, others need the art of farming as well ; and similarly some animals attain their full nature by them- selves, but man needs many arts for his preservation, both at birth and in the matter of nutrition later. If, then, art imitates nature, it is from nature that the arts have derived the characteristic that all their products come into being for an end ; for we should describe as coming into being for an end everything that comes into being rightly. Now that which comes into being beautifully comes into being rightly; and everything that comes into being or has come into being according to nature1 comes into or has come into being beautifully, since that which is contrary to nature is bad and contrary to that which is according to nature ; natural coming into being,2 therefore, is for an end. This one can see from any one of our parts ; if you were to consider the eyelid, you would see that it has come into being not at random but to aid the eyes — to give them rest and to ward off things that are falling on to them. Therefore that for the sake of which something has come into being is the same as that for which it ought to have come into being ; if it was right that a ship should come into being to provide transport by sea, it is for that reason that it has come into being. Now either absolutely 1 Omitting n-qv. 2 Reading to> Kara vaiv ivavrtov ij ovv Kara vaiv yeveois, with \ itelli. PROTREPTICUS 45 all animals belong to the class of things that have come into being by nature,1 or the best and most honourable of them do ; for it makes no difference if someone thinks most animals have come into being contrary to nature, to destroy and do mischief. Now man is the most honourable of the animals in the world, so that clearly he has come into being by nature and according to nature ; and knowledge is that for the sake of which nature and God have brought us into being. Pytha- goras, when asked what this end is, said 'to observe the heavens', and used to say he was an observer of nature and it was for this that he had come into being. And they say that Anaxagoras, when asked for what end one would choose to come into being and to live, replied ' to observe the heavens and the stars, moon, and sun in them ', everything else being nothing worth. If, then, the end of each thing is always better than the thing (for everything that comes into being does so for the sake of its end, and its end is better and the best of all things) , and if that which is completed last in order of generation when this proceeds continuously is the natural end, we note that the bodily parts of men are completed first and the mental parts later, and the completion of the better is, one may say, always later than its generation. Therefore soul is later than body, and wisdom is the latest of the qualities of the soul; for we see that by nature it is the latest faculty to come into being for men — that is why old age lays special claim to this alone of good things ; there- fore some form of wisdom is by nature our end, and the exercise of it the final activity for whose sake we have come into being. Now if we have come into being in order to exercise it and to learn, we also exist for that end. According to this argument, then, Pythagoras was right in saying that every man has been created by God in order to know and to observe. But whether the object of this knowlege is the world or something whose nature is different, we must con- sider later ; what we have said suffices as a first conclusion ; for if wisdom is our natural end, the exercise of it must be the best of all things. Therefore the other things we ought to do, we ought to do for the sake of the goods that come 1 Reading in twv voct. yeyev7//ueVcoi', with the MSS. 46 FRAGMENTS into being in oneself,1 and of these the bodily actions should be done for the sake of the mental, and virtue should be practised for the sake of wisdom ; for this is the supreme end. 12 (R3 58, W 12) Aug. Trin. 14. 9. 12. Cicero in his dialogue Hortensius argues thus: 'If we, when we depart2 this life, were permitted to live for ever, as the fables say, in the islands of the blest, what need should we have of eloquence when there were no causes to be pleaded — or even of the virtues themselves? We should not need courage, where no task or danger was prescribed to us, nor justice, where there was no property of another for us to seek, nor temperance, to rule non-existent lusts. We should not need even prudence, where no choice between goods and evils was held out to us. We should be blessed by the possession of one thing only — science and knowledge of nature, for which alone the life of the gods is to be praised. From this it may be seen that other things are matters of necessity, and only this a matter of choice. Thus that great orator, when he was preaching philosophy by repeating and expounding splendidly and persuasively what he had received from the philosophers, said that it is only in this life, which we see to be full of cares and errors, that all the four virtues are necessary. Iambl. Protr. 9 (52. 16-54. 5 Pistelli) . To seek from all knowledge a result other than itself, and to demand that knowledge must be useful, is the act of one completely ignor- ant of the distance that from the start separates things good from things necessary ; they stand at opposite extremes. For of the things without which life is impossible those that are loved for the sake of something else must be called necessities and contributing causes, but those that are loved for them- selves even if nothing follows must be called goods in the strict sense. This is not desirable for the sake of that, and that for the sake of something else, and so ad infinitum ; there is a stop somewhere. It is completely ridiculous, therefore, to : Reading avru>. 2 Reading in R. 68. 3 emigraverimns, with the MSS. PROTREPTICUS 47 demand from everything some benefit other than the thing itself, and to ask ' What then is the gain to us ? ' and ' What is the use ? ' For in truth, as we maintain, he who asks this is in no way like one who knows the noble and good, or who distinguishes causes from accompanying conditions. One would see the supreme truth of what we are saying, if some- one1 carried us in thought to the islands of the blest. There there would be need of nothing, no profit from anything; there remain only thought and contemplation, which even now we describe as the free life. If this be true, would not any of us be rightly ashamed if when the chance was given us to live in the islands of the blest, he were by his own fault unable to do so ? Not to be despised, therefore, is the reward that knowledge brings to men, nor slight the good that comes from it. For as, according to the wise among the poets, we receive the gifts of justice in Hades, so (it seems) we gain those of wisdom in the islands of the blest. It is nowise strange, then, if wisdom does not show itself useful or ad- vantageous ; we call it not advantageous but good, it should be chosen not for the sake of anything else, but for itself. For as we travel to Olympia for the sake of the spectacle itself, even if nothing were to follow from it (for the spectacle itself is worth more than much wealth), and as we view the Dionysia not in order to gain anything from the actors (indeed we spend money on them), and as there are many other spectacles we should prefer to much wealth, so too the contemplation of the universe is to be honoured above all the things that are thought useful. For surely it cannot be right that we should take great pains to go to see men imitating women and slaves, or fighting and running, just for the sake of the spectacle, and not think it right to view without payment the nature and reality of things. 13 (w 13) Iambl. Protr. 10 (54. 10-56. 12 Pistelli). That theoretical wisdom also provides us with the greatest advantages for 1 Reading after Xfyo/iev in R. 69. I ovSev eoiK€i> 6 toiouto? ei'Sdri KaXov Kaya96v ovhe rt airiov ra> SiayiyvwoKOVTi ko.1 avvairiov. toot o av tis oti ■navTos [Ma^XXov dXrjdij ravra Xeyo/xev, et ti? ktX., with the MSS. 48 FRAGMENTS human life, one will discover easily from studying the arts. For as all skilful physicians and most gymnasts agree that those who are to be good physicians or gymnasts must have experience of nature, so it is agreed that good legislators must have experience of nature, and indeed much more than the former. For the former are producers only of bodily excellence, while those who are concerned with the excellences of the soul and undertake to give instruction about the well- being and the ill-being of the state need philosophy far more. As in the mechanical arts the best instruments have been borrowed from nature (e.g. in carpentry the ruddled line, the rule, and the lathe were suggested by the surface of water and by the rays of light,1 and it is by reference to these that we test what is to our senses sufficiently straight or smooth), similarly the statesman must borrow from nature and reality certain limits by reference to which he will judge what is just, noble, or advantageous ; for as these tools excel all others, so the law that conforms best with nature is the best. Now this he cannot do unless he has practised philo- sophy and learned the truth. And in the other arts men do not take their tools and their most accurate calculations from the originals themselves and so attain something approaching to knowledge ; they take them from copies at second or third hand or at a distant remove, and base their reasonings on experience. The philosopher alone copies the exact originals ; he is a spectator of them and not of copies. As, then, he is not a good builder who does not use a straight rule or any other such instrument but compares his own building with others, so, presumably, if one either lays down laws for cities or does actions of his own, looking to and copying other actions or human constitutions, whether of Sparta or of Crete or of any other state, he is not a good lawgiver nor a virtuous man ; for an imitation of what is not good cannot be good, nor can an imitation of what is not divine and durable in its nature be immortal and durable ; it is clear2 that to the philosopher alone among craftsmen belong laws that are durable and actions that are right and 1 The text is corrupt, but the general sense is clear. 2 Reading dXXa 8rj\ov on kt\., with Yitelli. PROTREPTICUS 49 noble. For he alone lives with his eye on nature and the divine, and like a good steersman directs his life1 in depen- dence on what is eternal and unchanging, and lives his own master. This knowledge is theoretical indeed, but it enables us to frame all our practice in accordance with it. For as sight makes and shapes nothing (since its only work is to judge and to show us everything that can be seen), and yet it enables us to act as it directs, and gives us the greatest assistance towards action (for we should be almost entirely motionless if deprived of it), so it is clear that, though know- ledge is theoretical, yet we do a host of things in accordance with it, choose some actions and avoid others, and in general gain as a result of it all the goods we possess. 14 (W 14) Iamb. Protr. 11 (56. 13-59. I^ Pistelli) . That those who have chosen the life according to reason also enjoy life most will be clear from the following argument. The word 'live' seems to be used in two senses, one implying a potentiality, the other an actuality; for we describe as 'seeing' both those animals which have sight and are born capable of seeing, even if they happen to have their eyes shut, and those which are using this faculty and looking definitely at something. Similarly with cognition or knowing ; we sometimes mean by it the use of the faculty, actual contemplation, and sometimes the possession of the faculty of knowledge. If, then, we dis- tinguish life from non-life by the possession of perception, and 'perception' has two meanings, meaning properly the using of the senses, but in another significance the being able to use them (it is for this reason, it seems, that we say even a sleeping man perceives),2 it is clear that 'live' will correspondingly have two meanings; a waking man must be said to live in the true and proper sense, a sleeping man must be said to live because he is capable of passing into the activity in virtue of which we say that a man is waking and perceiving something ; it is for this reason and with reference 1 Reading 6pnq, with the MSS. 2 It is not necessary to assume the existence of a lacuna here. For afxev Xeyovres cf. L. and S. S.V. 4>r)fxl II. 2. 645.29 E 50 FRAGMENTS to this that we describe him as living.1 When, therefore, each of two things is called by the same name, and one of the two is so called by virtue of acting or being acted on,2 we shall assign the name by preference to this one ; we shall use the word 'know' rather of him who is using than of him who merely possesses knowledge, and ' see ' rather of him who is directing his sight than of him who merely can do so. For we apply the comparative degree not only to that which possesses more completely an attribute that has a single definition, but also to that whose possession of the attribute is prior; e.g. we say that health is better than wholesome things, and that which is by its own nature worthy of choice than that which tends to produce this, though we see that it is not by virtue of the definition's being predicable of both that we describe both useful things and virtue as good. Thus we must assign life in a higher degree to a waking man than to a sleeping one, to a man who is exercising his soul than to one who merely possesses a soul ; for it is because of the former that we assign life also to the latter, because he is such as to act, or be acted on, in the former way.3 The exercising of anything, then, is this: if the faculty admits only of one realization, it is exercised when one does just that thing; if the faculty admits of more than one realization, it is exer- cised when one brings about its best realization; e.g. one uses the flute either only, or most completely, when one is actually playing it ; for presumably it is on the basis of this that the 'uses' of it by other people are called uses. So we must say that he who uses a thing aright uses it in a higher degree, since the natural purpose4 and the natural manner belong to the man who uses the thing well and accurately. Now thinking and reasoning are, either alone or above everything else, the work of the soul. It is a simple inference, one that anyone can easily draw, that the man who thinks aright lives in a higher degree than others, that he who reaches truth in the highest degree lives in the 1 Placing the full stop after pXe-novres, not after twos. 2 Reading tw -noitiv 77 tu> -naoxeiv, with the MSS. 3 Reading inelvois, as suggested by Pistelli. 4 Reading if 6, with the MSS. PROTREPTICUS 51 highest degree, and that this is the man who thinks and theorizes according to the most precise knowledge ; and it is then and to these men that living completely must be ascribed — to those who think and to those who have the capacity to think. Now if living is, alike for every animal, its true being, it is clear that the thinker will be in the highest degree and in the most proper sense, and most of all when he is exercising this faculty and contemplating what is the most knowable of all things. But further, perfect and unimpeded activity contains in itself delight, so that the activity of contemplation must be the most pleasant of all. Further, there is a difference between enjoying oneself while drinking and enjoying drinking; for there is nothing to prevent a man who is not thirsty, or is not getting the drink he enjoys, from enjoying himself while drinking, not because he is drinking but because he happens at the same time to be looking at something, or to be looked at, as he sits. So we shall say that such a man enjoys himself, and enjoys himself while drinking, but not because he is drinking, nor that he is enjo3nng drinking. In the same way we shall say that walking, sitting down, learning, any activity, is pleasant or painful, not if we happen to feel pain or pleasure in the presence of these activities, but if we are all pained or pleased by their presence. Similarly we shall call that life pleasant whose presence is pleasant to those who have it ; we shall say that not all who have pleasure while living enjoy living, but only those to whom life itself is pleasant and who rejoice in the pleasure that comes from living. Now we assign life to the man who is awake rather than to him who is asleep, to him who thinks rather than to him who is thoughtless, and we say the pleasure of living is the pleasure we get from the exercise of the soul; that is true life. If, then, there are more than one exercise of the soul, still the chief of all is that of thinking as well as possible.1 It is clear, then, that the pleasure arising from thinking and contempla- tion is, alone or most of all, the pleasure of living. Pleasant life and enjoyment, therefore, belong in truth only to philo- sophers, or to them most of all. For the activity of our truest 1 Reading on na\t.cna, with Walzer. 52 FRAGMENTS thoughts, that which is replenished from the most real realities, and preserves steadfastly for ever the perfection it receives, this is of all activities the most productive of joy. Thus even for the sake of enjoying true and good pleasures men of sense ought to practise philosophy. 15 (w 15) Iambl. Protr. 12 (59. 19-60. 15 Pistelli). If we ought to draw this conclusion not only from considering the elements of well-being, but also start higher up and establish it by con- sidering well-being as a whole, let us say explicitly that as philosophizing is related to well-being, so is it related to the acquisition by us of anything good or bad. For it is as leading to this or as following from it that the existence of anything is for all men worthy of desire, and some of the things through which we have well-being are such because they are neces- sary, some because they are pleasant. Now we define well- being either as thoughtfulness (a sort of wisdom), or as virtue, or as the extreme of enjoyment, or as all of these together. If it is thoughtfulness, clearly philosophers alone will live hap- pily ; if it is excellence of the soul or enjoyment, then, too, it will belong to them alone or most of all ; for the highest element in us is virtue, and thinking is the most pleasant of all single things. Similarly, if one says that all these things together are well-being, well-being must be defined as thinking.1 Therefore all who can should practise philosophy ; for this is either complete good life, or of all single things most truly the cause of good life for souls. In this world, I suppose because life in it is unnatural to our race, learning and in- sight are difficult, and perception scarcely to be obtained2 because of our awkward and unnatural mode of life ; but if we can ever escape back to the place from which we have come, it is clear that we shall all do these things more pleasantly and more easily. 16 (R2 77, R3 90, W iC) Ath. 335 f. . . . enjoying the life of Sardanapallus, son of 1 Reading tu> povelv. 2 Reading ^dAu av aloddvotTo, suggested by Pistelli. PROTREPTICUS 53 Anacyndaraxes, whom Aristotle described as even sillier than1 the name of his father would suggest. Cic. Tusc. 5. 35. 101. How then can a life be pleasant from which prudence and moderation are absent ? We see from this the error of Sardanapallus, the wealthy king of Syria, who ordered these words to be engraved on his tomb : ' What I ate and what sated lust drained to the dregs, that I have; many a famous deed lies left behind.' 'What else', Aristotle says, 'would you have inscribed on the grave, not of a king but of an ox ? He says he had in death the things which even in life he had no longer than for the moment of enjoyment.' Cf. Strabo 14. 5. 9, p. C 672 ; Cic. Fin. 2. 32. 106. 17 (R3 54) Chalc. in Tim. 208-9 (Wrobel). In this Aristotle also agrees, saying that children at first, while still unweaned, think all men their fathers and all women their mothers, but as they grow up come to draw distinctions, and yet sometimes fail to do so, since they are often taken in by false images and hold out their hands to a mere simulacrum. He calls all these opinions unmanly; those who hold them think that the things that hurt us are beneficial and those that help us noxious; they are led towards pleasure that destroys, and take offence at healthy toil. This would certainly never have happened if they had not trusted too much to the senses, which by nature are most lively when they deceive. To make the whole matter plain, Aristotle uses an example of crystal clearness. The height of madness is reached when a man not only is ignorant, but does not know what he is ignorant of, and therefore gives his assent to false images and takes those that are true to be false ; as when men think that vice profits them and virtue acts to their prejudice and ruin. . . . These men Aristotle calls old children, because their mind differs very little from a child's. 1 Rea.ding in R. 91. 2 dvai 77 Kara, with Madvig. 54 FRAGMENTS 18 (W 18) Cic. Tusc. 5. 30. 85. The case of the Peripatetics has been unfolded — apart from the views of Theophrastus and those who, following him, show a weak dread of and shrinking from pain ; the rest may do what they in fact practically do, to exaggerate the importance and dignity of virtue. When they have extolled it to the skies, which these eloquent men are wont to do at length ... 31. 87 according to the reasoning of these men the happy life will follow virtue even if it leads to torture, and will descend with it into the tyrant's bull,1 with Aristotle, Xenocrates, Speusippus, and Polemon, to en- courage it; it will never, seduced by threats or blandish- ments, desert virtue. Ibid. 5. 10. 30. I do not, therefore, readily allow my friend Brutus, or our common masters, or the ancients, Aristotle, Speusippus, Xenocrates, and Polemon, when they count as evils the things I have enumerated above, at the same time to say that the ' wise man ' is always happy. If this noble and beautiful title, most worthy of Pythagoras, Socrates, and Plato, delights them, let them bring themselves to despise the things by whose splendour they are attracted — strength, health, beauty, riches, honours, power — and to count their opposites as nothing ; then they will be able with a voice of crystal clearness to profess that they are terrified neither by the onslaught of fortune, by the opinion of the multitude, by pain, nor by poverty, that everything lies in themselves, that there is nothing outside their power which they should reckon as a good. Cf. ibid. 5. 13. 39. Cic. Fin. 5. 5. 12. But since the happy life is sought for, and the one thing that philosophy ought to consider and pursue is the question whether happiness is entirely in the power of the wise man, or whether it can be weakened or snatched from 1 Phalaris' brazen bull. PROTREPTICUS 55 him by adversity, on this point there seems to be sometimes variation and doubt among philosophers. This impression is produced most strongly by Theophrastus' book on the happy life, in which a great deal is ascribed to fortune. If this were true, wisdom could not guarantee a happy life. This seems to me, so to speak, a softer and more timid line of thought than that demanded by the force and dignity of virtue. Let us, therefore, cling to Aristotle and his son Nicomachus . . . but let us follow Theophrastus in most things, only allowing virtue more firmness and strength than he did. . . . 14 Our own Antiochus seems to me to follow most faithfully the opinion of the ancients, which was (he maintains) com- mon to Aristotle1 and to Polemon. 19 (R3 25, W 19) Censor, c. 18. 11. There is, too, a year which Aristotle calls not the great but the greatest, which the spheres of the sun, the moon, and the five planets complete when they return together to the same constellation with which they were formerly in conjunction. Cic. N.D. 2. 20. 51-52. Most admirable are the motions of the five stars which we wrongly call wandering stars. ... It is on the basis of their diverse motions that mathematicians have given the name of 'great year' to that which is com- pleted when the sun, the moon, and the five 'wandering' stars, the course of all of them completed, have returned to the same relative positions. How long this period is, is a great question, but it must be certain and definite. Cf. Cic. Hortensius, fr. 35 Miiller; Tac. Dial. 16. 7. 20 Tert. De An. 46. How many writers have commented on this matter2 and asserted its existence — Artemon, Antiphon, 1 Reading Aristotelis, with some MSS. 2 sc. interpretation of dreams. 56 FRAGMENTS Strato, Philochorus, Epicharmus, Serapion, Cratippus, Diony- sius Rhodius, Hermippus, the whole literature of the age! If I laugh at anyone it will be at the writer who thought he could persuade us that Saturn was the first to dream ; he could be this only if he was the first to live. Aristotle, pardon my laughter ! ON WEALTH i (r2 86, r3 56) Plu. Pel. 3. 1. Of the general run of people, as Aristotle says, some through meanness do not use their wealth, others through extravagance misuse it ; the latter are permanent slaves to their pleasures, the former to their business. Plu. Mor. 527 a. Aristotle says that some men do not use wealth, others misuse it, implying that both are wrong; the former get no benefit or grace from what they have, the latter derive injury and disgrace. 2 (R2 87, R3 89) Cic. Off. 2. 16. 56-57. How much more weight and truth there is in Aristotle's reproach to us for not wondering at these lavish sums spent on cajoling the mob! That men besieged by an enemy should be forced into paying a mina for a pint of water, that (he says) seems incredible when we first hear of it, and we all marvel at it, but when we consider it we pardon their necessity; in these vast and boundless expenditures there is nothing that much surprises us, and that though there is no relief of necessity, no increase of dignity, and the very delight of the multitude is shortlived and derived from the meanest objects, and when satiation comes the very memory of the pleasure dies. He sums up the matter well when he says these things gratify children and mere women, slaves and freemen who are like slaves, but can in no way be approved by a serious man who weighs events with solid judgement. 3 Philod. Pap. Here. 3, p. 41, col. 211. Which happened to Aristotle (as Metrodorus proved) in respect of the argument, in the work On Wealth, to show that the good man is also a good money-maker, and the bad man a bad money-maker. ON PRAYER I (R2 46, R3 49, W i) Simp, in De Caelo 485. 19-22. That Aristotle has the notion of something above reason and being is shown by his saying clearly, at the end of his book On Prayer, that God is either reason or something even beyond reason. ON GOOD BIRTH $7(^3 A e US T (R282, R39i) Stob. 4. 29 A 24. From Aristotle On Good Birth. 'With regard to good birth, I for my part am quite at a loss to say whom one should call well-born.' 'Your difficulty ', I said, 'is quite natural; for both among the many and even more among the wise there is division of opinion and obscurity of statement, particularly about the significance of good birth. What I mean is this: Is it a precious and good thing, or, as Lycophron the sophist wrote,1 something altogether trivial? Comparing it with other goods, he says the attractiveness of good birth is obscure, and its dignity a matter of words; i.e. that the preference for it is a matter of opinion, and in truth there is no difference between the low-born and the well-born.' 2 (R2 83, R3 92) Stob. 4. 29 a 25. In the same book. 'Just as it is disputed what size is good,2 so it is disputed who those are who ought to be called well-born. Some think it is those born of good ancestors, which was the view of Socrates; he said that because Aristides was good his daughter was nobly born. They say that Simonides, when asked who it is that are well-born, said "those whose family has long been rich"; but at that rate Theognis' caustic observation is wrong, and so is that of the poet who wrote "Mortals honour good birth, but marry rather with the rich".3 Good heavens, is not a man who is rich himself preferable to one who had a rich great-grandfather or some other rich ancestor, but is himself poor ? ' 'Surely,' he said. 'And one ought to marry with the rich rather than with the well-born; for it is people of long ago that were wcll- 1 Reading in R. 92. 4 Avx6pa>v 6 oofaorris Zypatpe, with the MSS. 2 sc. in any given type of thing. 3 Eur. fr. 399 Nauck. 60 FRAGMENTS born, but people of today that are more powerful. Is it not much the same, then, if one supposes that it is not those born of rich ancestors but those born of good ancestors that are well-born ? One would suppose that recent goodness is better than ancient, that a man has more in common with his father than with his great-grandfather, and that it is preferable to be good oneself rather than to have a great- grandfather or some other ancestor who was good.' ' You are right,' he said. 'Well then, since we see that good birth does not consist in either of these things, should we not look elsewhere to see what it consists in ? ' 'We should,' he said. "Good" means, I suppose, something praiseworthy and excellent; e.g. having a good face or good eyes means, on this showing, something excellent or beautiful.' 'Certainly,' he said. ' Well then, having a good face means having the goodness proper to a face, and having good eyes means having the goodness proper to eyes, does it not ? ' 'Yes,' he said. 'But one stock is good, another bad and not good.' ' Certainly,' he said. ' And we say each thing is good in virtue of the excellence proper to it, so that a stock is good in the same way.' 'Yes,' he said. 'Clearly, then,' I said, 'good birth is excellence of stock.' 3 (R2 84, R3 93) Diog. Laert. 2. 5. 26 (10). Aristotle says Socrates married two wives — first Xanthippe, who bore him Lamprocles, and then Myrto, daughter of Aristides the Just, whom he took though she had no dowry, and who bore him Sophroniscus and Menexenus. Plu. Aristid. 27. 2. Demetrius of Phaleron, Hieronymus of Rhodes, Aristoxenus the writer on music, and Aristotle (if the work On Good Birth is to be reckoned among his genuine ON GOOD BIRTH 61 works) relate that Myrto, granddaughter of Aristides, lived with the Sage Socrates, who was married to another woman but took Myrto under his protection because she was a widow, poor and lacking in the necessities of life. Ath. 555 d-556 a. Starting from these facts, one must blame those who assign to Socrates two wedded wives, Xanthippe and Myrto the daughter of Aristides — not Aristides the Just, for the dates do not permit of this, but the third in descent from him. These writers are Callisthenes, Demetrius of Phaleron, Satyrus the Peripatetic, Aristoxenus; Aristotle gave them the keynote by relating this in his work On Good Birth. 4 (R2 85, R3 94) Stob. 4. 29 c 52. From Aristotle's work On Good Birth. 'It is evident, then', I said, 'from our previous discussion, why those born of a long line of rich or good ancestors are thought to be better born than those whose possession of these ad- vantages is recent. A man's own goodness is nearer to him than that of a grandfather, and on that basis it would be the good man that is well-born. And some writers have said this, claiming to disprove by this argument the merits of good birth ; Euripides, for example, says1 that good birth belongs not to those whose ancestors have long been good, but to him who is himself good, simply. That is not so ; those are right who give the preference to ancient virtue. Let us state the reasons for this. Good birth is excellence of stock, and excellence belongs to good men ; and a good stock is one in which there have been many good men. Now this happens when the stock has had a good origin ; for an origin has the power of producing many products like itself; this is the function of an origin — to produce many results like itself. When, then, there has been one man of this kind in the stock, a man so good that many generations inherit his good- ness, that stock is bound to be good. There will be many good men if the stock is human, many good horses if it is equine, 1 fr. 345 Nauck. 62 FRAGMENTS and so too with the other animals. Thus it is natural that not rich men nor good men, but those whose ancestors have long been rich or good, should be well-born. The argument has its eye on the truth ; the origin counts more than anything else. Yet not even those born of good ancestors are in every case well-born, but only those who have among their ances- tors originators. When a man is good himself, but has not the natural power to beget many like him, the origin has not in such a case the power we have ascribed to it. '. . . People are well-born if they come of such a stock — not if their father is well-born, but if the originator of the stock is so. For it is not by his own strength that a father begets a good man, but because he came of such a stock.' ON PLEASURE I1 (R2 72, R3 83) Ath. 6 d. Others call Philoxenus a fish-lover, but Aristotle calls him simply a dinner-lover. He also writes somewhere as follows: 'When they are making speeches to crowded audiences they spend the whole day in relating marvels, and that to people who have just returned from the Phasis or the Borysthenes,2 when they have themselves read nothing but Philoxenus' Banquet, and not the whole of that.' 1 Rose places this fragment under the work On Justice, but it seems to have no connexion with that subject. It is in connexion with the love of bodily pleasures that Philoxenus is mentioned in Eth. Eud. i23ia5-i7, and alluded to in Eth. Nic. in8a32-bi, so that the description of him as a dinner-lover is more likely to have occurred in the dialogue On Pleasure. In what work of Aristotle the words actually quoted by Athenaeus occurred, it is impossible to say. 2 The Rion or the Dnieper. ON EDUCATION 1 (R2 51, R3 62) Plu. Mor. 734 d. Floras was full of problems himself, and he used to share them with his associates, bearing witness to Aristotle's saying that much learning brings many vexations. 2 (R2 52, R3 63) Diog. Laert. 9. 8. 53 (4). Protagoras was the first to discover the so-called ' knot ' on which porters carry their burdens — so Aristotle says in his work On Education ; for Protagoras was a porter, as Epicurus also says somewhere. It was in this way that Protagoras was brought to the notice of Demo- critus, who saw how he had bound his logs together. Cf. Ath. 354 c. ON KINGSHIP TESTIMONIA Cic. Att. 12. 40. 2. I often try a letter of advice ;l I find noth- ing to say. I have, indeed, with me the books both of Aris- totle and of Theopompus addressed to Alexander. But what resemblance is there ? They wrote what was both honourable to them and acceptable to Alexander ; do you find anything of that sort here ? Ibid. 13. 28. 2. Nothing comes into my mind. You see what the advice sent to Alexander by eloquent and learned men is concerned with. They exhort to honourable conduct2 a young man kindled by desire for the truest glory, wishing for some advice that shall redound to his eternal praise. Ps.-Amm. in Cat. (Ven. 1546, f. 9 b). Those works are 'per- sonal' which were written to some individual in particular, as for instance letters or what Aristotle wrote at the request of Alexander of Macedon about kingship and about the right way of establishing colonies. I (R2 78, R3 646) Ps.-Amm. in Cat. (Ven. 1546, f. 56). Aristotle wrote to Alexander also about kingship, in a one-volume book, in- structing him how he ought to rule. Vit. Arist Marc. p. 430. 15-431. 2 (Rose). In order to confer a benefit on all men, Aristotle writes a book addressed to Alexander on kingship, instructing him how he should rule. This had such an effect on Alexander's mind that when he had failed to confer a benefit on anyone he said: 'Today I have not been king; I have done good to no one.' 1 To Caesar. 2 Reading in R. 408. 24 cohortantur ad decus, with the MSS. 645.29 F 66 FRAGMENTS 2 (r2 79, R3 647) Them. Or. 107 c-d. Plato, even if in all other respects he was divine and admirable, was completely reckless when he uttered this saying, that evils would never cease for men until either philosophers became rulers, or kings became philosophers. His saying has been refuted and has paid its account to time. We should do honour to Aristotle, who slightly altered Plato's words and made his counsel truer; he said that it was not merely unnecessary for a king to be a philosopher, but even a disadvantage ; what he should do was to listen to and take the advice of true philosophers, since then he filled his reign with good deeds, not with good words. ALEXANDER i (r2 8o, r3 648) Ps.-Amm. in Cat. (Ven. 1546, f. gb). See p. 65 supra. 2 (R2 81, R3 658) Plu. Mbr. 329 b. Alexander did not do as Aristotle advised — play the part of a leader to the Greeks and of a master to the barbarians, care for the former as friends and kinsmen, and treat the latter as beasts or plants, and so fill his reign with wars, banishments, and factions ; he behaved alike to all. Strabo i. 4. 9, p. C 66. At the conclusion of his memoran- dum, Eratosthenes refuses to praise those who divided the whole human race into two — Greeks and barbarians — and advised Alexander to treat Greeks as friends, but barbarians as enemies ; he says it is better to draw the division between virtue and vice. . . . Alexander did not ignore his advisers but took their advice and acted accordingly, looking to the intention of those who had sent it. POLITICUS TESTIMONIUM Cic. Fin. 5. 4. 11. Aristotle and Theophrastus had, each of them, taught what sort of man the ruler in a state should be. I (R2 70, R3 78) Cic. Q. Fr. 3. 5. 1. When these books were being read over to me in my Tusculan villa in the hearing of Sallust, I was advised by him that something much more authoritative could be said on these matters if I were myself to speak about the state ; especially because I was not a Heraclides Ponticus but a man of consular rank and one versed in the greatest affairs of state. What I put into the mouth of such ancient authorities would be seen to be fictitious. . . . Finally, he remarked that Aristotle himself says in his own name what he has to say about the state and the rule of it by the outstanding1 man. 2 (R3 79) Syrian, in Metaph. 168. 33-35. At all events Aristotle in the second book of his Politicus says expressly . . . ' The good is the most accurate measure of all things'. 3 (R2 94-95, R3 80) Sen. De Ira 1. 3. 3. Aristotle's definition is not far removed from ours ; he says anger is the desire to repay pain. Ibid. 1. 9. 2. Anger, Aristotle says, is necessary, nor can any battle be won without it — unless it fills the mind and kindles the spirit. But we must treat it not as a commander but as a soldier. 1 Reading praestanti, with Wesenberg. POLITICUS 69 Ibid. 1. 17. 1. Aristotle says certain passions serve as weapons, if we use them aright. Ibid. 3. 3. 1. But, as I have said in former books, Aristotle stands as the defender of anger and forbids the expulsion of it from our nature. He says it is the spur to virtme, and if it is taken from us the mind becomes unarmed, and too sluggish and inert for great endeavours. . . 5. There is, then, no reason why you should think that I am wasting time on useless matters, and that anger is disgraceful, as though it were a thing of doubtful repute among men, when there is someone, a famous philosopher indeed, who assigns definite functions to it, and invokes it as useful, and as supplying spirit for battle, for active life, for everything that demands a certain heat. Ibid. 1. 7. 1. Is anger to be called to our aid? It has often been useful. It raises and excites the spirits ; courage does nothing splendid in war without it — nothing unless it is in- flamed by anger, unless anger has goaded men into boldness in face of danger. Some therefore think it best to temper anger, not to root it out ; to reduce it to healthy proportions by eradicating what is excessive, but to retain that without which action would languish and the force and vigour of the mind be relaxed. Cic. Tusc. 4. 19. 43. What shall we say of the Peripatetic view that those perturbations which we think should be extirpated are not only natural, but even a useful gift of nature ? This is what they say: First, they say much in praise of anger ; they call it the whetstone of courage and say that, whether it be against an enemy or against a bad citizen, the reaction of an angry man is far more vigorous. They make light of the petty reasonings of those whose thoughts took this form: 'It is right that this battle be fought ; it is fitting to fight for law, for liberty, for country.' These thoughts, they say, have no force unless courage is fanned into a blaze by anger. Nor do they argue only about soldiers in battle ; they think no strict discipline is possible without some 7o FRAGMENTS bitterness of anger. Finally, they think little of a speaker unless, in defence as well as in attack, he feels the sting of anger. Even if anger is not there, they think it must be simulated in language and in gesture, that the speaker's action may kindle the hearer's anger. In short, they say he seems no man who does not know how to be angry, and what we call mildness they call by the opprobrious name of sluggishness. Nor, indeed, is it only this craving that they praise — for anger, as I have just denned it, is craving for revenge — they say that craving or desire in general is a most useful gift of nature, since no one can do supremely well what he does not desire to do. . . . 20. 45. They say that pain itself ... is established by nature to a most useful end, in order that in their ill-doing men should feel the suffering of punishment, blame, and disgrace. For those who bear with- out pain disgrace and infamy seem to be granted immunity for their sins ; it is better to suffer the gnawing of conscience. . . . 46. They say the other forms of pain also have their uses ; pity leads men to help others and relieve undeserved suffering ; even envy and disparagement are not without use, when one sees that one has gained less than another, or that another has gained as much as oneself ; if anyone took from us fear, he would take with it all diligence, which is greatest in those who fear the laws, the magistrates, poverty, dis- grace, death, pain. In their discussions they admit that desires must be pruned, but say that they neither can nor need be completely uprooted, and that in almost all things the mean is the best. Philod. De Ira, p. 65. 31-66. 2 (Wilke). Some at least of the Peripatetics, as we have previously indicated by reference to individuals, say that those who remove anger and temper cut outright the sinews of the soul ; that without these things there would be neither punishment nor vengeance . . . that men would not engage in wars without anger, which makes them bold and takes away all shrinking and cowardice, and makes men steadfast even to death. So, too, anger produces the spirit of vengeance on enemies,1 the existence of which 1 Reading in R. 84. 33-85. 1 TtuwprjTiKov ra>v exdpwv, with Wilke. POLITICUS 71 is noble, just, privately and publicly advantageous, and pleasant to boot. 4 Philod. Voll. Rhet. 2. 175, fr. 15. 1-6. A hare that makes its appearance among hounds cannot escape (Aristotle says), nor can that which is deemed shameless and despicable survive among men. 5 Pap. Herc. 1020. From these facts, they say, it follows that wise men (as Aristotle says) cannot be deceived or err, and do all things well. ON POETS TESTIMONIA Arist. Poet. I454bi5-i8. All these rules one must keep in mind throughout, and, further, those also for such points of stage-effect as directly depend on the art of the poet, since in these too one may often make mistakes. Enough, however, has been said on the subject in our published writings. Vita Arist. Marciana p. 427. 3-7 (Rose). While he was still young, he received the education of a free man, as is shown by his Homeric Questions, by the edition of the Iliad which he gave to Alexander, by the dialogue On Poets, the Poetics, and the rhetorical treatises. Cf. Vita Arist. vulgo (ante ps.-Ammon. in Cat). Dio Chr. Or. 53. 1: see p. 3 supra. 1 (r2 59, R3 70) Diog. Laert. 8. 2. 57-58 (3). In his work On Poets Aristotle describes Empedocles as Homeric, and an artist in language, skilled in metaphor and in the other devices of poetry; he adds that Empedocles wrote, besides other poems, one on Xerxes' crossing of the Hellespont, and a prelude to Apollo, but that a sister — or, as Hieronyrnus says, a daughter — burned the prelude by accident, and the Persian poem in- tentionally, because it was unfinished. Aristotle adds, in general terms, that he also wrote tragedies and works on politics. 2 (R2 60, R3 71) Diog. Laert. 8. 2. 51-52 (1). Empedocles, according to Hippobotus, was the son of Meton son of Empedocles, and belonged to Agrigentum. . . . Eratosthenes in his list of ON POETS 73 Olympic winners says that Meton's father was successful in the seventy-first Olympiad ; his authority is Aristotle. Apol- lodorus the grammarian in his chronicles says Empedocles 'was the son of Meton, and Glaucus says he went to Thurii just after its foundation'. Then a little later he says: 'Those who relate that he fled from home to Syracuse and fought with the Syracusans against the Athenians seem to me to be completely mistaken; for he was either no longer alive or in extreme old age, which, however, does not seem to have been the case. For Aristotle and also Heraclides say he died at the age of sixty.' The Empedocles who won a horse-race in the seventy-first Olympiad was his grandfather and namesake, so that Apollodorus indicates his date as well as his parentage. Cf. ibid. 8. 2. 74 (n). 3 (R2 6i, R3 72) Diog. Laert. 3. 48 (32). It is said that Zeno the Eleatic was the first to write dialogues ; but Aristotle in the first book of his work On Poets says it was Alexamenos of Styra or of Teos, as Favorinus also says in his Memoirs. But Plato seems to me, by bringing the genre to perfection, to deserve the first prize for the invention, as well as for the beauty of his execution. Ath. 505 b-c. The writer who has utterly condemned the others1 recounts the praises of Meno ; in the Republic he banishes Homer and imitative poetry, but he himself wrote his dialogues in an imitative way. He was not even the in- ventor of this type; for before him Alexamenos of Teos invented this type of writing, as Nicias of Nicaea and Sotion testify. Aristotle in his work On Poets writes thus: 'Are we then to deny that the so-called mimes of Sophron, which are not even in metre,2 are stories and imitations, or the dialogues of Alexamenos of Teos, which were written before3 1 i.e. Plato. 2 Reading in R. 78. 11 iixfierpovs ovras rovs, with Kaibel. 3 Reading in R. 78. 13 -rrporepov, suggested by Kaibel. 74 FRAGMENTS the Socratic dialogues ? ' Thus the great savant Aristotle says outright that Alexamenos wrote dialogues before Plato. 4 (R2 62, R3 73) Diog. Laert. 3. 37 (25). Aristotle says that the genre of Plato's dialogues lies between poetry and prose. 5 (R2 63, R3 81) Procl. in Remp. 1. 42. 2 (Kroll). We must first mention and discuss Plato's reason for not admitting poetry. ... 10. Secondly, what can be the reason why he specially excludes tragedy and comedy, though these contribute to the purifica- tion of the passions, which can neither be completely re- pelled nor safely gratified to the full, but need seasonable exercise, the achievement of which in listening to drama saves us from being troubled by them at other times? . . . 49. 13. The second point was that the expulsion of tragedy and comedy is paradoxical, since b}' means of them it is possible to gratify the passions in due measure and, by doing so, to have them at our service for the purpose of education, having cured what was diseased in them. This objection, which gave to Aristotle a great handle for criticism, and to the defenders of these forms of poetry a starting-point for their arguments against Plato, we shall, in continuation of what we have already said, refute. ... 50. 17-26. We shall agree, then, that the statesman must devise some outlets for these passions, but not so as to intensify our leanings towards them ; on the contrary, so as to bridle them and keep the exercise of them within due limits; but these forms of poetry, which in addition to their garishness make an un- measured appeal to these passions, are far from serving the purpose of purification ; for purification depends not on excess but on restrained exercise, and has little likeness to the passions which it purifies. Iambl. Myst. 1. 11 (Parthey). The powers of the human passions in us, hemmed in everywhere, wax stronger, but if they are permitted a modest exercise, within the limits of ON POETS 75 due proportion, they have a measured enjoyment and are satisfied, and being thereby purified they come to a stop in obedience to persuasion, and not to force. Therefore, both in comedy and in tragedy, by looking at the passions of others we stay our own passions, make them more moderate, and purify them. Ibid. 3. 9. This is by no means to be called an elimination, or a purification and a cure ; for it is innate in us not as a result of disease or superfluity or excess; it is divine. 6 (r2 64, R3 74) Macr. 5. 18. 16. That it was the custom of the Aetolians to go to war with only one foot shod is shown by the famous tragic writer Euripides, in whose tragedy Meleager a messen- ger is introduced describing the dress of each of the captains who had come together to capture the boar. . . 19. In this matter ... we shall not fail to point out a fact known to very few, that Euripides was criticized by Aristotle, who maintained that this was Euripides' ignorance ; the Aetolians had not their left foot bare, but their right. That I may not make an assertion without proving it I will quote the very words of Aristotle in the second book1 of his work On Poets, where he says this about Euripides : ' Euripides says the sons of Thestius went with their left foot unshod — "In their left step they were unshod of foot, while the right was shod — so that they should have one knee light". The custom of the Aetolians is just the opposite; their left foot is shod, the right unshod, I suppose because the leading foot should be light but not that which remains fixed.' 7 (R2 65, R^ 75) Diog. Laert. 2. 5. 46. Socrates had as rivals (so Aristotle says in the third book of his work on poetry) a certain Antilochus of Lemnos and Antiphon the soothsayer, as Pythagoras had Cylon of Croton ; Homer while alive had Syagrus, and when dead Xenophanes of Colophon. Hesiod 1 Reading in R. 79. 3 secundum scripsit, with Eyssenhardt. 76 FRAGMENTS when alive had Cecrops, and after death the aforesaid Xenophanes; Pindar had Amphimenes1 of Cos, Thales had Pherecydes, Bias had Salarus of Priene, Pittacus had Anti- menidas and Alcaeus, Anaxagoras had Sosibius, and Simo- nides had Timocreon. 8 (R2 66, R^ 76) Ps.-Plu. Vit. Horn. 3-4. Aristotle in the third book of his work on poetry says that in the island of Ios, at the time when Neleus the son of Codrus ruled this Ionic colony, a certain girl who was a native of the island became pregnant by a spirit which was one of the companions of the Muses in the dance. When she saw the signs of her pregnancy she was ashamed of what had happened and betook herself to a place called Aegina. Pirates raided the place, captured the girl, and took her to Smyrna, which was then under the Lydians ; this they did as a favour to Maeon, who was the king of Lydia and their friend. He fell in love with the girl for her beauty and married her. While she was living near the Meles the birth-pangs came upon her and she gave birth to Homer on the bank of the river. Maeon adopted him and brought him up as his own son, Critheis having died im- mediately after her delivery. Not long after, Maeon himself died. When the Lydians were being oppressed by the Aeolians and had decided to leave Smyrna, and their leaders had called on any who wished to follow them to leave the town, Homer (still an infant) said he too wished to follow ; for which reason he was called Homer2 instead of Melesigenes. When he had grown up and already become famous for his poetry, he asked the god who were his ancestors and whence he came, and the god replied thus : ' Ios is thy mother's native island, which will receive thee dead ; but beware of the riddle of young men.' . . . Not long after, while sail- ing to Thebes, to the festival of Kronos (this is a musical contest which they hold), he came to Ios. Here he sat on a rock and watched the fishermen sailing in, and asked them 1 Reading in R. 79. 17 '^^i/xe'n?j, with the MSS. 2 6fiT)peiv — "O/irjpos. ON POETS 77 if they had anything. They had caught nothing, but were picking lice off themselves,1 and owing to the difficulty of this chase they replied : ' What we caught we left ; what we did not catch we bring with us', intimating that the lice they had caught they had killed and left behind, and those they had not caught they were carrying in their clothing. Homer failed to interpret the riddle and died of discouragement. The people of Ios buried him and inscribed on his tomb the high-sounding words: 'Here earth covers the sacred head, Homer, divine glorifier of heroes.' Cf. Gell. 3. 11. 7 and Homeri Opera, ed. Allen, 5. 244, 247, 251-2. Rose's fr. 77 is omitted, because it seems to belong not to the dialogue On Poets, but to the lost second book of the Poetics. 1 Reading in R. 80. 22 9eiplt,eo9at., with most of the MSS. ON PHILOSOPHY TESTIMONIA Philod. Piet. 7b4~8. On Philosophy. in the third book of Aristotle's work Prisc. Lydus 41. 16-42. 3. Our materials have been taken and put together from Plato's Timaeus . . . and from Aris- totle's Physics, De Caelo, De Generatione et Corruptione, and Meteorologica, and similarly from the De Somno and the De Somniis, and from what he wrote in dialogue form On Philo- sophy and On the Worlds. Simp, in De Caelo 288. 31-289. 2: see p. 5 supra. Ascl. in Metaph. 112. 16-19. 'About the first principles' (Aristotle says) 'we have already spoken in the Physics' ; and he promises to speak about these in Book a,1 and to raise and solve the problems about them in the work On Philosophy. 1 (R2 4, R3 I, W i) Plu. Mor. 1 1 18 c. Of the inscriptions at Delphi that which was thought to be the most inspired was ' Know thyself ' ; it was this, as Aristotle has said in his Platonic works,2 that induced in Socrates this mood of uncertainty and questioning. 2 (R2 3, R3 2, W 2) Diog. Laert. 2. 5. 23 (7). Aristotle says that Socrates went to Delphi; but also to the Isthmus, as Favorinus relates in the first book of his Memoirs. 3 (r2 5, R3 3, w 3) Porph. apud Stob. 3. 21. 26. What and whose was the sacred injunction at Delphi, which bids him who is to seek anything 1 Of the Metaphysics. 2 i.e. his dialogues. ON PHILOSOPHY 79 from the god to know himself ? . . . Whether it was Phemonoe . . . or Phanothea ... or Bias or Thales or Chilon that set it up . . . or whether we should give credence rather to Clearchus, who says the injunction was that of the Pythian oracle and was given to Chilon when he inquired what it was best for men to learn ; or whether even before the time of Chilon it was al- ready inscribed in the temple that was founded after the temple of feathers1 and that of bronze, as Aristotle has said in his work On Philosophy . . . Clem. Al. Strom. 1. 14. 60. 3. The saying 'Know thyself some have ascribed to Chilon, while Chameleon in his work on the gods ascribes it to Thales, and Aristotle ascribes it to the Pythian priestess. 4 (R2 6, R3 4, w 4) Clem. Al. Strom. 1. 14. 61. 1. Again, the saying 'Nothing in excess!' is ascribed to Chilon the Lacedaemonian. . . . 'Give a pledge, and ruin waits you' is cited by Cleomenes in his work on Hesiod. . . . The Aristotelian tradition ascribes it to Chilon, while Didymus assigns the advice to Thales. 5 (r2 7, R^ 5, w 5) Etymol. Magn. 722. 16-17 (Sylburg) s.v. ao^tarr-qs. Properly one who practises sophistry ; but Aristotle uses it of the Seven Sages. 6 (r2 8, 29, R3 6, 34, w 6) Diog. Laert. 1 Prooem. 8 (6). Aristotle in the first book of his work On Philosophy says that the Magi are more ancient even than the Egyptians, and that according to them there are two first principles, a good spirit and an evil spirit, one called Zeus and Oromasdes, the other Hades and Areimanius. Pliny, N.H. 30. 3. The art of magic undoubtedly began with Zoroaster in Persia, as the authorities agree. But it is not 1 Cf. Paus. 10. 5. 9 'The second temple was made by bees out of wax and feathers.' 80 FRAGMENTS quite clear whether there was only one Zoroaster, or a later one as well. Eudoxus, who claimed it to be the most illus- trious and most beneficial of the sects of philosophy, related that this Zoroaster lived six thousand years before the death of Plato; Aristotle agrees. Plu. Mor. 370 c. Of the planets, which they call the gods of birth, the Chaldaeans describe two as beneficent, two as maleficent, the other three as intermediate and neutral. . . . Aristotle calls the one form, the other privation. 7 (r2 9, R3 7, w 7) Philop. in De An. 186. 14-16. Aristotle says 'so-called' because the poems are thought not to be the work of Orpheus ; Aristotle himself maintains this in the books On Philosophy ; the opinions are those of Orpheus, but it is said1 that Onomacritus spun them out in verse. Cic. N.D. 1. 38. 107. Aristotle says the poet Orpheus never existed ; the Pythagoreans ascribe this Orphic poem to a certain Cercon.2 8 (r2 2, r3 13, W 8) Synes. Calvit. Enc. 22. 85 c. ... if indeed a proverb is a wise thing; and why should those things not be wise which Aristotle describes as relics, saved by their conciseness and cleverness when ancient philosophy perished in the wide- spread destruction of mankind ? Philoponus in Nicom. Isagogen 1. 1. Wisdom (oofta) was so called as being a sort of clearness (cra^eia) , inasmuch as it makes all things clear. This clearness, being, as it were, some- thing light ((f>aes), has acquired its name from that of light (cj)dos, a>s), because it brings hidden things to light. Since, then, as Aristotle says, things intelligible and divine, even if they are most clear in their own nature, seem to us dark 1 Reading in R. 26. 19 4>aaiv, with Hayduck. 2 Reading in R. 26. 22 Cerconis, with the MSS. ON PHILOSOPHY 81 and dim because of the mist of the body which hangs over us, men naturally gave to the knowledge which brings these things into the light for us the name of wisdom. But since we use the words 'wisdom' and 'wise' in a general way, it must be realized that these words are ambiguous. They have been taken by the ancients in five ways, which Aristotle mentions in his ten books On Philosophy. For you must know that men perish in diverse ways — both by plagues and famines and earthquakes and wars and various diseases and by other causes, but above all by more violent cataclysms, such as that in the time of Deucalion is said to have been ; it was a great cataclysm but not the greatest of all. For herdsmen and those who have their occupation in the mountains or the foothills are saved, while the plains and the dwellers in them are engulfed ; so, at least, they say that Dardanus was swept by the flood from Samothrace to what was afterwards called Troy, and thus was saved. Those who are saved from the water must live on the uplands, as the poet shows when he says: 'First Zeus the cloud-gatherer begat Dardanus, and he stablished Dardania, for not yet was holy Ilios built upon the plain to be a city of mortal men, but still they dwelt on slopes of many-fountained Ida.1 The word 'still' shows that they had not yet courage to live in the plains. These survivors, then, not having the means of sustenance, were forced by necessity to think of useful devices — the grinding of corn, sowing, and the like — and they gave the name of wisdom to such thought, thought which discovered what was useful with a view to the necessities of life, and the name of wise to anyone who had had such thoughts. Again, they devised arts, as the poet says, 'at the prompting of Athene' — arts not limited to the necessities of life, but going on to the production of beauty and elegance ; and this again men have called wisdom, and its discoverer wise, as in the phrase 'A wise craftsman framed it',2 'knowing well by Athene's promptings of wisdom '.3 For, because of the excellence of the discoveries, they ascribed the thought of these things to God. Again, they turned their attention to politics, and invented 1 Horn. //. 20. 215-18. 2 Cf. ibid. 23. 712. 3 Cf. ibid. 15. 412, Od. 16. 233. < 1 . j'.i G 82 FRAGMENTS laws, and all the things that hold a state together ; and such thought also they called wisdom ; for such were the Seven Wise Men — men who attained political virtues. Then they went farther and proceeded to bodies themselves and the nature that fashions them, and this they called by the special name of natural science, and its possessors we describe as wise in the affairs of nature. Fifthly, men applied the name in connexion with things divine, supramundane, and com- pletely unchangeable, and called the knowledge of these things the highest wisdom. 9 (w 9) Sext. Em p. Phys. 2. 45-46. Some say that movement exists, others deny this . . . namely the followers of Parmenides and Melissus, whom Aristotle has called immobilists1 and non- physical thinkers — immobilists because they maintain the immobility of being, non-physical because nature is the source of movement, and in saying that nothing moves they denied the existence of nature. 10 (R2 10, R3 8, W 10) Procl. apud Philop. De Aet. Mundi, p. 31. 17 (Rabe). It looks as though there were nothing in Plato that Aristotle rejected so firmly as the theory of Ideas, not only in his logical writings ... 20 but also in his ethical writings ... 21 and in his physical writings ... 32. 1 and much more in his Metaphysics . . . 5-8 and in his dialogues, where he asseverates most clearly that he cannot agree with this doctrine, even if he lays himself open to the charge of opposing it from love of polemic. Plu. Mor. 1 1 15 b-c: see p. 4 supra. 11 (R2 11, R3 9, W 11) Syrian- in Metaph. 159. 33-160. 5. Aristotle himself admits that he has said nothing against the hypotheses of the 1 Omitting ttJs voecos, with some MSS. This seems to be a punning use of the word oto.oiu)tt]s. ON PHILOSOPHY 83 Platonists and quite fails to keep pace with the doctrine of the ideal numbers, if these are different from the mathematical. This is shown by the words in the second book of the work On Philosophy: 'Thus if the Ideas are a different sort of number, not mathematical number, we can have no under- standing of it ; for of the majority of us, at all events, who comprehends any other number ? ' Thus in fact he has addressed his refutation to the multitude who know no num- ber other than that which is composed of units, and did not begin to grasp the thought of these divine thinkers. Alex. Aph. in Metaph. 117. 23-118. 1. Aristotle sets out the Platonic dogma, which he has also stated in the work On Philosophy. Wishing to reduce realities (which is what he always means by ' substances ') to the first principles which they assumed (the great and the small, which they called the indefinite dyad), they said the first principles of length were the short and long (the assumption being that length takes its origin from a long and short, i.e. from a great and small, or that every line falls under one or other of these) , and that the first principles of the plane were the narrow and wide, which are themselves also great and small. Arist. De An. 404bi6-24. In the same way Plato, in the Timaeus, fashions the soul out of his elements ; for like, he holds, is known by like, and things are formed out of the principles or elements.1 Similarly also in the work On Philo- sophy it was set forth that the Animal itself is compounded of the Idea itself of the One together with the primary length, breadth, and depth, everything else2 being similarly constituted. Again, he puts his view in yet other terms: Mind is the monad, knowledge the dyad (because it goes undeviatingly from one point to another), opinion the num- ber of the plane, sensation the number of the solid. Simp, in De An. 28. 7-9. Aristotle now applies the name On Philosophy to his work On the Good (taken down from plato's 1 sc. so that the soul must be so too. 2 sc. the objects of its cognition. 84 FRAGMENTS lectures), in which he relates both the Pythagorean opinions about reality and those of Plato. Cf. Philop. in De An. 75. 34-76. 1 (see p. 116 infra). Ps.-Alex. in Metaph. 777. 16-21. The principle of the One they did not all introduce in the same way. Some said that the numbers themselves introduced the Forms into spatial magnitudes, the number 2 doing so for the line, the number 3 for the plane, the number 4 for the solid (Aristotle relates this about Plato in the work On Philosophy, and that is why he here summarizes only briefly and concisely the theory of the Platonists) ; while others explained the form of the spatial magnitudes by participation in the One. 12 a (r2 12, R3 10, w 12a) Sext. Emp. Phys. 1. 20-23. Aristotle used to say that men's thought of gods sprang from two sources — the experiences of the soul, and the phenomena of the heavens. To the first head belonged the inspiration and prophetic power of the soul in dreams. For when (he says) the soul is isolated in sleep, it assumes its true nature and foresees and foretells the future. So is it too with the soul, when at death it is severed from the body. At all events, Aristotle accepts even Homer as having observed this ; for Homer has represented Patroclus, in the moment of his death, as foretelling the death of Hector, and Hector as foretelling the end of Achilles. It was from such events (he says) that men came to suspect the existence of something divine,1 of that which is in its nature akin to the soul and of all things most full of know- ledge. But the heavenly bodies also contributed to this be- lief; seeing by day the sun running his circular course, and by night the well-ordered movement of the other stars, they came to think that there is a God who is the cause of such movement and order. Such was the belief of Aristotle. Cic. Div. ad Brut. 1. 30. 63. When, therefore, sleep has freed the mind from the society and contact of the body, then it 1 Reading in R. 28. 13 detov, with Mutschmann. ON PHILOSOPHY 85 remembers the past, discerns the present, and foresees the future ; for the body of a sleeper lies like that of a dead man, but his mind is active and alive . . . and so when death approaches it is much more divine. . . . 64. That dying men have foreknowledge Posidonius confirms by the example he adduces. . . . Another instance of this is Homer's Hector, who when dying announces the approaching death of Achilles. 12 b (r2 13, R3 II, W 12 b) Sext. Emp. Math. 9 (Phys. 1) 26-27. Some men, when they come to the unswerving and well-ordered movement of the heavenly bodies, say that in this the thought of gods had its origin ; for as, if one had sat on the Trojan Mount Ida and seen the array of the Greeks approaching the plains in good order and arrangement, 'horsemen first with horses and chariots, and footmen behind',1 such a one would certainly have come to think that there was someone arranging such an array and commanding the soldiers ranged under him, Nestor or some other hero who knew 'how to order horses and bucklered warriors'.2 And as one familiar with ships, as soon as he sees from afar a ship running before the wind with all its sails well set, knows that there is someone directing it and steering it3 to its appointed harbours, so those who first looked up to heaven and saw the sun running its race from its rising to its setting, and the orderly dances of the stars, looked for the Craftsman of this lovely design, and surmised that it came about not by chance but by the agency of some mightier and imperishable nature, which was God. 13 (R2 14, R3 12, W 13) Cic. N.D. 2. 37. 95-96. Great was the saying of Aristotle: ' Suppose there were men who had lived always underground, in good and well-lighted dwellings, adorned with statues and pictures, and furnished with everything in which those who are thought happy abound. Suppose, however, that they had 1 Horn. //. 4. 297. 2 Ibid. 2. 554. 3 Reading in R. 29. 6 Ka.Ta.ywv, with Mutschmann. 86 FRAGMENTS never gone above ground, but had learned by report and hearsay that there is a divine authority and power. Suppose that then, at some time, the jaws of the earth opened, and they were able to escape and make their way from those hidden dwellings into these regions which we inhabit. When they suddenly saw earth and seas and sky, when they learned the grandeur of clouds and the power of winds, when they saw the sun and learned his grandeur and beauty and the power shown in his filling the sky with light and making day ; when, again, night darkened the lands and they saw the whole sky picked out and adorned with stars, and the varying lights of the moon as it waxes and wanes, and the risings and settings of all these bodies, and their courses settled and immutable to all eternity ; when they saw those things, most certainly they would have judged both that there are gods and that these great works are the works of gods.' Thus far Aristotle. Philo, Leg. Alleg. 3. 32. 97-99. The earliest thinkers inquired how we came to recognize the divine. Later, the most highly esteemed philosophers said that it was from the world and its parts and the powers inherent in these that we came to grasp their cause. If one saw a house carefully furnished with entrances, colonnades, men's quarters, women's quarters, and all the other buildings, he would acquire an idea of the archi- tect, since he would reflect that the house could not have been completed without the art of a craftsman ; and so too with a city, a ship, or any structure small or great. So also if one comes into this world as into a vast house or city, and sees the heavens revolving in a circle and containing all things within them, planets and unwandering stars moving uni- formly in orderly and harmonious fashion for the good of the whole, earth occupying the midmost region, streams of water and air in between, living things also, mortal and immortal, varieties of plants and crops ; he will surely reason that these things have not been framed without perfect skill, but that there both was and is a framer of this universe — God. Those, then, who reason thus grasp God by way of his shadow, apprehending the Craftsman through his works. ON PHILOSOPHY 87 Cf. Philo, De Praem. et Poen. 7. 40-46, De Spec. Leg. 1. 35. 185-36. 194. 14 (r2 44, R3 14, w 14) Sen. Q.N. 7. 30. Aristotle says excellently that we should nowhere be more modest than in matters of religion. If we compose ourselves before we enter temples . . . how much more should we do this when we discuss the constellations, the stars, and the nature of the gods,1 to guard against saying anything rashly and imprudently, either not knowing it to be true or knowing it to be false ! Cf. Plu. Mor. 477 c-f. 15 (R245> R3I5, w 15) Synesius, Dio. 10. 48 a. ... as Aristotle claims that those who are being initiated into the mysteries are to be expected not to learn anything but to suffer some change, to be put into a certain condition, i.e. to be fitted for some purpose. Michael Psellus, Schol. ad Joh. Climacum {Cat. des Man. Alch. Grecs, ed. Bidez, 1928), 6. 171. I undertook to teach you what I have learned, not what I have experienced . . . the one is matter for teaching, the other for mystical experience. The first comes to men by hearing, the second comes when reason itself has experienced illumination — which Aristotle described as mysterious and akin to the Eleusinian rites (for in these he who was initiated into the mysteries was being moulded, not being taught). 16 (R2 15, R3 16, W 16) Simp, in De Caelo 289. 1-15. Aristotle speaks of this in the work On Philosophy. In general, where there is a better there is a best. Since, then, among existing things one is better than another, there is also something that is best, which will 1 Reading in R. 31. 7-8 de sideribus, de stellis, de deorum natura disputamus, with Gercke. 88 FRAGMENTS be the divine. Now that which changes is changed either by something else or by itself, and if by something else, either by something better or by something worse, and if by itself, either to something worse or through desire for something better ; but the divine has nothing better than itself by which it may be changed (for that other would then have been more divine), nor on the other hand is it lawful for the better to be affected by the worse ; besides, if it were changed by some- thing worse, it would have admitted some evil into itself, but nothing in it is evil. On the other hand, it does not change itself through desire for something better, since it lacks none of its own excellences; nor again does it change itself for the worse, since even a man does not willingly make himself worse, nor has it anything evil such as it would have acquired from a change to the worse. This proof, too, Aristotle took over from the second book of Plato's Republic. 17 (R2 16, R3 17, W 17) Scliol. in Proverb. Salomonis, cod. Paris, gr. 174, f. 46 a. To Aristotle belongs the following: 'There is either one first principle or many. If there is one, we have what we are looking for; if there are many, they are either ordered or disordered. Now if they are disordered, their products are more so, and the world is not a world but a chaos ; besides, that which is contrary to nature belongs to that which is by nature non-existent. If on the other hand they are ordered, they were ordered either by themselves or by some outside cause. But if they were ordered by themselves, they have something common that unites them, and that is the first principle.' 18 (R2 17, R3 18, W 18) Philo, De Aet. Mundi 3. 10-11. Aristotle was surely speaking piously and devoutly when he insisted that the world is ungenerated and imperishable, and convicted of grave un- godliness those who maintained the opposite, who thought that the great visible god, which contains in truth sun and moon and the remaining pantheon of planets and unwander- ON PHILOSOPHY 89 ing stars, is no better than the work of man's hands ; he used to say in mockery (we are told) that in the past he had feared lest his house be destroyed by violent winds or storms beyond the ordinary, or by time or by lack of proper maintenance, but that now a greater danger hung over him, from those who by argument destroyed the whole world. 19 a (r3 19, W 19 a) Philo, De Act. Mundi 5. 20-24 -The arguments which prove the world to be ungenerated and imperishable should, out of respect for the visible god, be given their proper precedence and placed earlier in the discussion. To all things that admit of being destroyed there are ordained two causes of destruc- tion, one inward, the other outward. Iron, bronze, and such- like substances you will find being destroyed from within when rust invades and devours them like a creeping disease, and from without when a house or a city is set on fire and they catch fire from it and are destroyed by the fierce rush of flame ; and similarly death comes to living beings from themselves when they fall sick, and from outside when they have their throats cut or are stoned or burned to death or suffer the unclean death by hanging. If the world, too, is destroyed, it must be either by something outside or by one of the powers in itself. Now each of these is impossible. For there is nothing outside the world, since all things have contributed to its completeness. For so will it be one, whole, and ageless; one because only if something had been left out of its composition would there be another world like the present world ; whole because the whole of being has been expended on it ; ageless and diseaseless because bodies caught by disease and old age are destroyed by the violent assault from without of heat and cold and the other contrary forces, of which none can escape and circle round and attack the world, since all without exception are entirely enclosed within it. If there is anything outside, it must be a complete void or an impassive nature which cannot suffer or do any- thing. Nor again will the world be destroyed by anything within it — firstly because the part would then be both go FRAGMENTS greater and more powerful than the whole, which is the most incredible of all things ; for the world, wielding unsurpassable power, directs all its parts and is directed by none ; secondly because, there being two causes of destruction, one within and one without, things that can suffer the one are necessarily susceptible also to the other. The evidence? Ox and horse and man and such-like animals, because they can be destroyed by iron, will also perish by disease. For it is hard, nay im- possible, to find anything that is fitted to be subject to the external cause of destruction and entirely insusceptible to the internal. Since, then, it was shown that the world will not be destroyed by anything without, because absolutely nothing has been left outside, neither will it be destroyed by anything within, because of the preceding argument to the effect that that which is susceptible to the one cause is also susceptible to the other. 19 b (r3 20, w 19 b) Philo, DeAet. Mundi 6. 28 — 7. 34. This may be put in another way. Of composite bodies all that are destroyed are dissolved into their components ; but dissolution is surely nothing but reduction to the natural state of the parts, so that conversely where there is composition, it has forced into an unnatural state the parts that have come together. And indeed it seems to be so beyond a doubt. For we men were put to- gether by borrowing little parts of the four elements, which belong in their entirety to the whole universe — earth, water, air, and fire. Now these parts when mixed are robbed of their natural position, the upward-travelling heat being forced down,1 the earthy and heavy substance being made light and seizing in turn the upper region, which is occupied by the earthiest of our parts, the head. The worst of bonds is that which is fastened by violence ; this is violent and shortlived, for it is broken sooner by those who have been bound, because they shake off the noose through longing for their natural movement, to which they hasten. For, as the tragic poet says, 'Things born of earth return to earth, 1 Reading in R. 35. 13-14 KaTaooOeiorjs, with Diels. ON PHILOSOPHY 91 things born of an ethereal seed return to the pole of heaven ; nothing that comes into being dies; one departs in one direction, one in another,1 and each shows its own form.'2 For all things that perish, then, this is the law and this the rule prescribed — when the parts that have come together in the mixture have settled down they must in place of their natural order have experienced disorder, and must move to the opposites of their natural places, so that they seem to be in a sense exiles, but when they are separated they turn back to their natural sphere. Now the world has no part in the disorder we have spoken of ; for let us consider. If the world is perishing, its parts must now each be placed in the region unnatural to it. But this we cannot easily suppose; for to all the parts of the world have fallen perfect position and harmonious arrangement, so that each, as though fond of its own country, seeks no change to a better. For this reason, then, was assigned to earth the midmost position, to which3 all earthy things, even if you throw them up, descend. This is an indication of their natural place ; for in that region in which a thing brought thither stays and rests, when under no compulsion, there it has its home. Secondly, water is spread over the earth, and air and fire have moved from the middle to the upper region, to air falling the region between water and fire, and to fire the highest region of all. And so, even if you light a torch and throw it to the ground, the flame will none the less strive against you and lighten itself and return to the natural motion of fire. If, then, the cause of destruction of other creatures is their unnatural situation,4 but in the world each of its parts is situated according to nature and has had its proper place assigned to it, the world may justly be called imperishable. 19 c (R3 21, W 19 c) Philo, De Aet. Mundi 8. 39-43. The most conclusive argu- ment is that on which I know very many people to pride themselves, as on something most precise and quite irrefutable. 1 Reading in R. 35. 23 npos dXXo, with the MSS. 2 Eur. fr. 836 Nauck. 3 Reading in R. 36. 11 e' 6v. 4 Reading in R. 36. 20-1 17 napa 4>vaiv ra£is rcov aAAcuv, with Cohn. 92 FRAGMENTS They ask, Why should God destroy the world?1 Either to save himself from continuing in world-making, or in order to make another world. The former of these purposes is alien to God ; for what befits him is to turn disorder into order, not order into disorder ; and further, he would be admitting into himself repentance, an affection and disease of the soul. For he should either not have made a world at all, or else, if he judged the work becoming to him, should have rejoiced in the product. The second alternative deserves full examina- tion. For if instead of the present world he is to make an- other, the world he makes will be in any case either worse or better than the present world, or like to it, and each of these possibilities is open to objection, (i) If it is worse, its artificer will be worse ; but the works of God are blameless, exempt from criticism, incapable of improvement, fashioned as they are by the most perfect art and knowledge. For, as the saying goes, 'not even a woman is so lacking in good judgement as to prefer the worse2 when the better is avail- able' ;3 and it is befitting for God to give shape to the shapeless and to deck the ugliest things with marvellous beauties. (2) If the new world is like the old, its artificer will have laboured in vain, differing in nothing from mere children, who often, when they make sand-castles on the shore, build them up and then pull them down. It were far better, instead of making a new world like the old, neither to take away nor to add anything, nor change anything for better or for worse, but to leave the original world in its place. (3) If he is to make a better world, the artificer himself must become better, so that when he made the former world he must have been more imperfect both in art and in wisdom — which it is not lawful even to suspect. For God is equal and like to him- self, admitting neither slackening towards the worse nor intensification towards the better. 20 (R2 18, R3 22, W 20) Cic. Lucullus 38. 119 (Plasberg). When your wise Stoic has 1 Reading in R. 36. 27 depet, with Gomperz. 2 Reading in R. 37. 12 ^cpeiof', with Meineke. 3 Reading in R. 37. 13 dfieivorepajv napeovrcov, with Mangey. ON PHILOSOPHY 93 said all these things to you syllable by syllable, Aristotle will come with the golden flow of his speech, to say that the Stoic is talking nonsense ; he will say that the world never came into being, because there never was a new design from which so noble a work could have taken its beginning, and that it is so well designed in every part that no force can effect such great movements and so great a change, no old age can come upon the world by lapse of time, so that this beauteous world should ever fall to pieces and perish. Lact. hist. 2. 10. 24. If the world can perish as a whole because it perishes in parts, it clearly has at some time come into being ; and as fragility proclaims a beginning, so it pro- claims an end. If that is true, Aristotle could not save the world itself from having a beginning. Now if Plato and Epicurus wring this admission from Aristotle, then in spite of the eloquence of Plato and Aristotle, who thought the world would last for ever, Epicurus will force from them the same unwilling conclusion, since it follows that the world has also an end. 21 (R2 19-20, R3 23-24, W 2l) Cic. N.D. 2. 15. 42. Since some living things have their origin in earth, others in water, others in air, Aristotle thinks it absurd to suppose that in that part which is fittest to generate living things no animal should be born. Now the stars occupy the ethereal region ; and since that region is the least dense and is always in movement and activity, the animal born in it must have the keenest perception and the swiftest movement. Thus, since it is in ether that the stars are born, it is proper that in these there should be perception and intelligence. From which it follows that the stars must be reckoned among the gods. Ibid. 16. 44. Aristotle is to be praised, too, for judging that all things that move do so either by nature or by compulsion or by choice, and that the sun and moon and all the stars are in movement, and that things that move by nature move 94 FRAGMENTS either downwards by virtue of weight or upwards by virtue of lightness, neither of which could happen to the stars, because their movement is in an orb or circle. Nor again can it be said that some greater force makes the stars move contrary to nature; for what power can be greater? What remains, then, is that the movement of the stars is voluntary. He who sees these things would be acting not only ignorantly but also impiously if he denied that there are gods. 22 (W 22) Stob. 1. 43 = Dox. Gr. 432. 4-8. Plato and Aristotle say there are four kinds of animals — of land, of water, winged, heavenly. For the stars too, thej' say, are said to be animals, and the world itself is divine,1 a reasonable immortal animal. Olymp. in Phd. 180. 22-23 (Norvin). Aristotle ascribes the whole process of creation to the heavenly animals.2 Nemes. De Nat. Horn. ch. 34. Aristotle ascribes the genera- tion of these to the sun and the zodiacal circle. Cf. Plu. Mor. 908 f, Ps.-Galen, Phil. Hist. ch. 35. 23 (r2 37, R3 42, W 23) Olymp. in Phd. 200. 3-6 (Norvin). That there must even be a whole race of men which is thus nourished is shown by the case of the man in these parts who was nourished by the sun's rays alone; Aristotle told about him, having himself seen him. Ibid. 239. 19-21. If Aristotle recorded the case of a man in this world who was sleepless and was nourished only by the sun's rays, what must we think of things in another world ? 24 (R2 39, R3 48, W 24) Olymp. in Phd. 26. 22-27. 4 (Norvin). Proclus would have heavenly bodies possess only sight and hearing, as Aristotle 1 Reading Aeyeodai kcu tov koo^iov kolvtov ZvOeov, with Diels. 2 i.e. to the zodiacal animals. ON PHILOSOPHY 95 also would; of the senses they have only these, which are those that contribute to well-being, not those that contribute to being, as the other senses do. The poet testifies to this, saying: 'Sun, who seest all things and hearest all things'1 — which implies that the heavenly bodies have only sight and hearing. Aristotle adds that these senses, most of all, have knowledge by way of activity rather than of passivity, and are fitter for the unchanging heavenly bodies. Damascius, however, holds that these bodies have also the other senses. 25 (R2 43, R3 47, w 25) Plu. Mor. 1 138 c-1104 b. We have shown that Plato rejected the other forms of music not from ignorance or musical inexperi- ence but as being unbefitting to such a constitution ; we will next show that he was skilled in music. . . . 1139 b-1140 b. On the theme that music is something noble, divine, and grand, Aristotle, the pupil of Plato, says: 'Music is heavenly, by nature divine, beautiful, and inspired ; having by nature four parts, it has two means, the arithmetical and the harmonic, and the parts of it, their extents, and their excesses one over another, have numerical and proportionate relations; for tunes2 are arranged in two tetrachords.3 These are his words. He meant that the body of music was composed of unlike parts ; which, however, harmonized with each other. But its means also harmonized in arithmetical ratio ; for the highest note, proportioned to the lowest in the ratio of 2 : 1, com- pleted the octave. For music has, as we said before, a highest note of twelve units and a lowest note of six. Paramese, harmonizing with hypate in the ratio of 3 : 2, has nine units, while, as we said, mese has eight.4 It is of these that the fundamental musical intervals are composed — the fourth, 1 Horn. //. 3. 277, Od. 12. 323. 2 Reading in R. 53. 7 /xe'A??, with the MSS. 3 The Greeks regarded a musical scale as formed by two tetrachords, either so that the highest note of one was identical with the lowest note of the other (as in EFGAB[?CD), or so that there was an interval of a note between them (as in EFGA BCDE). 4 Plutarch takes account only of the fundamental notes of the scale — the base note (hypate), the fourth (mese), the fifth (paramese), and the octave (neate). 96 FRAGMENTS involving the ratio 4 : 3, the fifth, involving the ratio 3 : 2, and the octave, involving the ratio 2:1. But the ratio 9 : 8 is also found, which gives the interval of a single tone. The notes of the scale exceed, and are exceeded by, the notes, and the intervals by the intervals, by the same excesses, both in geometrical progression and in arithmetical. Aristotle, then, describes them as having such values, neate exceeding mese by the third part of itself,1 hypate exceeded by paramese in the same ratio,2 so that the excesses are correlative ; the notes exceed and are exceeded by the same fractions. Thus the extreme notes respectively exceed and are exceeded by mese and paramese in the same ratios, 4 : 3 and 3 : 2.3 Such an excess is the harmonic.4 And neate exceeds mese and para- mese exceeds hypate by arithmetically equal fractions.5 For paramese is to mese as 9 : 8, neate to hypate as 2 : 1, para- mese to hypate as 3 : 2, and mese to hypate as 4 : 3. Thus, according to Aristotle, is the scale constituted in respect of the notes and the corresponding numbers. Both it and all its notes are, as regards their inmost nature, constituted by the even, the odd,6 and the even-odd. For it is itself, as a whole, even, involving four terms, while its parts and their ratios are even, odd, and even-odd ; neate is even, containing twelve units, paramese odd, containing nine, mese even, containing eight, hypate even-odd, contain- ing six.7 Being itself thus constituted, and its notes so related 1 Reading in R. 53. 27 avTrjs, with Bernardakis. 2 i.e. by the third part of paramese. 3 i.e. neate : mese = paramese : hypate = 3:2, and neate : paramese = mese : hypate = 4:3. 4 Three quantities a, b, c were described by the Greeks as forming a . . o. c 12 , 6 harmonic progression if a = b-\ — and b = c-\ — . 12 = 8-\ — ■ and 8 =6-\ — , n « 3 3 so that 12, 8, 6 (neate, mese, hypate) formed a harmonic progression. 5 This sentence cannot be right as it stands in the Greek ; the sense requires in R. 54. 2-4 something like 17 8e vedrr) vnepexei ttjs p-earjg /car' dpi.dp.-qTt.K6v \6yov loco fiepei. ko.1 y Trapafxia-q rijs vTTaTrjs. Neate, paramese, mese, and hypate being to one another as 12, 9, 8, 6, neate exceeds mese, and paramese exceeds hypate, by equal fractions, i.e. by a half. 6 The context seems to demand in R. 54. 9-10 the reading zk re ttjs aprlas K01 TTepLooijs, which was proposed by Yolkmann. 7 12 is said to be even but 6 to be even-odd, because 'even-odd' was applied, and confined, to numbers whose halves are odd. ON PHILOSOPHY 97 in respect of their mutual excesses and ratios, it is as a whole in harmony with itself and with its parts. But furthermore, of the senses that come into being in bodies, those which are heavenly and divine, affording by God's help and by reason of this harmony1 perception to men — namely sight and hearing — exhibit harmony by the aid of sound and light. And the senses that accompany them are, qua senses, harmoniously constituted ; for it is not without harmony that these too produce their effects ; they are lesser than sight and hearing, but not derived from them. When God is present, those. two come into being in bodies, in accordance with numerical principles, and their nature is both powerful and beautiful. It is clear, then, that the ancient Greeks were right in valuing musical education most highly of all. 26 (R2 21, R3 26, w 26) Cic. N.D. 1. 13. 33 (speaking in the person of an Epicurean). ' Aristotle, in the third book of his work On Philosophy, creates much confusion through dissenting2 from his master Plato. For now he ascribes all divinity to mind, now he says the world itself is a god, now he sets another god over the world and ascribes to him the role of ruling and preserving the movement of the world by a sort of backward rotation. Then he says the heat of the heavens is a god, not realizing that the heavens are part of the world, which he has himself elsewhere called a god. But how can the divine sense-per- ception which he ascribes to the heavens be preserved in a movement so speedy? Where, again, are all the gods of popular belief, if we count the heavens, too, as a god ? And when he himself demands that God be without a body, he deprives him of all sense-perception, and even of foresight. Moreover, how can the world move3 if it lacks body, and how, if it is always moving itself, can it be calm and blessed ? ' 1 Reading 8«i ttjv appovlav (with the MSS.) after aioQ-qciv in R. 54. 21, in- stead of in R. 54. 20. 2 Omitting non in R. 39. 19, with the MSS. 3 Reading in R. 40. 2 modo mundus moveri, with the MSS. 645.29 H 98 FRAGMENTS 27 (w 27) Cic. Acad. 1. 7. 26. Therefore air — this word1 too we use as a Latin word — and fire and water and earth are primary; from them spring the forms of animals and of the fruits of the earth. Therefore these are called first principles and, to translate from the Greek, elements; of them, air and fire have the power of producing movement and causing change, while the part of the others — water and earth — is to receive and, as it were, to suffer. The fifth kind, from which were derived stars and minds, Aristotle thought to be something distinct, and unlike the four I have mentioned above. Cic. Tusc. i. 10. 22. Aristotle, who far exceeded all others — Plato I always except — both in intellect and in industry, after taking account of the four well-known classes of first principles from which all things were derived, considers that there is a fifth kind of thing, from which comes mind ; for thought, foresight, learning and teaching, discovery, the riches of memory, love and hate, desire and fear, distress and joy, these and their like (he thinks) cannot be included in any of the four classes ; he adds a fifth, nameless class, and so calls the mind itself by the new name eVSeAe'xeta, as being a continuous and endless movement. Ibid. 1. 17. 41. If the mind is either a certain number (a subtle but not a very clear hypothesis) or the fifth nature, which is unnamed but well understood, these beings are much more perfect and pure, so that they move very far from the earth. Ibid 1. 26. 65-27. 66. But if there is a fifth nature, introduced first2 by Aristotle, this is the nature both of gods and of minds.3 We, following this opinion, have expressed it in these very words in our Consolatio : ' The origin of minds is not to be found on earth ; for in minds there is nothing mixed and composite, nothing that seems to be born and fashioned of earth, nothing even resembling water, air, or fire. For in 1 sc. aer. 2 Reading inducta primum, haec, with the MSS. 3 Reading animorum, with the MSS. ON PHILOSOPHY 99 these natures there is nothing that has the power of memory, mind, and thought, that retains the past, foresees the future, and can grasp the present — which alone are living powers — nor will it ever be discovered whence these can come to man, except from God.' There is, therefore, a singular nature and power of mind, disjoined from these customary and well- known natures. Thus, whatever it is that feels, knows, lives, thrives, it must be celestial and divine, and- therefore eternal. Nor can the God whom we know be otherwise understood than as a mind apart and free, separated from all mortal admixture, feeding and moving all things, and itself endowed with eternal motion. Of this kind and of the same nature is the human mind. Clem. Rom. Recogn. 8. 15. Aristotle introduced a fifth ele- ment, which he called aKarovo^aarov, i.e. unnameable, doubt- less pointing to the being who by uniting the four elements in one made the world. 28 (w 30) Arist. Phys. i94a27-36. The end and the means must be studied by the same science ; and the nature is the end (for the terminus of a continuous process is also its final cause;1 hence the poet's2 absurd remark, ' He has the end for which he was born',3 which is absurd because not every final point but only that which is best is a final cause). Indeed, some arts make their matter and others make it workable, and we use their matter as existing for our own sake (for we are the end, in one of the two senses we have distinguished in the work On Philosophy). 1 Reading com ti reXos, tovto to eaxarov kcu to ov fi'CKa. 2 An unidentified comic poet (Kock, Com. Alt. Fr. in, p. 493). 3 i.e. death. ON JUSTICE TESTIMONIUM Cic. Rep. 3. 8. 12. The other writer1 filled four huge books with his views on justice itself. 1 (R2 71, R3 82) Demetr. Eloc. 28. Neither in passages meant to rouse terror, then, as I have shown, nor in passages of pathos or moral reflection, is the use of words of similar ending serviceable ; for pathos wants to be simple and unforced, and so does moral reflection. At all events in Aristotle's work On Justice, if the speaker who is bewailing the fate of Athens were to say ' They took an enemy city and lost their own ; compare their gain with their loss', he would have used the language of pathos and pity; but if he uses the jingle 'They took an enemy city and lost their own ; compare the profit they gained with the loss they sustained', by heaven he will rouse not sympathy nor pity2 but (as we say) smiles mixed with tears. To use such false artifices in pathetic passages is, in proverbial language, to play among those who mourn. 2 (R2 73, R3 84) Suet. De Blasph. p. 416 (Miller) s.v. EvpvfiaTos. A criminal, also called Eurybates. . . . Aristotle in the first book of his work On Justice says he was a thief who when he was caught and put in chains and encouraged by the warders to show how he got over walls and into houses, 'on being set free, fastened spikes to his feet and took the sponges, climbed very easily, escaped from the roof, and got away'. Cf. Greg. Cor. Ad Hermog. c. 19, and Suidas s.v. Evpvfiaros. 1 Aristotle. 2 Reading in R. 87. 1 Kivrjaei ouSe eXeov dXXd, with the MSS. ON JUSTICE 101 3 (r2 74, R3 85) Lact. Inst. 5. 15. Carneades,1 in order to refute Aristotle's and Plato's praise of justice, in his first discourse collected all the things that used to be said in favour of justice, with the object of disproving them, as he in fact did. Lact. Epit. 55. A great number of philosophers, but princi- pally Plato and Aristotle, said much about justice, defending it and bestowing the highest praise on it because it assigns to each man what is his own and preserves equity in all things, and maintained that while the other virtues are, so to speak, silent and inward, it is justice alone that is not so self-contained and hidden, but stands boldly forth in readiness to act well for the general good. 4 (r2 75, R3 86) Plu. Mor. 1040 e. Chrysippus says in criticism of Aristotle on the subject of justice that he is not right in saying that if pleasure is the end justice is destroyed, and with justice each of the other virtues. Cf. Cic. Hortensius, fr. 81 (Miiller) = August. C. ltd. Pel. 4. 14. 72. 5 (r2 76, R3 87) Porph. in De hit. apud Boeth. in De Int. ed. 2, 1. 1, p. 27 (Meiser). Aristotle in his work On Justice says 'thoughts and sensations are from the very start distinct in their nature'. 6 (R3 88) Them. Or. 26 d-27 b. Zeno, the founder of the Stoic school, though he was in all other respects proud and lofty, yet was pleased and flattered when on the strength of his discourses the Athenians conferred citizenship on him, a stranger and 1 In Cicero's De Re Publico . 102 FRAGMENTS a Phoenician ; is it likely then that I was so boorish, and so heedless of Aristotle, whom I had taken as my master both in life and in philosophy, as to think all honour, no matter from whom or on what ground, a thankless and mercenary object for a good man? Do I not remember the grounds on which Aristotle distinguishes vanity from true pride ? In dis- tinguishing them,1 he says somewhere that with regard to great honours, as with regard to all other things that are called good, there is an immoderate care for them, but also a moderate and reasonable care. He adds that the man who is purled up and raises his eyebrows at the noisy applause given him by the mob because he has spent much on theatres or horse-races for their entertainment is a vain fellow, and is afflicted with the vice to which Aristotle gives the name of vanity ; while the man who despises the applause and thinks it little better than the noise of waves beating on the shore, but values more than anything else the approval without flattery which good men bestow on virtue, he is truly great- hearted and high-minded. 1 Reading in R. 89. 22 biopl^v. LOGICAL WORKS TESTIMONIA Alex, in Top. 5. 17-19. Of this so-called dialectic Aristotle has treated both in other books and particularly in these, which are called Topics. Ibid. 27. 11. Perhaps he would apply the phrase 'mental gymnastic' to a discussion which probes both sides of a question. This type of discussion was not unusual with the ancients. . . . 14-18. They put forward a thesis, and practised on it their1 inventiveness in argument, establishing and re- futing2 the thesis by probable arguments. There are books both of Aristotle and of Theophrastus containing such argu- ments from probable premisses to opposite conclusions. Cf. Elias in Cat. 133. 9-17. Theon, Prog. 2, p. 165. Examples of training in theses may be got both from Aristotle and from Theophrastus; there are many books of theses bearing their names. 1 Reading in R. 105. 8 o.vtu>v, with Wallies. 2 Reading in R. 105. 9 KaraoKevd^ovTes re kcli dvaoKevd^ovres, with the MSS. ON PROBLEMS I (R1 IO9, R2 112) Alex, in Top. 62. 30. One might consider in which class of problems one should include such problems as 'Why does the magnetic stone attract iron? ', or 'What is the nature of prophetic waters ? ' These do not seem to fall under any of the recognized kinds. Is it that these are not dialectical problems at all, such as those which we are discussing and whose kinds we are distinguishing? ... 63. n-19. Are these not physical problems, as Aristotle has said in his work On Problems} Physical phenomena whose causes are unknown constitute physical problems. Still, there are dialectical problems even about physical matters, as there are about ethical and logical matters ; those of one kind are dialectical, those of another physical. All dialectical problems will be reducible to the inquiry whether the connexion of an attri- bute with a thing is a fact, and the inquiry whether a thing exists, which are two of the four questions enumerated at the beginning of the second book of the Posterior Analytics ;* for the questions 'What is the reason of a connexion ?' and 'What is the nature of a thing?' are not dialectical problems. 1 Ch". 1. DIVISIONS i (r2 iio, r3 113) Alex, in Top. 242. 1-9. 'Moreover, what is itself nobler and more precious and praisewortrry is more desirable than what is less so.' Aristotle here uses the phrases 'nobler', 'more precious', 'more praiseworthy' in a wide sense. In the division of goods he reserves the word ' precious ' for the more primary good things, such as gods, ancestors, happiness, the words 'noble' and 'praiseworthy' for the virtues and vir- tuous activities, the word 'capacities' for those things which may be used well or ill, the word ' useful ' for what produces these same goods or contributes towards them. But here he seems to apply the words 'noble', 'praiseworthy', and ' precious ' even to things that are good as capacities. 2 (R2 III, R3 114) Diog. Laert. 3. 80 (45). Plato, according to Aristotle, used to divide things in this way: of goods some are in the soul, some in the body, some external. For example, justice, wisdom, courage, temperance, and the like are in the soul, beauty, good condition, health, and strength in the body ; friends, the happiness of one's country, and wealth fall among external goods. . . . 107 (74). Of existing things some exist in their own right, others are relative. . . . 109 (74). It was thus that, according to Aristotle, Plato classified primary things as well. 3 (r2 112, R3 115) Cod. Marc. 257, f. 250. Aristotle's Divisions. The soul is divided into three elements. 4 Simp, in Cat. 65. 4. In the Divisions . . . 7-8 after putting forward the categories he adds: 'I mean these with their cases' (i.e. inflexions). DISSERTATIONS I (R2 113, R3 116) Simp, in Cat. 64. 18-65. I0- But why, say the followers of Lucius, did he omit the conjunctions, if these too are signifi- cant utterances ? . . . They also ask where the articles are to be placed. The same account must be given of these. These words also are, as it were, conjunctions which in addition indicate indefinitely the male and the female sexes ; for they do not show the essence of anything — which is why some people call them indefinite. But where are negations, priva- tions, and the various inflexions of verbs to be placed ? This question Aristotle himself answered in his Dissertations. For both in his works on method, in his Dissertations, in his Divisions, and in another dissertation called Fallacies de- pending on Language (which, even if it is thought by some not to be a genuine work of Aristotle, is at all events the work of some member of the school) — in all of these, after putting forward1 the categories, he adds, ' I mean these with their cases' (i.e. inflexions), thus connecting the theory of them with that of negations, privations, and indefinite terms. Dexippus, in Cat. 33. 8-13. But where, they say, are nega- tions, privations, and indefinite terms, and the inflexions answering to each category, to be placed ? Aristotle himself dealt better with this matter in his Dissertations ; he put for- ward the categories, with their 'cases' and with negations and indefinite terms, and thus connected together the theory of all these things ; by cases he meant inflexions. 1 Reading in R. 108. 3 npodels, with Kalbfleisch. CATEGORIES TESTIMONIA Ps.-Amm. in Cat. (Ven. 1546), f. 13 a. Indeed, they say that in the Great Library there have been found forty books of Analytics and two of Categories; it was judged by the com- mentators that of the Categories this one was a genuine work of Aristotle. . . . This judgement was based on the thoughts expressed, on the language, and on the fact that the Philo- sopher has in his other treatises always mentioned this book. Cf. Elias, in Cat. 133. 9-17. I (r2 114, R3 117) Simp, in Cat. 18. 16-21. Adrastus, in his work on the order of Aristotle's treatises, relates that another book of Categories is referred to as being by Aristotle — itself short and concise in its language and differing little from the other Categories, but starting with the words ' Of existing things, some are. He records that both versions had the same number of lines, so that he used the word 'short' with reference to the style, implying that each of the proofs was set out concisely. . Ammon. in Cat. 13. 20-25. It should be known that in the old libraries forty books of Analytics have been found, but only two of Categories. One began1 'Of existing things, some are called homonymous, others synonymous'. The other, which we now have lying before us, had this introduction : ' Those things are called homonymous which have only their names in common, their definitions being different.'2 This version has been preferred as being superior in order and in matter, and as everywhere proclaiming Aristotle as its begetter. 1 Omitting ttjv . . . fani in R. 108. 28, with Busse. 2 This is almost identical with the beginning of the Categories which have come down to us. 108 FRAGMENTS Cf. Ps.-Ammon. in Cat. (Ven. 1546), f. 17 a, and Schol. in Arist. Cat. 33b25-33 (Brandis). Boeth. in Cat. 1. p. 161 d-162 a (Migne). The book is the work of Aristotle and of no other, since in his whole philosophy he consistently maintains the doctrine of this work, and its brevity and subtlety are not unworthy of Aristotle . . . though there exists another work of Aristotle discussing the same topics, containing much the same comments, while differently expressed. But this book has been generally regarded as the authentic one. ON CONTRARIES TESTIMONIA Arist. Metaph. ioo3b33-ioo4a2. There must be exactly as many species of being as of unity. To investigate the nature of these is the work of a science that is generically one — I mean, for instance, the discussion of the same, the similar, and the other concepts of this sort ; and nearly all contraries may be referred to this origin ; let us take them as having been investigated in the Selection of Contraries. Ibid. io54a2o,-32. To the One belong (as we indicated graphi- cally in our distinction of the contraries) the same, the like, and the equal, and to plurality belong the other, the unlike, and the unequal. Alex, in Metaph. 250. 17-19: see p. 122 infra. Syr. in Metaph. 61. 12-17. The same, the like, the equal, the straight, and in general the terms on the better side of the list of cognates, are differentiae and as it were species of the One, as the terms on the worse side belong to the Many. The Philosopher himself treated of the subject separately, making a selection of all contraries and classing some under the One, others under the Many. Cf. Asc. in Metaph. 237. 11-13 (p. 122 infra). Simp, in Cat. 382. 7-10. Aristotle seems to have taken what he says about contraries from the Archytean book entitled On Contraries, which he did not group with his discussion of genera, but thought worthy of a separate treatise. Ibid. 407. 15. Now that Aristotle's account of the difference between opposites has been completed, it would be well to quote Archytas' discussion of them .... 19-20. For anyone no FRAGMENTS who had examined Aristotle's book On Contraries could not have neglected Archytas' book. I (R2 115, R3 118) Simp, in Cat. 387. 17. But now that the language of Aristotle has been clarified, let us see what the more famous inter- preters make of the passage. The Stoics pride themselves on their working out of logical problems, and in the matter of contraries, as well as in all other matters, they are anxious to show that Aristotle furnished the starting-point for every- thing in one book which he called On Opposites, in which, too, there is an immense number of problems set forth ; of which they have set out a small portion. The others of these it would not be reasonable to include in an introduction, but those which the Stoics set out in agreement with Aristotle must be mentioned. Aristotle laid down an ancient definition of contraries, which we have mentioned previously, viz. that they are the things which differ most from one another within a genus ; but in his work on opposites Aristotle sub- jected this definition to all manner of tests, and amended it. He raised the question whether things that differ1 are contraries, and whether difference can be contrariety, and whether2 complete divergence is maximum difference, and whether the things that are farthest apart are identical with those that differ most, and what distance is3 and how we are to understand maximum distance. These difficulties having been observed, something (he maintained) must be added to the phrase 'the genus', so that the definition comes to be 'the things that are farthest apart in the same genus'. He pointed out the difficulties consequent on this ; he asked whether contrariety is otherness,4 and whether the things that are most different are contraries, and added many other criticisms. . . . 388. 13-14. This is but a small part of the difficulties raised by Aristotle in his work on contrarieties. 1 Omitting the second k with Diels. 4 i.e. Aristotle. ON THE PYTHAGOREANS 135 at Metapontum and at Croton ; and at Olympia, during the games, he got up in the theatre and showed that one of his thighs was golden. The same writer says that while crossing the Cosas he was hailed by the river, and that many people heard him so hailed. Ibid. 4. 17. Pythagoras used to tell people that he was born of more than mortal seed; for on the same day and at the same hour he was seen (they say)1 at Metapontum and at Croton ; and at Olympia he showed that one of his thighs was golden. He informed Myllias of Croton that he was Midas the Phrygian, the son of Gordius. He fondled the white eagle, which made no resistance. While crossing the river Cosas he was addressed by the river, which said ' Hail, Pythagoras ! ' Diog. Laert. 8. 1. 11 (9). He is said to have been very dignified in his bearing, and his disciples held that he was Apollo, and came from the men of the north. There is a story that once, when he was stripped, his thigh was seen to be golden ; and there were many who said that the river Nessus had hailed him as he was crossing it. Iamb. V.P. 28. 140-3. The Pythagoreans derive their con- fidence in their views from the fact that the first to express them2 was no ordinary man, but God.3 One of their traditions relates to the question 'Who art thou, Pythagoras? '4; they say he is the Hyperborean Apollo. This is supposed to be evidenced by two facts: when he got up during the games he showed a thigh of gold, and when he entertained Abaris the Hyperborean he stole from him the arrow by which he was guided. Abaris is said to have come from the Hyper- boreans collecting money for the temple and prophesying pestilence ; he lived in the sacred shrines and was never seen to drink or eat anything ; it is said, too, that in Lacedaemon 1 Reading in R. 154. 17 tf>aal, suggested by Rose. 2 Reading in R. 155. 3 avra, with Kiessling. 3 Reading in R. 155. 4 d\X' 6 deos, with the MSS. 4 Reading in R. 155. 5 rls el, IJvOayopa ; with Deubner. i36 FRAGMENTS he offered preventive sacrifices, and that for this reason there was never again a plague in Lacedaemon. From this Abaris Pythagoras took the golden arrow without which he could not find his way, and so made Abaris witness to his power. At Metapontum, when certain people prayed that they might receive the cargo of the ship that was sailing thither, he said, ' Then you will have1 a dead man ' ; and the ship was found to carry a corpse. At Sybaris he seized and dis- patched the serpent that had killed the hare, and similarly the little serpent in Tyrrhenia which killed by biting.2 At Croton (they say) he caressed the white eagle, which made no resistance. When someone wanted to hear him speak, he said he would never speak until a sign had appeared ; and after that the white bear appeared in Caulonia. In speech with someone who was about to announce to him the death of his son,3 he announced it first himself. He told Myllias of Croton that he was Midas the son of Gordius ; and Myllias went off to the mainland to do over Midas' tomb what Pythagoras had bidden. They say, too, that the man who bought his house and destroyed it dared tell no one what he had seen, and for this crime was convicted at Croton of sacrilege and put to death; he was found guilty of seizing the golden beard which fell from Pythagoras' statue. These things and others like them are what the Pythagoreans say in confirmation of their belief. Cf. Porph. V.P. 23-28. 2 (R2 187, R3 192) Iamb. V.P. 6. 30. Besides, they numbered Pythagoras among the gods, as a good spirit and a great friend to men ; some of them identified him with the Pythian, some with the Hyper- borean, some with the Paean Apollo, and others with one of the spirits that inhabit the moon. ... 31. Aristotle relates in his work on the Pythagorean philosophy that the following 1 Reading in R. 155. 17 Iotcu. 2 Reading in R. 155. 21 5(f>iv 6? dW^Teu'e, with the MSS. 3 Reading in R. 156. 2 aiirw rov rov vlov Bavarov, with Cobet. ON THE PYTHAGOREANS 137 division was preserved by the Pythagoreans as one of their greatest secrets — that there are three kinds of rational living creatures — gods, men, and beings like Pythagoras. 3 (R* 188, R3 I93) Apul. De Deo Soc. 20. 166-7. I believe that most of you are reluctant to believe what I have just said, and marvel greatly at Socrates' having had a vision of a divine being. But I suppose Aristotle is a sufficient witness to the fact that the Pythagoreans marvelled at any town-bred person who said he had never seen a divine being. Now if anyone can have the power of seeing a divine apparition, why should not such a power have fallen to the lot of Socrates, above all others ? Clem. Al. Strom. 6. 6. 53. 2-3. Isidorus the son and pupil of Basilides, in the first book of his commentary on the prophet Parchor, says himself in so many words: 'The Athenians say certain things were disclosed to Socrates by a divine being which accompanied him; and Aristotle says all men have divine beings which accompany them at the time of their incarnation;' this prophetic teaching he received and set down in his books, without confessing whence he had stolen this account. 4 (R2 189, R3 194) Gell. 4. 11. 11-13. Plutarch also, a scholar of great authority, says in the first of his books on Homer that the philosopher Aristotle had in his writings made the same statement about the Pythagoreans, that they did not abstain from eating animals, except for a few kinds of flesh. Since the fact is not generally recognized, I add Plutarch's own words: 'Aristotle says the Pythagoreans abstain from eating womb and heart, the sea anemone, and certain other such things, but use all other kinds. The sea anemone is a marine animal which is called the nettle.' Porph. V.P. 45. Pythagoras advised his followers to abstain 138 FRAGMENTS from other things as well, such as womb, the red mullet, the sea anemone, and indeed almost all other sea creatures. Diog. Laert. 8. i. 19 (18). Above all, he forbade them to eat erythinus and black-tail ; they must also abstain from eating heart or beans ; and Aristotle says that at times they must abstain from eating womb or red mullet. 5 (R2 190, R3 195) Diog. Laert. 8. 1. 33 (19). The Pythagoreans say we should not pay equal honour to gods and to heroes, but to the gods at all times, keeping a guard on our lips, in white raiment and with pure bodies, and to the heroes only from midday onwards. The purity is to be achieved by cleansing rites, by baths, by lustral water, by having no stain from funeral rites, from childbirth,1 or from any infection, and by absten- tion from meat that has been nibbled at or has died by disease, and from red mullets, black-tails, eggs and oviparous animals, beans, and the other things that are forbidden to those who perform the sacred rites in temples. Aristotle says, in his work On the Pythagoreans,2 that Pythagoras enjoined abstention from beans either because they are like the privy parts, or because they are like the gates of Hades (for this is the only plant that has no joints), or because they are destructive, or because they are like the nature of the uni- verse, or because they are oligarchical (being used in the choice of rulers by lot). Things that fall from the table they were told not to pick up — to accustom them to eating with moderation, or because such things marked the death of someone. . . . They must not touch a white cock, because this animal is sacred to Lunus and is a suppliant, and suppli- cation is a good thing. The cock was sacred to Lunus because it announces the hours ; also, white is of the nature of the good, black of the nature of the bad.3 They were not to touch 1 Reading in R. 158. 8 after k-qSovs the words /cat Ae'^ouy, omitted by Rose. 2 Reading in R. 158. 13 after HpioTOTeXrjs the words «V tu> nepl twv Tlvda- yopelcov, with some MSS. and Diels. 3 Reading in R. 158. 21-24 xal to fj.cv Xcvkov . . . KaKov before tuiv IxQvwv . . . oovXois, with Diels. ON THE PYTHAGOREANS 139 any fish that was sacred, since it was not right that the same dishes should be served to gods and to men, any more than they should to freemen and to slaves. They must not break the loaf (because in old times friends met over a single loaf, as barbarians do to this day) , nor must they divide the loaf which brings them together. Others explain the rule by reference to the judgement in Hades ; others say that dividing the loaf would produce cowardice in war; others explain that it is from the loaf that the universe starts. ... 36. These things Alexander says he found in the Pythagorean commentaries; Aristotle records the practices akin to these. 6 (r2 191, R3 196) Porph. V.P. 41. Pythagoras said certain things in a mystical and symbolic way, and Aristotle has recorded most of these ; e.g. that he called the sea the tear of Cronos, the Bears1 the hands of Rhea, the Pleiades the lyre of the Muses, the planets the dogs of Persephone ; the ringing sound of bronze when struck was, he said, the voice of a divine being imprisoned in the bronze. Aelian, V.H. 4.17. The origin of earthquakes was, Pytha- goras said, nothing but a concourse of the dead ; the rainbow was the gleam of the sun, and the echo that often strikes on our ears was the voice of mightier beings. 7 (R2 192, R3 197) Porph. V.P. 42. There was also another kind of symbol, illustrated by what follows: 'Step not over a balance', i.e. be not covetous : ' Poke not the fire with a sword ', i.e. do not vex with sharp words a man swollen with anger ; ' Pluck not the crown', i.e. offend not against the laws, which are the crowns of cities. Or again, 'Eat not heart', i.e. vex not your- self with grief: 'Sit not on the corn ration', i.e. live not in idleness; 'When on a journey, turn not back', i.e. when you are dying, cling not to this life; 'Walk not the highway', 1 Ursa Major and Minor. i4o FRAGMENTS i.e. follow not the opinions of the many but pursue those of the few and educated ; ' Receive not swallows in your house ', i.e. do not make housemates of talkative men of uncontrolled tongue ; ' Add to the burdens of the burdened, lighten them not', i.e. contribute to no man's sloth, to every man's excel- lence ; 'Carry not images of the gods in your rings', i.e. make not your thought and speech about the gods manifest and obvious, nor lay it open to many; 'Make your libations to the gods at the handle of the cup', i.e. honour and celebrate the gods with music ; for this rings through the handle. Jerome, Adv. Libros Rufini 3. 39. To the Pythagoreans also belong such sayings as ' Friends have evetything in common ' . . . and those riddles which Aristotle recounts with care in his books : ' Leap not over a balance ', i.e. go not beyond what is just ; ' Poke not fire with a sword', i.e. vex not with abusive words a mind swollen with anger; 'Never pluck a crown', i.e. preserve the laws of your cities ; ' Eat not heart ', i.e. cast sadness from your mind; 'When you have started out, return not', i.e. desire not life itself after death; 'Walk not on the highway', i.e. follow not the errors of the multitude; 'Take no swallow into your house', i.e. have not as house- mates garrulous and talkative men ; ' Place more burdens on the burdened, help not those who lay burdens down',1 i.e. encourage those who press on to virtue, abandon those who give themselves to ease. 8 (r2 193, R3 198) Mart. Cap. 7. 131 (Philosophy speaks). 'Although Aristotle, one of my followers, reasoning from the fact that the unit itself is one alone and wishes to be always sought after, asserts that it is called Desire because it desires itself, since it has nothing beyond itself and, never carried beyond itself or linked with other things, turns its own ardours on itself.' 9 (R2 194, R3 199) Theo. Sm. Math, p. 21. 20 (Hiller). The first division of numbers they recognize is into two kinds, even and odd. ... 24. Some 1 Reading in R. 160. 25 superponendum onus, deponentibus. ON THE PYTHAGOREANS 141 said 1 was the first odd number. ... 22. 5-9. But Aristotle in his work On the Pythagoreans says that the One partakes of the nature of both kinds ; for added to an even number it makes an odd, and added to an odd an even, which it could not have done if it had not shared in both natures ; and that for this reason the One was called even-odd. 10 (R2 195, R3 200) Simp, in De Cael. 386. 9. The Pythagoreans reduced all anti- theses to two lists of opposites, the one worse, the other better — the list of goods and the list of evils. They rounded off each list symbolically by the decad, as being the complete number, and they took each of the ten antitheses as revealing all its congeners within itself. Of the local positions they took the right and the left . . . 19-23 and explained the other local opposites in the light of these. Right, above, and before they called good, and left, below, and behind evil, as Aristotle himself related in his collection of Pythagorean tenets. 11 (R2 196, R3 20l) Stob. 1. 18. ic (Wachsmuth and Hense). In the first book of his work on the philosophy of Pythagoras Aristotle writes that the heaven was one, and that time and breath and the void, which divides for ever the regions of different things, were drawn in from the infinite. 12 (R2 197, R3 202) Alex. Aphr. in Metaph. 75. 15-17. Of the arrangement in the heavens which the Pythagoreans assigned to the numbers, Aristotle informs us in the second book of his work on the doctrine of the Pythagoreans. 13 (R2 198, R3 203) Alex. Aphr. in Metaph. 38. 8. Aristotle has shown what are the likenesses that the Pythagoreans believed in between numbers and the things that exist and come into being; assuming that reciprocity or equality is a property of justice 142 FRAGMENTS and finding it to exist in numbers, they said, for this reason, that justice is the first square number; for in every case the first of a number of things that admit of the same definition is most truly that which it is said to be. Now this number some declared to be the number 4, because, being the first square number, it is divided into equals and is itself equal (being twice 2), while others declared it to be the number 9, which is the first square number produced by multiplying an odd number (3) by itself. Again, they said the number 7 was opportunity ; for natural things seem to have their per- fect seasons of birth and completion in terms of sevens, as in the case of man. Men are born after seven months, they begin to grow their teeth in seven months, they reach puberty about the end of the second set of seven years, and grow beards about the end of the third. The sun, too, since it is itself thought to be (as he says) the cause of seasons, they maintain to be established where resides the number 7, which they identify with season; for the sun holds the seventh place among the ten bodies that move round the earth or hearth of the universe; it moves after the sphere of the unwandering stars and the five spheres of the planets ; after it come the moon, eighth, and the earth, ninth, and after the earth the counter-earth. Since the number 7 neither generates nor is generated by any of the numbers in the decad, they identified it with Athene. For the number 2 generates 4, 3 generates 9, and 6, 4 generates 8, and 5 generates 10, and 4, 6, 8, 9, and 10 are also themselves generated, but 7 neither generates any number nor is gener- ated from any ; and so too Athene was motherless and ever- virgin. Marriage, they said, was the number 5, because it is the union of male and female, and according to them the odd is male and the even female, and 5 is the first number generated from the first even number, 2, and the first odd number, 3 ; for the odd is for them (as I said) male, and the even female. Reason (which was the name they gave to soul) and substance they identified with the One. Because it was unchanging, alike everywhere, and a ruling principle they called reason a unit, or one ; but they also applied these names to substance, because it is primary. Opinion they ON THE PYTHAGOREANS 143 identified with the number 2 because it can move in two directions; they also called it movement and epithesis.1 Picking out such likenesses between things and numbers, they assumed numbers to be the first principles of things, saying that all things are composed of numbers. But they also saw the concordant intervals to be con- stituted according to particular numbers, and said that numbers were the first principles of these also ; the octave depends on the ratio 2:1, the frfth on the ratio 3:2, the fourth on the ratio 4:3. They said, too, that the whole universe is constructed in accordance with a certain harmony . . . 39. 24-41. 15 because it consists of numbers and is con- structed in accordance with number and harmony. For the bodies that move round the centre of the universe have their distances in a certain ratio, and some move faster and others slower, and in their movement the slower strike a deep note and the faster a high one, and these notes, being propor- tionate to the distances, make the resultant sound har- monious ; and since they said number was the origin of this harmony, they naturally made number the first principle of the heavens and of the universe. For they thought the sun to be, say, twice as far from the earth as the moon, Venus to be three times as far, Mercury four times, and each of the other heavenly bodies to be in a certain ratio, and the move- ment of the heavens to be harmonious, and the bodies that move the greatest distance to move the fastest, those that move the least distance the slowest, and the intermediate bodies to move in proportion to the greatness of their circuit. On the basis of these likenesses between things and numbers, they supposed existing things both to be composed of num- bers and to be numbers. Thinking numbers to be prior to nature as a whole and to natural things (for nothing could either exist or be known at all without number, while numbers could be known even apart from other things), they laid it down that the elements and first principles of numbers are the first principles of all things. These principles were, as has been said, the even and the odd, of which they thought the odd to be limited and 1 sc. the addition of 1 to 1. i44 FRAGMENTS the even unlimited ; of numbers they thought the unit was the first principle, composed of the even and the odd; for the unit was at the same time even-odd, which he1 used to prove from its power of generating both odd and even number ; added to an even it generates an odd, added to an odd it generates an even. As regards the agreements which they found between num- bers and concordant combinations on the one hand, and on the other hand the attributes and parts of the heavens, they took these for granted straight off, as being obvious, and inferred that the heavens are composed of numbers and dis- play a concord. If any of the heavenly phenomena seemed to fail to conform with numerical principles, they made the necessary additions themselves and tried to fill the gap so as to make their whole treatment of the matter self-consis- tent. Treating the decad straight off as the perfect number, and seeing that in the visible world the moving spheres are nine in number — seven spheres of the planets, the eighth that of the unwandering stars, the ninth the earth (for this, too, they thought, moves in a circle about the resting hearth of the universe, which according to them is fire) — they added, in their system, a counter-earth, which they supposed to move in a direction opposite to that of the earth's movement, and to be for that reason invisible to those on earth. Aristotle speaks of these matters both in the De Caelo2 and, with greater precision, in his collection of Pythagorean doc- trines. They made out the arrangement of those bodies to be harmonious by assuming that the ten moving bodies of which the universe consists are at harmonic distances from each other, and move in proportion to their distances (as Aristotle has said before), some faster, others slower, and that, as they move, the slower moving sound deeper notes and the faster moving higher notes, and that by the harmonious propor- tions between these a harmonious note is produced, which, however, we do not hear because we have grown up with it from childhood. He has spoken of this also in the De Caelo, and shown there that it is not true. That the even is for them the indefinite and the odd the definite, and that these are 1 Pythagoras. 2 Omitting fiev in R. 162. 19, with Hayduck. ON THE PYTHAGOREANS 145 the generating principles of the unit (for it is by derivation from them that it is even-odd), and indeed of all number (since the units in turn are the generating principles of the numbers), and that the whole heavens, i.e. everything that is in the heavens, in other words all existing things, are number— this he says here, but he has spoken of the subject more fully in those other places. 14 (r2 199, R3 204) Simp, in De Caelo 511. 25. The Pythagoreans oppose this view ; for this is what ' contrariwise ' means ; they do not say that the earth is at the centre, but that in the centre of the universe there is fire, and that about the centre the counter- earth moves, being itself an earth but called a counter-earth because it is on the opposite side to our earth. 'After the counter-earth came our earth, itself also moving round the centre, and after the earth the moon ; ' so Aristotle relates in his work on the Pythagorean doctrines.1 . . . 512. 12-14. For this reason some call fire the tower of Zeus, as Aristotle him- self related in his work on the Pythagoreans, while others call it the stronghold of Zeus (so Aristotle says here), or the throne of Zeus (as other authors relate). Cf. Procl. in Eucl. p. 90. 14 (Friedlein). The Pythagoreans thought fit to call the pole the seal of Rhea . . . 17-18 and the centre of the universe the stronghold of Zeus. Cf. Procl. in Tim. p. 61 c, Simp, in Phys. 1355. 8-9. 15 (R2 200, R3 205) Simp, in De Caelo, 392. 16-32. Aristotle says that the Pytha- goreans place us in the upper part and on the right side of the universe, and those opposite to us in the lower part and on the left side ; how can he say this if, as he himself relates in the second book of his collection of Pythagorean tenets, they say that one part of the whole universe is up and the other down, the lower part right and the upper left, and that 1 Reading in R. 163. 1 eV rat -nepl tv TIudayopiKcjv, with Karsten. 645.29 L 146 FRAGMENTS we are in the lower part ? Is it that he has used the words 'upper' and 'on the right' here not in accordance with his own view but with that of the Pythagoreans ? They coupled 'up' and 'before' with 'right', 'down' and 'behind' with 'left'. But Alexander thinks that the statement in Aristotle's collection of Pythagorean tenets has been altered by someone and should be that the upper part of the universe is on the right, the lower part on the left, and that we are in the upper part, not in the lower as the text now runs; in this way Aristotle's original statement would agree with what he says here, that we, who say we live in the lower part and therefore on the left side (since the lower part is coupled with the left side), are in opposition to the Pythagorean statement that we live in the upper part and on the right side. The suggested corruption of the text is very probable, since Aristotle knows that the Pythagoreans coupled the higher position with the right side, and the lower with the left. Them, in De Caelo, 96. 17-22. If, indeed, the Pythagoreans say the upper part is that which is on the right side — as appears from Aristotle's criticism of them in his book against the Pythagorean tenets, where he opposes those who con- tended that the higher region is on the right. 16 Stob. 1. 26. 3. Some of the Pythagoreans, according to Aristotle's account and the statement of Philippus of Opus, say that the eclipse of the moon is due to the interposition, sometimes of the earth, sometimes of the counter-earth. Of the younger members of the school there are some who thought it was due to distribution of the flame, which kindles gradually and regularly until it gives the complete light of full moon, and again diminishes correspondingly until the time of conjunction, when it is completely extinguished. ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARCHYTAS i (r3 206) Simp, in De Caelo, 296. 16-18. These things, then, Aristotle knows. For this reason, in his epitome of Plato's Timaeus he writes : ' He says the universe is a generated universe ; for he supposes that it is perceptible to sense, and that what is perceptible has been generated, and what intelligible has not been generated.' 2 (R2 201, R3 207) Damasc. Pr. 2. 172. 16-22 (Ruelle). It is better, therefore, to stick to his distinction, treating as 'other', in accordance with the Pythagorean custom and that of Plato himself, things that have matter in their being, and matter itself ; for this is how Plato uses the word 'other' in the Phaedo,1 saying that sensible forms are ' other and in things that are other'. Aristotle in his work on Archytas relates that Pytha- goras, too, called matter ' other ', as being in flux and always becoming different. So it is clear that Plato, too, defines in this way the things that are 'other'. 1 83 b. 645.29 L 2 ON DEMOCRITUS I (R2 202, R3 208) Simp, in De Caelo, 294. 23-295. 26. Alexander adds that those who say the universe is now in this state, now in that, are ascribing to it change of quality, not generation and destruction. 'Those who say the universe is generated and perishable like any other composite thing, must be ' (he says) ' the followers of Democritus. For as each other thing, accord- ing to them, comes into being and perishes, so does each of the numberless universes. And, as in the case of other things that which comes into being is not the same, except in kind, as that which has perished, so too (they say) is it with the universes.' Now if the atoms remain the same, being immune from alteration, clearly these thinkers also must be ascribing to the worlds change of quality and not destruction, as Empedocles and Heraclitus seem to do. A few words quoted from Aristotle On Democritus will reveal the line of thought of the Atomists: ' Democritus thinks the nature of the eternal entities con- sists of small substances infinite in number; as a place for them he supposes something else infinite in size, and to this he applies the names "void", "nothing", and "the infinite", while to each of the substances he applies the names " thing ", "solid",1 and "real". He thinks the substances are so small as to escape our senses, but have all sorts of shapes and figures, and differences of size. From these substances, as from elements, are generated and compounded visible and sensible masses. The substances are at variance and move in the void because of their dissimilarity and the other afore- said differences, and as they move they impinge on each other and are so completely interlocked that they touch one another or get near one another ; but a single substance is never in reality produced from them by this interlocking; for it would be very naif to suppose that two or more things 1 Reading in R. 166. 5 rw Sev nal tu> vaarco, with Heiberg. ON DEMOCRITUS 149 could ever become one. The fact that substances stay with one another for some time the Atomists ascribe to the bodies fitting into one another and catching hold of one another ; for some of them are scalene, others hook-shaped, others concave, others convex, and others have numberless other differences. He thinks they cling to one another and remain together until some stronger force arriving from the environ- ment shakes them asunder and separates them.' He ascribes the genesis and the separation opposed to it not only to animals but also to plants and to worlds, and comprehensively to all sensible bodies. If, then, genesis is combination of atoms, and destruction separation of them, then even according to Democritus ' genesis ' must be change of quality. Indeed, Empedocles, too, says that that which comes into being is not the same, except in kind, with that which has perished, and yet Alexander says that Empedocles assumes the existence of change of quality, not of coming into being. AUTHORS QUOTED (a) = not in Rose. (b) = not in Walzer. (c) = fuller quotation than Rose gives. Ael. V.H. 2. 26 . . 134 4- 17 • • • 135. 1 al-Dailami, cod. Tub. Weiswei- ler 81 (a) 26 Alex. Aph. in Metaph. 38. 8-41. 15 (c) 141 55. 20-57. 28 (c) . 117 59. 28-60. 2 . 122 75. 15-17 141 79- 3-83- 30 (c) 125 83- 34-89. 7 ip) 129 85. 16-18 119 97- 27-98. 24 132 117. 23-118. 1 (a, I ) ■ 83 250. 17-20 . 122 250. 17-19 (a) 109 262. 18-26 . 122 in Top. 5. 17-19 103 27. 11-18 103 62. 30-63. 19 104 149- 9-17 27 242. 1-9 105 apud Eliam in Cat. 115. 3-; i 5 apud Simp, in Phys. 454 19-455. 11 (a) . 119 al-Kindi, cod. Aya Sofia 4832, fol. 34! > («, b) 23 cod. Taimuriyye Falsafa 5' (a, b) 23 Amm. in Cat. 6. 25-7. 4 (c) 5 13. 20-25 107 Apollon. Mirab. 6 134 25 11 Apul. De Deo Soc. 20. 166-7 137 Arist. De An. 404bi6-24 [a, b) • 83 404bi6-2i (a) . 116 404bi8-2i (a) 1 Metaph. ioo3b33-ioo4a2 (a ) 109 i054a29-32 (a) 109 Ph. 194327-36 (a) 99 i94a35-36 (a) 1 209bn-i6 (0) • "5 Poe/. 1454W5-18 (a) • 1, ~z Aristox. Harm. 2. 30. 16-31. 3 (a) . 115 Asa in Metaph. 77. 2-4 (a) . 116 79. 7-10 (a) . 123 112. 16-19 (a, b) . 78 237- n-14 (a) 122 237. 11-13 (a) 109 247. 17-19 (a) 122 Ath. 6 d. . 63 34 b 13 40 c-d 9 44 d 11 178 e-f 8 335f 52 354C 64 429 c-d 13 429 f . 13 447 a-b 12 464 c-d M 496 f . 14 505 b-c 73 555 d-556 a 61 564 b . 25 641 b . 12 641 d-e 12 674 e-675 a 9 August. C. Jul. Pel. 4. 14. 72 (a) IOI 4- 15- 78 ■ 41 Trin. 14. 9. 12 . . 46 14. 19. 26 . 42 Basil, Ep. 135 5 Boeth. Consol. 3. 8 . 40 in Cat. 1. 161 d-162 a . 108 Censor, c. 18. 11 . 55 Chalc. in Tim. 208-9 (b, c) 53 Cic. Acad. 1. 7. 26 (a) • 98 Alt. 4. 16. 2 3 12. 40. 2 • 65 13. 19. 3-4 . 3 13. 28. 2 • 65 Brut. 31. 1 20-1 (a) . 2 AUTHORS » QUOTED 151 Cic. (cont.) Diog. Laert. {cont.) De Or. i. ii. 49 (a) . 1 2. 5- 46 75 3. 21. 80 (a) . 1 2- 6. 55 7 Div. ad Brut. 1. 25. 53 16 3- 37 (25) 74 1. 30. 63 {a) . 84 3- 48 (32) . . 73 Fam. 1. 9. 23 (a) 3 3- 80 (45) - 105 Fin. 2. 13. 39-4° 42 8. 1. 11 (9) • 135 2. 32. 106 53 8. 1. 19 (18) • 138 5. 4. 11 68 8. 1. 33-36 (19) - 138 5. 5. 12-14 («) 54 8. 2. 51-52 (1) 72 5- 5-12 2 8. 2. 57-58 (3) 72 Hortsnsius, fr. 35 55 8. 2. 57 (3) • 15 fr. 81 {a) 101 8. 2. 63 (9) 15 Inv. 2. 6 (a) 1 8. 2. 74 (11) 73 Lucullus 38. 119 (a) . 92 9-5-25 (4) 15 iV.D. 1. 13. 33 . 97 9- 8. 53 (4) . 64 1. 38. 107 80 9- 8. 54 (5) 15 2. 15. 42 93 9. 11. 81 11 2. 16. 44 93 Diog. Oen. fr. 4 col. 1.7 — co 2. 20. 51-2 . 55 2.8 . 4 2- 37- 95-6 • 85 Dox. Gr. 432. 4-8 (a) 94 Off. 2. 16. 56-7 57 Elias Q. Fr. 3. 5. 1 . 3,68 in Cat. 114. 15-115. 5 (c) 5 i?e/>. 3. 8. 12 . 100 114. 25-115. 12 17 Top. 1. 3 (0) . 2 124. 3-6 (a) . 6 Twse. 1. 10. 22 (a) 98 133- 9-17 • 103 1. 17. 41 (a, 6) 98 133- 9-17 («) 107 1. 26. 65-27. 66 (a) 98 in Porph. 3. 17-23 28 1. 39. 94 (a, 6) 40 Etymol. Magn. 722. 16-17 79 3. 28. 69 37 Eus. P.E. 14. 6. 9-10 (a) 4 4. 19. 43-20. 46 . 69 Gell. 3. 11. 7 77 5. 5. 12-14 (*) 54 4. 11. 11-13 . • 137 5. 10. 30 (a) . 54 Greg. Cor. Ad Hermog. c. 19 100 5. 13. 39 {a) . 54 Hist. Aug. 2. 97. 20-22. 27 5- 30. 85-31. 87 (a) 54 Horn. Opera, vol. 5. 244 77 5- 35- 101 53 247 77 Clem. Al. 251-2 . 77 Protr. 1. 7. 4 (a) 42 Iambi. Strom. 1. 14. 60. 3 79 Comm. Math. 26. 79. 1-81.7 30 1. 14. 61. 1 . 79 26. 83. 6-22 . 37 6. 6. 53. 2-3 . 137 My st. 1. 11 74 6. 18. 162. 5 (a, b) 29 3- 9 • 75 Clem. Rom. Recogn. 8. 15 (a, b 1 99 Protr. 6. 37. 3-22 (a) 29 Cod. Marc. 257, f. 250 . i°5 6. 37. 26-41. 5 3i Damasc. Pr. 2. 172. 16-22 147 7. 41. 15-43- 25 (a) 34 David, Proll. 9. 2-12 28 7- 43- 25-45- 3 («) ■ 36 Demetr. Eloc. 28 . 100 8- 45- 4-47- 4 38 Dexippus in Cat. 33. 8-13 106 8. 47. 5-21 . 39 Dio Chr. Or. 53. 1 3. 72 8. 47. 21-48. 9 41 Diog. Laert. 1 Prooem. 8 (6) 79 8. 48. 9-21 . 42 2- 5- 23 (7) • 78 9- 49- 3-52- 16 (a) . 43 2. 5. 26 (10) . 60 9. 52. 16-54. 5 46 152 AUTHORS QUOTED Iambi. — Protr. (cont.) 10. 54. 10-56. 12 (a) 11. 56. 13-59- 18 (a) 12. 59. 19-60. 15 (a) V.P. 6. 30-31 . 28. 140-3 Jerome, Adv. Libros Rufini 3 39 • Lact. Epit. 55 . 7ms/. 2. 10. 24 (a, b) . 3. 16 . 5- 15 • Macr. 5. 18. 16-19 7- 3-23 Mart. Cap. 5. 44 {b) 7- 131 Michael Psellus, Sckol. ad Joh Climacum 6. 171 (a) Nemes. De Nat. Horn. ch. 34 (a, b) Nonius 394. 26-28 Olymp. in Ale. p. 144 . in Phd. 26. 22-27. 4 173. 20-30 . 180. 22-23 (a» £>) 200. 3-6 239. 19-21 • Pap. Here. 1020 (a) Pap. Oxyrrh. 666 Philo, Aet. Mundi 3. 10-11 5. 20-24 6. 28-27. 34 . 8. 39-43 Leg. Alleg. 3. 32. 97-99 De Plant. 34. 141-40. 166 De Praem. et Poen. 7. 40-46 De Spec. Leg. 1. 35. 185-36 194 . Philod. De Ira, p. 65. 31-66. 2 Pap. Here. 3, p. 41, col. 21: (a) . " . Piet. 7b4-8 {a, b) Voll. Rhet. 2. 175 fr. 15. 1-6 («) . Philop. in D» An. 75. 34-76. 1 {a, b) 75- 34-76. 1 47 49 52 136 135 140 101 93 29 101 75 8 27 140 87 94 27 28 94 21 94 94 94 7i 29 88 89 90 91 86 9 87 87 70 57 78 7i 84 116 Philop. — in De An. (cont.) 141. 22-147. 10 186. 14-16 . in Nicom. Isagogen, 1. (a, b) in Ph. 515. 29-32 (a in Ph. 521. 9-15 (a) Pliny, N.H. 30. 3 (a) Plu. Aristid. 27. 2 Dion 22. 3 Mor. 115 b-e 329 b . 370 c (a) 382 d-e (a, b) 447 f-448 a (a) 477 c-f (a) • 503 e-504 b . 527 a . 612 d-e 650 a . 651 f-652 a (a) 733 c (6) 734 d • 760 e-761 b . 761 d-e 90S f (a, b) . 1040 e . 1 1 1 5 b-c (a) . 1115 b-c 1118 c . 1 1 38 c-1140 b Pel. 3. 1 18. 4 . Porph. apud Stob. 3. 21. 26 . in De Int. apud Boeth De Int. 1. 1. p. 27 V.P. 23-28 41 42 45 Prise. Lydus. 41. 16-42 Procl. apud Philop. De Aet Mundi, 31. 17-32. 8 in End., 28. 13-22 . 90. 14-18 in Remp. 1. 42. 2-50. 26 2. 349. 13-26 in Tim. 61 c 33S c-d 19 80 80 116 115 79 60 16 18 67 80 22 4 87 11 57 8 13 14 22 64 25 25 94 101 82 4 78 95 57 25 78 101 136 139 139 137 78 82 34 145 74 17 145 17 AUTHORS Ps.-Alex. in Metaph. 615. 14- 17 (a) 642. 38-643. 3 (a) 695. 23-6 {a). 777. 16-21 (a, b) 836. 34-837- 3 Ps.-Amm. in Cat. 5 b 9b . 13 « («) 17 a. Ps.-Galen. PAi/. ff*s/. c. 35 (a, 6) Ps.-Jul. Ep. 391 b-c Ps. Plu. Vit. Horn. 3-4 Quint. Inst. 2. 17. 1-14 3- r. 13 10. 1. 83 (a) . Schol. in Aristoph. Pacem. 1. 772 in y4w. Pr., cod. Paris. 2064, fol. 263 a . in Ca/. 33b^5-33 in Dion. Thrac. 116. 13-16 in Proverb. Sal. cod. Pari: 174, fol. 46 a in Theocr. 3. 21 Sen. .Bra>. Vit. 1. 2 De 7m 1. 3. 3 1. 7. 1 . 1. 9. 2 . 1. 17. 1 3- 3- l ■ Q.N. 7. 30 Serv. in Aen. 6. 448 (a, b) Sext. Emp. Dogm. 1. 6-7 Geom. 57 . P/rys. 1. 20-23 . 1. 26-27 1. 412 . 2. 45-46 (a) Pyrr. 1. 84 Simp. in Cat. 4. 14-22 (a) 18. 16-21 64. 18-65. 10 65. 4-8 («) • 382. 7-10 (a) 387. 17-388. 14 388. 21-389. 10 389. 25-390. 7 390. 19-25 . 402. 26-403. 24 122 122 122 84 124 65 65. 67 107 108 94 12 76 7 7 3 («.*>) 12 28 108 124 88 9 4i 68 69 68 69 69 87 23 15 121 84 85 121 82 11 5 107 106 i°5 109 no in in 112 112 QUOTED Simp. — in Cat. (cont.) 407. 15-20 . 409. 15-410. 30 in De An. 28. 7-9 (a) 28. 7-9 53- i-4 221. 20-33 . in De Caelo 288. 31-289. 2 {a, b) 289. 1-15 294. 23-295. 26 296. 16-18 . 386. 9-23 392. 16-32 . 485. 19-22 . 511. 25-512. 14 in Ph. 151. 6-19 (c) 453- 25-454- J9 454- 19-455- « (a 503. 10-15 (a) 542. 9-12 (a) 545. 23-25 (a) 1355- 8-9 (a) Sophon. in DeAn. 25. 4-8 (a) Stob. 1. 18. ic 1. 26. 3 1. 43 (a) 3- 3- 25 4. 29 A 24 4. 29 A 25 4. 29C 52 4. 32. 21 Strabo 1. 4. 9, p. C 66 14. 5. 9, p. C672 (a) Suet. De Blasph. p. 416 Suidas, s.v. EvpvfiaTos ■ Synes. Calvit. Enc. 22. 85 c . Dio. 10. 48 a . Syr. iw Metaph. 61. 12-17 (a) 120. 33-I2i- 4 159- 33-l6°- 5 168. 33-35 • 195. 10-15 . Tac. Dial. 16. 7 (a) Tert. De /!«. 46 (a, b) . Them. in De An. 24. 13-25. 25 106. 29-107. 5 in De Caelo 96. 17-22 in Ph. 106. 21-23 ia) 153 109 113 83 116 21 22 5.78 87 148 147 141 145 58 145 119 120 119 116 116 116 145 22 141 146 94 29 59 59 61 27 67 53 100 100 80 87 109 124 82 68 124 55 55 21 16 146 "5 154 Them, (cont.) Or. 26 d-27 b 107 c-d 295 c-d 319 c . Theo. Sm. 21. 20-22. Theon, Prog. 2. 165 AUTHORS QUOTED Vit. Arist. Marc. 427. 3-7 72 IOI 43°- I5-43I- 2 65 66 433. 10-15 116 . 24 vulgo .... 72 5 Vitae Homeri in Homeri Opera, 140 ed. Allen, 5. 244, 247, ■ 103 251-2 77 ROSE'S NUMBERING OF FRAGMENTS Trans., Trans., Trans., R3 R2 P- i?3 R2 P- i?3 R2 P- I 4 78 54 . . 53 IO4 100 12 2 3 78 55 38 I05 218 12 3 5 78 56 86 57 IO6 IOI 12 4 6 79 57 89 29 IO7 102 13 5 7 79 58 46 IO8 103 13 6 8, 29 79 59 49 39 I09 104 13 7 9 80 60 36 41 IIO-II 105-6 14 8 10 82 61 48 42 112 109 104 9 11 82 62 5i 64 113 no 105 IO 12 84 63 52 64 114 III 105 ii 13 85 64 53 24 "5 112 105 12 14 85 65 54 15 116 "3 106 13 2 80 66 55 15 117 114 107 14 44 87 67 56 15 118 115 no 15 45 87 68 57 7 119 116 in 16 15 87 69 58 7 120 117 in 17 16 88 70 59 72 121 118 112 iS 17 88 7i 60 72 122-3 119-20 112 19 89 72 61 73 124 121 "3 20 90 73 62 74 139 133 7 21 9i 74 64 75 185 180 124 22 18 92 75 65 75 186 181 124 23-24 19-20 93 76 66 76 187 182 125 25 55 78 70 68 188 183 129 26 21 97 79 68 189 184 132 27 22 116 80 94-95 68 191 186 134 28 23 117 81 63 74 192 187 136 29 24 121 82 7i 100 193 188 137 30 25 122 83 72 63 194 189 137 31 26 122 84 73 100 195 190 138 37 32 16 85 74 IOI I96 191 139 38 33 16 86 75 IOI 197 192 139 39 33 17 87 76 IOI I98 193 140 40 34 17 88 IOI 199 194 140 41 35 17 89 87 57 200 195 141 42 37 94 90 77 52 20I 196 141 43 38 22 9i 82 59 202 197 141 44 40 18 92 83 59 203 198 141 45 41 19 93 84 60 204 199 145 46 42 22 94 85 61 205 200 145 47 43 95 96 9i 25 206 147 48 39 94 97 92 25 207 201 147 49 46 58 98 93 25 208 202 148 50 47 27 100 175 8 646 78 65 5i 50 27 IOI 108 9 647 79 66 52 30 102 98 9 648 80 67 53 1 37 103 99 11 658 81 67 BIBLIOGRAPHY Rose, V., Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus , 1863. , Aristotelis qui ferebantur Librorum Fragmenta [1870]. , Aristotelis qui ferebantur Librorum Fragmenta, 1886. Heitz, E., Aristotelis Fragmenta, 1872. Walzer, R., Aristotelis Dialogorum Fragmenta, 1934. Albeggiani, F., Aristotele e Epicuro, in Logos, 1937, 422-4. Bernays, J., Aus dem aristotelischen Dialog Eudemos, in Rhein. Mus., 1861, 236-46. , Die Dialoge des Aristoteles, 1863. Bidez, J., A propos d'un Fragment retrouve de l'Aristote perdu, in Bull, de la CI. des Lettres de V Acad. Roy. de Belgique, 1942, 201-30. , Hermias d'Atarnee, ibid., 1943, 133-46. , Un Singulier Naufrage litteraire dans I'antiquite, 1943. Bignone, E. Nuove ricerche e testimonianze sulla prima dottrina e sulle opere perdute di Aristotele attraverso gli scritti degli Epicurei, in Rivista di Filologia, 1933, 16-43, 155~7^>- , Nuove ricerche sulla formazione filosofica di Epicuro, in Atene e Roma, 1933, 13-62, and Annali delta R. Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa, 1933, 273-300, 333-58, and 1934, 289-330. , Alia riconquista dell' Aristotele perduto, in Giornale critico delta Filosofia italiana, 1934, 13-58. , La polemica di Epicuro in difesa dell' edonismo, contro le opere perdute di Aristotele e della scuola platonico-peripatetica, in Atene e Roma, 1934, 3-62, 129-61. , La formazione dell' etica Epicurea attraverso la polemica con il primo Aristotele e la scuola Platonico-Aristotelica, ibid., 1934, 217-31 1, and 1935, 3-52. , Una nuova meta nella riconquista dell' Aristotele perduto, in Civilta Moderna, 1935, 117 ff. , II Simposio di Aristotele e quello di Epicuro, in Atti del IV0 Congresso intern, di Papirologia, 1936, 123-58. , L' Aristotele perduto e la Formazione filosofica di Epicuro, 2 vols. [1936]. , Nuove testimonianze e frammenti del Prolrettico di Aristotele, in Riv. di Fit. Class., 1936, 225-37. , Chiarimenti e aggiunte all' Aristotele perduto, in Atene e Roma, 1937. 119-29- , Conferme ed aggiunte all' Aristotele perduto, in Ann. de I'Inst. de Phil., 1937, 87-116. , Importanti conferme all' Aristotele perduto, in Atene e Roma, 1937. 217-34. BIBLIOGRAPHY 157 Bignone, E., Aristotele e Diogene di Enoanda, ibid., 1938, 214-32. — - — , Postilla aristotelica sulla dottrina dell' endelecheia, ibid., 1940, 61-64. , Seneca, Marco Aurelio e il Protrettico di Aristotele, in Ann. d. Sc. Norm. Sup. di Pisa, 1940, 241-9. Bournot, W. Platonica Aristotelis Opuscula, Putbus, 1853. Bywater, I., On a lost dialogue of Aristotle [the Protrepticus], in Journal of Philol., 1869, 55-69. , Aristotle's dialogue On Philosophy , ibid., 1877, 64-87. Capone-Braga, G., Aristotele, Epicuro e Diogene di Enoanda, in Atene e Roma, 1940, 35-47. Cataudella, Q., Nuove ricerche sull' Anonimo di Giamblico e sulla composizione del Protrettico, in R. Accad. d. Linzei, Rendici cl. sc. mor., 1937-8, 182-210. Courcelle, P., Les Lettres grecques en Occident, de Macrobe a Cassio- dore, 1943. Diels, H., Ober die exoterischen Reden des Aristoteles, Ber. Berl. Akad., 1883, 477-94. , Zu Aristoteles' Protreptikos u. Cicero's Hortensius, in Archiv f. Gesch. d. Philos., 1888, 477-97. Dyroff, A., tiber Arist. Entwicklung, in Festgabefiir Georg v. Hertling, 1913- Ein arson, B., On a supposed pseudo-Aristotelian treatise on the soul, in Class. Philol., 1933, 129-30. , Aristotle's Protrepticus and the structure of the Epinomis, in Trans, of the Amer. Philos. Association, 1936, 261-85. Festugiere, A. J., L'Ideal religieux des Grecs et l'£vangile, 1932, 222-63. , La Revelation d'Hermes Trismegiste, 1949, ii. 219-59, 587-91 (on the De Philosophia). Gadamer, H. Der aristotelische Protreptikos u. d. entwicklungs- geschichtliche Betrachtung d. Arist. Ethik, in Hermes, 1928, 138-64. Garin, E., '.E^SeAeyeia e '.E^TeAeveia. nelle discussioni umanistiche, in Atene e Roma, 1937, 177-87. Guthrie, W. K. C, The Development of Aristotle's Theology, in Cl. Qu., 1933, 161-71. Harder, R., Ocellus Lucanus, 1926, pp. 22, 122-5. Hartlich, De exhortationibus a Graecis Romanisque scriptis histo- ria, in Leipz. Stud. z. klass. Philol., 1889, 236-72. Heitz, E., Die verlorenen Schriften des Aristoteles, 1865. Hirzel, R., Tiber den Protreptikos des Arist., in Hermes, 1876, 61-100. , Ueber Entelechie u. Endelechie, in Rhein. Mus., 1884, 169-208. Jaeger, W., Aristoteles: Grundlegung einer Geschichle seiner Entwick- lung, 1923. , trans, by R. Robinson, 1934, J948. 158 BIBLIOGRAPHY Jaeger, W., ! ' A-napyai, in Hermes, 1929, 22-23. Kail, A., De Aristotelis dialogis, qui inscribuntur De Philosophia et Eudemus, in Dissert. Philol. Vindob., 1913, 67-99. Karpp, H., Die Schrift des Aristoteles Llepl VSetuv, in Hermes, 1933, 384-91. Lazzati, G., L'Aristotele perduto e gli scrittori cristiani, in Pubbl. d. Univ. Catt., 1938. Mansion, S., Deux ecrits de jeunesse d'Aristote sur la doctrine des Idees, in Rev. Philos. de Louvain, 1950, 398-416. Mariotti, S., Un passo di Servio e VEudemo di Aristotele, in Studi ital. di Filol. CI., 1938, 83-85. , Cicerone e una fonte stoica dipendente da Aristotele, in Stud. ital. di Filol. CI., 1940, 73-76. , Nuove testimonianze ed echi dell' Aristotele giovanile, in Atene e Roma, 1940, 48-60. , La 'quinta essentia' nell' Aristotele perd. e nell. Accademia, in Riv. di Filol., 1940, 179-89. Mugnier, H., La The'orie du premier Moteur et revolution de la Pensee aristotelicienne, 1930. Needler, M. C, The Aristotelian Protrepticus and the developmen- tal treatment of the Aristotelian ethics, in Class. Phil., 1928, 280-4. Norsa, M., Un frammento di fisica aristotelica in uno papiro fioren- tino, in Annali della R. Scuola Normale Superior e di Pisa, 1938, 1-12. Oellacher, H., Griechische literarische papyri aus der Papyrus- sammlung Erzherzog Rainer in Wien, in Etudes de Papyrologie, 1937. 135-96. Orth, E., Ein neues aristotel. fragment, in Philol. Wochenschr., 1934, 589-90. Philippson, R., II IJepl '/Sewv di Aristotele, in Riv. di Filol., 1936, 13-25- , Diogene di Enoanda e Aristotele, ibid., 1938, 235-52. Pohlenz, M., Review of Walzer's Aristotelis Dialogorum Fragmenta, in Gott. Gelehrte Anzeiger, 1936, 514-31. Rostagni, A., II dialogo Ilepl TIoirjTcov, in Riv. di Fil., 1926, 433-70, and 1927, 145-73- , Qualche osservazioni supra un papiro estetico-letterario attribuito ad Aristotele, ibid., 1938, 295-7. Shorey, P., Les Idees de Platon et revolution d'Aristote, in Melanges Paul Thomas, 1930, 133-49. Von Arnim, H., Quellenstudien zu Philo von Alexandria, 1888, pp. 5-8. Von der Muhll, P., Isokrates u. d. Protreptikos des Aristoteles, in Philol., 1941, 259-65. Walzer, R., Un frammento nuovo di Aristotele, in Studi ital. di Filol. Class., 1937, 125-37- BIBLIOGRAPHY 159 Walzer, R., Fragmenta graeca in litteris arabicis, in Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1939, 407-22. Waszink, J. H., Traces of Aristotle's lost dialogues in Tertullian, in Vigiliae Christianae, 1947. — — , art. Aristoteles, in Reallexikon f. Antike u. Christentum, i. 657-64. Wilpert, P., Reste verlorener aristotelischer aristotelesschriften bei Alexander von Aphrodisias, in Hermes, 1940, 369-96. , P., Neue Fragmente aus IJepl Tdyadov, in Hermes, 1941, 225-50. , Zwei aristotelische Friihschriften iiber die Ideenlehre, 1949. Zurcher, J., Aristoteles' Wsrk u. Geist, 1952, pp. 21-31. INDEX Academy, x. Alexamenos, 73-74- Alexander the Great, ix, xi, 65, 67. Alexander, viii, ix, x, xi, 67. Anger, 6S-71. Antisthenes, xi. Archytas, 109-10, 147. Archytas, On the Philosophy of, 147. Aristotle's style, 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 92-93 ; open-mindedness, 4; attitude to Plato, 4. Art and nature, 43-46. Bignone, E., xii. Categories, 107-8. Cicero, viii, x, xii. Colonists, On, viii, ix. Contraries, On, 109-14. Corinthian dialogue, viii, 24. Delphi, 78-79. Democritus, On, 148-9. Deucalion, 81. Dialogues, Aristotle's, vii-xii, 1-6. Diogenes Laertius, vii, viii, xi. Dissertations, 106. Divisions, 105. Dreams, 55-56. Drinking and Drunkenness, 8-14. Drunkenness, On, vii, n. 7. Education, On, viii, ix, 64. Einarson, B., x. Empedocles, 15, 72-73. Eroticus, vii, ix, 25-26. Eudemus, 16. Eudemus, vii, n. 8, viii, ix, xi, xii, 16-23. Eudoxus, 132. Euripides, 75. Euthydemus, x, n. 1. Exoteric works, 5, 6. Fifth element [aKarovo^aaTov) , 98- 99- Forms, Platonic, 22. Good, On the, viii, xi, 115-23. Good Birth, On, vii, viii, ix, 59-62. Gorgias, x. Great year, 55. Gryllus, vii, 7. Gryllus, vii, ix, 7. Happiness, 54~55- Hermippus, vii. Hesychius, vii, viii, xi. Homer, 8-9, 72, 76-77, 84-85. Hortensius, viii, 27. Howald, E., vii. Ideal numbers, xi. Ideas, Platonic, xi, xii, 117, 124-33. Ideas, On, xi, xii, 124-33. Immortality, 16-18. Indefinite dyad, 1 17-21, 123. Isocrates, x. Jaeger, W., ix, xi, xii. Justice, On, vii, ix, 100-2. Kingship, On, viii, ix, x, xi, 65-66. Love, 25-26. Magi, 79-80. Magicus, xi. Mathematics, 30-31, 34. Melissus, 82. Menexenus, vii, ix. Metaphysics, xii. Music, 95-97- Mysteries, the, 87. Nerinthus, vii, viii, ix, 24. Numbers, n 7-19. One and indefinite dyad, 11 7-21, 123; One and Plurality, 122. Parmenides, 82. Parts of speech, 106. Phaedo, x, n. 1. Philosophy, 27-30, 33-34, 37. 52- Philosophy, On, vii, viii, ix, x, xi, xii, 78-99. Plato, ix, x, xi, 74, 82-84, 88, "5-33- l62 INDEX Pleasure, On, viii, ix, 63. Poets, On, vii, viii, ix, 72-77. Politic us, vii, viii, ix, x, 68-71. Prayer, On, vii, ix, 58. Privation, 1 12-13. Problems, On, 104. Protrepticus, vii, viii, ix, x, n. 1, xii, 27-56. Pseudo-Ammonius, xi. Pythagoras, 134-9. Pythagoreans and numbers, 117, 140-5 ; and cosmology, 145-6. Pythagoreans, On the, xii, 134-46. Religion, origin of, 84-87. Rhetoric, 1. Rhetoric, On, vii, 7. Rose, V., xi, xii. Sardanapallus, 52-53. Sophistes, vii, ix, 15. Soul and body, 17-22, 32, 34. Soul, On, vii, viii, 16-23. Stage-effect, 1. Strabo, xi. Suidas, xi. Symposium, vii, ix, 8-14. Themison, 27. 'Third man', 129. Von der Miihll, P., x. Walzer, R., xii. Wealth, On, vii, ix, 57. Wilpert, P., xi, xii. World, ungenerated and imperish- able, 88-93. Zoroaster, 79-S0. PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS OXFORD BY CHARLES BATEY PRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY